Philosophy of Political Science

“You have an architect and a ditch-digger working together on a construction project. Who gets paid more, and why?” Does a tendency toward abstraction and quantification, a pretense of objectivity, obscure the character, situation and bias from which all economic and political theorems stem? Following the principle that arguments neither arise nor persist in a vacuum, that they live and die by their context and character, we can describe two sorts of response corresponding to two rather timeless worldviews, along with (...) their accompanying “mind-sets”. The degree to which these views indicate differing “kinds” in human nature, beyond which there can be no further reduction to common ground, whether conversely they simply reflect historical and economic circumstance, or to what extent they are both, will be left to the reader. One might discern in the sensibilities described some alignment along traditional epithets of “bourgeois” vs. “working class”, but this is not necessarily so. I will therefore avoid overwrought labels, but admit that such family resemblances speak to a longer historical view and a persistent problematic. (shrink)

This paper gives further feedback in response to the evening of presentations about the value of different disciplines to the social sciences, at the University of Manchester. I respond to Peter Lawler’s presentation for the politics department, or discipline area. The appendix responds to a remark which I found online about Laura Valentini, related to the main content.

Political philosophers sometimes write of liberal democracies, but which societies, if any, are liberal democracies? John Rawls says that in the public political culture of a liberal democracy, we find the principle that this society should be a fair system of cooperation between free and equal individuals. In this paper, I draw attention to how, if we grant Rawls’s definition, a society can easily be mistaken for a liberal democracy when it is not. I then argue that Andrew March, Gabrielle (...) Badano and Alasia Nuti have not given sufficient evidence for treating various European societies as Rawlsian liberal democracies. (shrink)

This paper contains my attempt to pastiche the Lacanian philosopher and social theorist Renata Salecl. The pastiche focuses on the effects of coronavirus on liberal societies, the invasion of Ukraine, and offers a definition which I think is of interest to analytic philosophy.

This chapter presents the reception of Leo Strauss by analytic philosophers after Strauss’s emigration to the United States. It gives a brief survey of the polemics against Strauss and his school by analytic philosophers, which aided in the self-constitution of analytic philosophy as a rival school of thought in philosophy. But most of the chapter is devoted to recovering the significance and influence of a criticism of Strauss by Ernest Nagel. The chapter argues that this response is of intrinsic interest (...) because it involves the relationship between science and values. Nagel’s response was foundational to Felix Oppenheim’s political philosophy or what Oppenheim called his project of ‘conceptual reconstruction.’ Lurking in Oppenheim’s response to Strauss are questions about the role of the principle of sufficient reason in philosophy. Rge chapter argues that an opportunity was missed to clarify questions pertaining to the inductive risk of philosophy more than a half century before these issues became fashionable again. (shrink)

I propose a novel model of the human ego (which I define as the tendency to measure one’s value based on extrinsic success rather than intrinsic aptitude or ability). I further propose the conjecture that ego so defined both is a non-adaptive by-product of evolutionary pressures, and has some evolutionary value as an adaptation (protecting self-interest). I explore ramifications of this model, including how it mediates individuals’ reactions to perceived and actual limits of their power, their ability to cope with (...) risk and uncertainty, and how this model may interpolate between rational choice models and cognitive psychology. I develop numerous examples and applications, including poverty traps, to demonstrate the model’s predictive power to elucidate a broad range of social phenomena. -/- [December 2018: Updated version to submit for publication. Expanded Sections 4 and 5.1, revised Section 5.7] -/- . (shrink)

