Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom

Episteme 4 (2):219-232 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Abstract Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the beliefforming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of selfmutilation. I discuss several variations of this strategy, interpreting “conspiracy theory” in different ways but conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PIGCTA
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,692 ( #1,412 of 51,448 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
254 ( #1,370 of 51,448 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.