على مدى سنواتٍ طويلة، شغلتني إشكالية العلاقة بين العلم والسياسة، قراءةً وبحثًا وإشرافًا على أطروحات تُعالج هذه العلاقة وتأثيراتها على الكوكب المُثقل بنا وبما كسبت أيدينا. قد تبدو هذه العلاقة للوهلة الأولى علاقة اعتماد متبادل؛ فالبحوث والكشوف العلمية في حاجةٍ إلى تمويل، والتمويل يأتي من قبل الحكومات، أو من قبل أرباب رؤوس الأموال الذين يُهيمنون على سياسات الدول والحكومات؛ كما أن الدول والحكومات في حاجة إلى البحوث والكشوف العلمية لتنفيذ برامجها التنموية والانتصار لأيديولوجياتها. يُمكننا تمثيل هذه العلاقة بين العلم والسياسة (...) بعلاقة الأعرج والأعمى؛ فالأول مُقيد في تنقلاته بكرسي مُتحرك، فهو في حاجةٍ إلى من يدفعه، والثاني فَقد بصره، فهو في حاجةٍ إلى من يُوجهه، ومن ثم فقد ارتبطا معًا بمصيرٍ واحد، وباتا يعتمدان على بعضهما البعض وإن اختلفت أهدافهما! لكن الأعمى في الحقيقة هو الذي يقود، وقد يصُم أذنيه عن نداءات الأعرج فيهوي به في الظلمات سبعين خريفًا! وهل يُمكن للسياسي حين تغلب عليه أيديولوجيته، وتطغى عليه طموحات التفوق والهيمنة، أن يُدرك تعقيدات القوة التي يمكن للعلم أن يُطلقها من عنانها؟ وهل بإمكانه أن يُوازن دومًا بين هذه القوة وما تتسم به النفس البشرية من ضعف وتناقضٍ وتحول وفقًا لشروط الزمان والمكان؟! تلك هي القضية الكبرى التي تواجه الإنسان منذ منتصف القرن الماضي، وبصفة خاصة منذ أن ألقيت أول قنبلة ذرية على هيروشيما؛ يومها أعلن الفيزيائي الأمريكي «جاكوب روبرت أوبنهايمر» أن العلم قد فقد عذريته، ولم يعد لنا أن نتخيله تلك العذراء الطاهرة الحنون! لكن عالــــم الكيمياء الحيوي النمســــوي «إروين شارجــــــاف» ذهب إلى أبعد من ذلك؛ رأى أن العلم قد فقد عذريته مع بدء مشروع مانهاتن، أول معسكر اعتقال علمي جُمع فيه أكثر العلماء عبقرية من كيميائيين وفيزيائيين تحت حراسة مشددة، وقيل لهم: هيا العبوا واقتلوا. كانوا يعرفون جميعـًا أنهم سيقومون بأكبر عملٍ شيطاني: تفجير الذرة، وأن هذا الاكتشاف سيسُتخدم في أكبر مذبحة في تاريخ البشرية! ومنذ ذلك الحين، بات جليًا أن الحياد العلمي أمرًا يوتوبيًا مُفارقًا للواقع، وأن القدرة على تطهير العقل العلمي من أدرانه الأيديولوجية مسألة عصية على العلماء في عالمٍ تنهشه السياسة وتبتلعه بطون السادة على موائد الأموال، وهو ما تعكسه بوضوح أزمة جائحة كورونا. (shrink)

In this Chapter, we address the challenge of explaining institutional change, asking whether the much-criticized rational choice perspective can contribute to the understanding of institutional change in political science. We discuss the methodological reasons why rational choice institutionalism (RCI) often assumes that institutional change is exogenous and discontinuous. We then identify and explore the possible pathways along which RCI can be extended to be more useful in understanding institutional change in political science. Finally, we reflect on what RCI theorizing would (...) look like if it started to take endogenous change seriously: by giving up some of its simplifying assumptions, RCI can be a useful tool for analyzing institutional change, but choosing this path has consequences for the generality of the models in RCI as well as for the style of its theorizing. (shrink)

Rival causal and interpretive approaches to explaining social phenomena have important ethical differences. While human actions can be explained as a result of causal mechanisms, as a meaningful choice based on reasons, or as some combination of the two, it is morally important that social scientists respect others by recognizing them as persons. Interpretive explanations directly respect their subjects in this way, while purely causal explanations do not. Yet although causal explanations are not themselves expressions of respect, they can be (...) used in respectful ways if they are incorporated into subjects’ self-directed projects. This can occur when subjects correctly understand and freely adopt researchers’ goals through a process of informed consent. It can also occur when researchers correctly understand and adopt their subject’s goals, using their research to empower those they study. (shrink)

We propose a qualitatively new kind of governance for the emerging need to efficiently guide the densely interconnected, ever more complex world development, which is based on explicit and openly presented problem solutions and their interactive implementation practice within the versatile, but unified professional analysis of complex real-world dynamics, involving both the powerful central units and the attached creative worldwide network of professional representatives. We provide fundamental and rigorous scientific arguments in favour of introduction of just that kind of governance (...) at the modern development stage, after the complexity threshold in the real world dynamics evolution (sometimes intuitively designated as "globalisation"), where the traditional spontaneous-empirical kind of development and related administrative governance lose dramatically and inevitably their efficiency and the necessity of explicit consistent understanding and guidance of complex real-world dynamics becomes evident. (shrink)

To succeed, political science usually requires either prediction or contextual historical work. Both of these methods favor explanations that are narrow-scope, applying to only one or a few cases. Because of the difficulty of prediction, the main focus of political science should often be contextual historical work. These epistemological conclusions follow from the ubiquity of causal fragility, under-determination, and noise. They tell against several practices that are widespread in the discipline: wide-scope retrospective testing, such as much large-n statistical work; lack (...) of emphasis on prediction; and resources devoted to ‘pure theory’ divorced from frequent empirical application. I illustrate, via Donatella della Porta’s work on political violence, the important role that is still left for theory. I conclude by assessing the scope for political science to offer policy advice. (shrink)

I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We like to see ourselves as members of certain groups (e.g. “rugged individualists”) and being (...) part of those groups depends on having certain beliefs (e.g. about welfare spending). Even if a decrease in welfare spending would be bad for me, I might still benefit by believing in and, consequently, voting for a decrease since my vote is unlikely to make a difference but getting to see myself as a rugged individualist will make a noticeable difference to my wellbeing. It is sometimes argued that this hypothesis fails for empirical reasons. I will argue that things are worse: it is conceptually incoherent. I will do so by first showing that it is a rationalizing explanation and then argue that rationalizing explanations must be reflectively stable from the agent's perspective. The rational irrationality hypothesis is not. (shrink)

Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that, even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political polarization, namely that (1) people have a tendency to (...) conform to descriptive norms (i.e., norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel), and (2) claims about political polarization often convey such norms. Many of these claims thus incline people to behave, cognize, and be affectively disposed in ways that contribute to social division. But there is a silver lining. People’s tendency to conform to descriptive norms also provides the basis for developing new, experimentally testable strategies for counteracting political polarization. I outline three. (shrink)

This article proposes the thesis that archeofuturism is a postmodern project of the International Alt-Right (IAR). By postmodern project we mean that: i) it is a project for a time after modernity; and ii) it is a project that, due to its content, can be classified as related to the ideas against modernity called postmodernism. As it is part of the IAR, archeofuturism is also a project of a fascist or far-right nature. To prove our thesis, we will first analyze (...) the Archefouturism developed by the French political scientist Guillaume Faye, a member of the IAR. Then what is IAR will be defined and its relationship with postmodernism will be evidenced. Finally, based on that connection called reactionary postmodernism, the existence of other archeofuturists theses that combine fascist rhetoric with postmodernism will be proposed. (shrink)

As the multiple issues of the digital public sphere threaten our democracies and the cohesion of our societies, most attempts for a betterment of the digital networks and platforms revolve around a risk-response approach. This paper takes the opposite approach and develops a positive definition of the ideal ethical public sphere, combining normative features with original taxonomies. In view of defining common standards for a healthy digital public sphere, this paper offers an interdisciplinary literature review, and original recommendations, before discussing (...) potential leverages for implementing these changes. The suggested ethical normative features derive from a positive approach to the digital public sphere, as ideal common standards. Sustained by the underlying assumption that the composite landscape of the media ecosystem and its different layers (networks, platforms, users) cannot be steered by government regulations alone, the normative (deontological) approach serves to understand and justify the need for a normative approach, to help envision new pathways for an ethical transformation. (shrink)

Alongwith the major organ of the doctrinal operations, the Permanent Resolution Act, this research presented a situation review article on the Doctrine of the Chittagong Peace Process in Bangladesh with few global strikeable issues. Unarmed surviving Parbatya Chittagong nation of Buddhists population in Bangladesh has not yet been able to form their government since 1997 to 2023, so it has been assumed that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina & Awami League Government of Bangladesh (ALGOB) cheated to weaponless freedom fighters Buddhists people (...) by taking their weapons through the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 1997 that was signed between Bangladesh and Chittagong HillTracts in order to a Commonwealth of Independence of Autonomy Government, Formation of Legislative Assembly House and Parliament Building Construction, which is also the last official initiative of the Parbatya Peace Process in the Chinese Belt and Road. Following the theater of war between the US-led NATO—Ukraine alliance and the Russian Federation, the 3rd World War situations intended to expand between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This doctrinal paper has been presented through codification of situations of the post-seizure war-fighting battles surviving cold and silent conflicts in Parbatya, Chittagong Hill Tracts, in order to deliver the seized nation onto a free pathway. (shrink)

In this paper I explored the concept of ‘I(i)nternational R(r)elations’, with the aim (i) to show the two techniques of writing and their representation, (ii) the meaning that is attached to each technique; (iii) the process of creation of a concept based on two terms. -/- Through this paper: (i) I return to theorizing the concept of ‘I(i)nternational R(r)elations’ but from its etymological bases; (ii) the terms ‘relation’ and ‘international’ is based on a wide range of concepts that help its (...) formation, and I want to show this formation; (iii) I contribute to the existing literature that discusses the concept; (iv) I contribute to the historical development of the interdiscipline and (v) I respond to the crisis of ideas that haunts science. -/- If you started reading this paper it means that it is time to look with greater clarity and objectivity to all the elements and the process of creating a concept. To see the concept of ‘I(i)nternational R(r)elations’ as it is. (shrink)

Some common explanations of issue polarization and echo chambers rely on social or cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. Accordingly, suggested interventions like “be more open-minded” target these mechanisms: avoid epistemic bubbles and don’t discount contrary information. Contrary to such explanations, we show how a much weaker mechanism—the preference for belief—can produce issue polarization in epistemic communities with little to no mechanisms of exclusion. We present a network model that demonstrates how a dynamic interaction between the preference for belief and common structures (...) of epistemic communities can turn very small unequal distributions of initial beliefs into full-blown polarization. This points to a different class of explanations, one that emphasizes the importance of the initial spread of information. We also show how our model complements extant explanations by including a version of biased assimilation and motivated reasoning—cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. We find that mechanisms of exclusion can exacerbate issue polarization, but may not be the ultimate root of it. Hence, the recommended interventions suggested by extant literature is expected to be limited and the problem of issue polarization to be even more intractable. (shrink)

A good definition of process tracing should highlight what is distinctive about process tracing as a methodology of causal inference. I look at eight criteria that are used to define process tracing in the methodological literature, and I dismiss all eight criteria as unhelpful (some because they are too restrictive, and others because they are vacuous). In place of these criteria, I propose four alternative criteria, and I draw a distinction between process tracing for the ultimate aim of testing a (...) start--end hypothesis versus process tracing as an ultimate end in itself. Although it is clear enough how the former method works, there is still much methodological work to be done in understanding the latter method as a distinctive method of causal inference, I argue. (shrink)

The nationalist phenomenon has played an important role in contemporary history. We are currently entering the fourth industrial revolution, a process of social and political change driven by artificial intelligence, 5G connectivity and other cutting-edge technologies. This paper explores the manifestation of nationalism in the fourth industrial revolution, in particular the concepts of techno-nationalism and digital nationalism, their relationship and their differences. Subsequently, the article explains how digital media affect the rise of techno-nationalism and offers a broader definition of the (...) concept, including the ideas of digital territory, digital culture and digital identity. The article concludes that techno-nationalism is a complex manifestation of nationalism that includes not only a country’s quest for technological sovereignty, but also has an ideological component strongly linked to the political use of cutting-edge technologies. (shrink)

Internationale vergelijkingen vormen een waardvolle bron van inzicht bij het analyseren van maatschappelijke problemen en het beoordelen van beleidsmatige antwoorden op die problemen. Vergelijkend onderzoek levert vaak interessante of nuttige informatie op doordat er verschillen én overeenkomsten worden geconstrueerd, bijvoorbeeld: hoe ‘leefbaar’ is Toronto vergeleken met Berlijn? Zelfs wanneer de definities verschillen en de gebruikte meeteenheden enigszins onnauwkeurig kunnen zijn – bijvoorbeeld “leefbaar voor wie en ten opzichte van wat?” – zijn vergelijkingen leerrijk en aanleiding voor verdere reflectie. Maar internationale (...) vergelijkingen kunnen op verschillende manieren ook problematisch zijn. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic ‘oughts’ that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. I argue that the policy of systematically doubting or disbelieving conspiracy theories would be both a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation, since (...) it leads to the conclusion that history is bunk and the nightly news unbelievable. In fact (of course) the policy is not employed systematically but is only wheeled on to do down theories that the speaker happens to dislike. I develop a deductive argument from hard-to-deny premises that if you are not a ‘conspiracy theorist’ in my anodyne sense of the word then you are an ‘idiot’ in the Greek sense of the word, that is, someone so politically purblind as to have no opinions about either history or public affairs. The conventional wisdom can only be saved (if at all) if ‘conspiracy theory’ is given a slanted definition. I discuss some slanted definitions apparently presupposed by proponents of the conventional wisdom (including, amongst others, Tony Blair) and conclude that even with these definitions the conventional wisdom comes out as deeply unwise. I finish up with a little harmless fun at the expense of David Aaronvitch whose abilities as a rhetorician and a popular historian are not perhaps matched by a corresponding capacity for logical thought. (shrink)

What is Gandhi’s Satya? How does truth entail peace? Satya or truth, for Gandhi, is experiential. The experiential truth of Gandhi does not exclude epistemological, metaphysical, or moral facets of truth, but is an unequivocal acknowledgement of the subjective basis of the pursuit of objectivity. In admitting my truth, your truth, our truth, their truth, etc., Gandhi brought into clear focus the reality of I and we—the subjects (or viewpoints) of subjective experiences (views). The totality of these subjective viewpoints, along (...) with their mutual relationships, constitutes an objective frame of reference for reconciling or putting together seemingly irreconcilable perceptions into a unitary whole of mutual understanding and an ever more refined comprehension of reality, thereby engendering peace. Considering the generality of the basic tenet—viewpoint dependence of views—of Gandhi’s satyagraha and in view of the kinship between positive conception of peace and unity, I put forward ‘satyagraha for science’ as a method to address numerous foundational problems in various branches of science centered on unity such as the binding problem in neuroscience. (shrink)

The interpretations of sustainability are varied. In most cases, the focus is on reinterpretations and transformations of human attitudes towards the natural environment and certain (unacceptable) social practices and conditions, i.e. the task would be to shape these spheres of human existence in the interests of sustainability. However, the creation and widespread use of the Internet is fundamentally changing human life that is no longer confined to the natural and social spheres. Web life, as a third sphere of human existence (...) created by the universal use of the Internet, is also a component of human condition, both in itself and through its interactions with the natural and social spheres. It is essential to take this into account: the sustainability of these “three spheres” should be addressed together. The continuous construction of web life can be decisive for the sustainability of the whole human existence. (shrink)

Social science is often described as a product of 19th century Europe, and as a handmaiden to its imperial and colonial projects. However, centuries prior to the Western social science enterprise, Islamic imperial scholars developed their own ‘science of society.’ This essay provides an overview of the historical and cultural milieu in which 'Islamic' social science was born, and then charts its development over time through case studies of four seminal scholars -- al-Razi, al-Farabi, al-Biruni and Ibn Khaldun -- who (...) played pivotal roles in establishing fields that could be roughly translated as psychology, political science, anthropology and sociology. The axioms undergirding Islamic social science are subsequently explored, with particular emphasis paid to the relations between said axioms and the discursive tradition, 'Islam.' The essay concludes with an exploration of how looking to social science enterprises beyond the ‘modern’ West can clarify the purported relationships between social science and empire. (shrink)

Drawing upon empirical studies of racial discrimination dating back to the 1940’s, the Movement for Black Lives platform calls for the abolition of capital punishment. Our purpose here is to defend the Movement’s call for death penalty abolition in terms congruent with its claim that the death penalty in the U.S. is a “racist practice” that “devalues Black lives.” We first sketch the jurisprudential history of race and capital punishment in the U.S., wherein courts have occasionally expressed worries about racial (...) injustice but have usually taken such evidence to warrant reform but not outright abolition. We argue that the racial discrimination at issue flows in significant part from implicit biases concerning race, criminality, and violence, which do not fit comfortably within the picture of racial bias advanced by the courts. The case for abolition, we contend, rests on Black Americans as a class (not merely those who interact with the criminal justice system as capital defendants or as murder victims) being subject to such bias and thereby not being accorded equal status under the law. (shrink)

Frente a problemas de decisión colectiva de cierta complejidad, distintos métodos de votación pueden considerarse igualmente democráticos. Ante esta situación, argumento que es posible investigar cuáles de esos métodos producen mejores resultados epistémicos sobre asuntos fácticos. Comienzo ilustrando la relación entre democracia y métodos de votación con un sencillo ejemplo. Muestro cómo el uso de modelos idealizados permite descubrir algunas propiedades de los métodos de votación; varios de estos descubrimientos muestran que, frente a problemas de cierta complejidad, no hay una (...) respuesta clara acerca de cuál es el resultado de una elección democrática. Frente a esto, sugiero que deberíamos tomar en cuenta un rasgo epistémico instrumental de varios métodos de votación: su capacidad para generar respuestas correctas ante varias situaciones. Esta intuición ofrece lecciones importantes para el diseño de instituciones electorales. (shrink)

Michael Wendeler’s disputation on the Turkish republic is a discussion of Ottoman history, political philosophy, and the concept of monarchy and tyranny. Half of his disputation concerns the identification of the Turks with the little horn which arises on the head of the fourth beast in the prophet’s vision described in the Book of Daniel 7:1–28. Giving copious historical references, Wendeler explains that this little horn cannot be referring to Christ as the Jews believe, nor to the Seleucid monarch Antiochos (...) Epiphanes as the Calvinists believe. Nor can it be identifed with the Antichrist as the Catholics believe. Wendeler puts forth a detailed argument that the little horn on the fourth beast in the prophecy of Daniel can only be identified with the Turkish monarch (Ottoman Sultan). In conclusion, Wendeler draws a parallel between the monstrous ‘little horn’—the tyrannical Turkish monarchy—and the tyranny of the Catholic Church, exemplified by the untrustworthy Pope and the satanic writings of the Catholic Machiavelli. (shrink)

Public policymakers and institutional decision-makers routinely face questions about whether interventions “work”: does universal basic income improve people’s welfare and stimulate entrepreneurial activity? Do gated alleyways reduce burglaries or merely shift the crime burden to neighbouring communities? What is the most cost-effective way to improve students’ reading abilities? These are empirical questions that seem best answered by looking at the world, rather than trusting speculations about what will be effective. Evidence-based policy (EBP) is a movement that concretizes this intuition. It (...) maintains that policy should be based on evidence of “what works.” Not any evidence will do, however. Following on the heels of its intellectual progenitor, evidence-based medicine (EBM), EBP insists on the use of high-quality evidence produced in accordance with rigorous methodological standards. Though intuitively compelling, EBP has attracted significant criticism from methodologists, political scientists, and philosophers. This chapter provides a critical overview of EBP through a philosophical lens, reviewing and discussing some of the most pressing challenges that EBP faces and outlining some proposals for improving it. I first provide a brief overview of EBP and distinguish a broader and narrower understanding of it. I then review existing lines of criticism of EBP, two of which are considered in detail. The first elaborates how EBP struggles with extrapolation, that is, the use of evidence from study populations to make inferences about the effects of policies on novel target populations. The second maintains that EBP’s methodological tenets are deeply entwined with moral and political values, which can threaten EBP’s promise to promote objectivity in policymaking. Finally, I make some proposals for how EBP could be improved going forward. (shrink)

Nossa seleção de verbetes parte do interesse de cada pesquisador e os dispomos de maneira histórico-cronológica e, ao mesmo tempo, temática. O verbete de Melissa Lane, “Filosofia Política Antiga” vai da abrangência da política entre os gregos até a república e o império, às portas da cristianização. A “Filosofia Política Medieval”, de John Kilcullen e Jonathan Robinson, é o tópico que mais demanda espaço na nossa seleção em virtude das disputas intrínsecas ao período, da recepção de Aristóteles pelo medievo e (...) da tensão entre poder Papal e Civil. No verbete “Liberalismo”, de Gerald Gaus, Shane Courtland e David Schmidtz, vemos as fontes fundantes da Filosofia Política da modernidade. As ideias de liberdade negativa e positiva se coadunam com a Ética Liberal e sua influência sobre a abrangência do valor fundamental da liberdade individual diante das políticas públicas. O texto de Ian Carter, “Liberdade Positiva e Liberdade Negativa”, expõe o paradoxo da liberdade em suas concepções valorativas e neutra, muito úteis para compreender os problemas políticos que enfrentamos hoje. Por fim, Bas Van Der Vossen no texto “Libertarianismo” trata das noções tensas entre Estado e indivíduos. A concepção de “liberdade de si”, genuinamente negativa, ganha destaque justificatório. Jackie Scully, no verbete Bioética Feminista, exemplifica o valor da influência dessas correntes no âmago de todos os contemporâneos. Sua escrita homenageia postumamente Anne Donchin com um apanhado histórico da luta de inserção de políticas feministas na pesquisa acadêmica global. No verbete “Democracia”, os professores brasileiros Gustavo Dalaqua e Alberto Ribeiro Barros acrescentaram tópicos importantes ao tema geral, respectivamente: “Construtivismo Representativo vs. Representação Descritiva” e “Democracia Contestatória de Philip Pettit”. O texto de Thomas Christiano perpassa os principais argumentos de justificação política contra e a favor da democracia ocidental, com foco central nas concepções de liberdade e igualdade. Os verbetes dispostos nessa seleção de textos são tendenciosos na medida que expressam o interesse genuíno de cada pesquisador com os assuntos relevantes em suas pesquisas. Em virtude disso, a escolha “adota um lado” em detrimento de outros – mais especificamente: de outro que poderia ser mais “progressista”. Por si só, o livro já nasce reclamando um segundo volume, que será providenciado. Colocamos de lado qualquer exigência de “imparcialidade”, algo que não existe na Filosofia, muito menos na Filosofia Política. Sobressai, nesse aspecto, o caráter reflexivo que o assunto exige e a importância do assunto, sem o qual não teríamos a modernas concepções de representatividade, as teorias da justiça ou mesmo as ciências sociais. Um outro volume, portanto, se faz imperativo, por conta da abrangência da própria SEP e do respeito a seu projeto inicial, genuinamente um plano plural. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

With the 21st century, we are witnessing the mass spread of the communication technologies and social media revolution. Interactive networks built on a global scale have led to the formation of a virtual world of reality that is connecting the whole world. With the global spread of communication networks, the question of whether social media points to a new public sphere has been raised. Social media applications such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are nowadays seen as a place where political (...) campaigns are carried out, causing the destruction of authoritarian regimes, organizing global protests and innovation culture, and discussing political, social and cultural changes. What gives social media a similar quality to the agora of Ancient Greek city-states is the characteristic of been a place where citizens come together and talk about issues that are considered to be public, eventhough in a virtual reality. This work, following the Arendtian sense, discusses whether social media really is a place where public issues are discussed, common ideas are produced and transparency prevails. In her work "The Human Condition", Arendt makes a fundamental distinction between private and public sphere based on human activities. By conceiving the activities that she describes as labour and work in relation to the private sphere, Arendt tackles the activity of action through linking it to public sphere. Arendt defines the public sphere as a sphere of freedom and a political sphere. The public sphere consists of equal people without hierarchy, who come together with their completely free will. According to Arendt, the condition for the public sphere to be possible is transparency and commonality. Firstly; it has a wide transparency in the sense that something have to be seen and heard by others, and the second is that it points to a common world that belongs to everyone, except for the part that is privately owned. Considering the public sphere in relation to the transparency not a direct transfer of things that happen in the private or intimate sphere. It is precisely related to the fact that something pertaining to the private exhibits a presence within the world of public and the fact that the private acquires a public chatacter. This does not mean that the public sphere is a sphere in which the private and intimate are directly transferred. According to Arendt, leading a private life as a whole will lead to the lack of what is necessary to be a true person. It also leads to the lack of a common world that unites and separates them. Arendt thinks that with the modern period, what belongs to the purely private and intimate sphere expands and causes the collapse of the public. The collapse of the public sphere in the modern period; It has caused both the loss of difference and interaction and the emergence of individuals who are increasingly alike, unable to think and act. In this kind of society, action has left its place to behavior, difference to standartization and thought to obedience. Arendt sees the public sphere as a sphere where public affairs are discussed, while the private sphere is a sphere where intimate and private activities take place. Arendt argues that with modern society the distinction between public and private has became indistinct , and as a third sphere, the social sphere has swallowed up both the public and the private. The social sphere has removed the distinction between the public transparency and commonality of the public and the privacy of the private sphere and activities. This study considers social media as a sphere where public issues are discussed. It also dıscusses the private sphere events and the most intimate issues. It claims that social media is not a new public sphere as it is cosidered, but it is a social sphere in which the distinction between private and public in the Arendtian sense is become indistinct. In this context, the study seeks to answer the following questions: How does the distinction between public and private spheres, which is central in Arendt's thought, look like in today’s world? Is it possible to talk about a public sphere in the modern age? Can social media be considered as a public sphere? Or is social media a sphere of freedom and a political sphere? Does social media allow discussions on public issues? Is social media a non-hierarchical nature open to the free participation of everyone, difference and plurality? (shrink)

Wie können Freiheit und Widerstand innerhalb von Foucaults Theorie der Macht und Subjektivierung konzipiert werden? Diese zentrale Frage der Interpretation von Foucaults vielschichtigem Werk wurde breit diskutiert und dennoch nicht befriedigend beantwortet. Dass bis heute kaum Klarheit über den Status von Freiheit in Foucaults Werk erreicht werden konnte, liegt auch daran, dass die gängigen Interpretationen die verschiedenen Freiheitsbegriffe, die in Foucaults Werk zu finden sind, vermischen. Der Artikel bringt deshalb Ordnung in diese unübersichtliche Lage, indem er die verschiedenen Freiheitsbegriffe und (...) Freiheitsprobleme in Foucaults Werk differenziert. Dies ermöglicht ein besseres Verständnis von Foucaults Freiheitsdenken und Machttheorie und führt zu einem neuen Freiheitsbegriff: Freiheit als die Fähigkeit zur kritischen Reflexion der eigenen Subjektivierung. Weil diese "Freiheit als Kritik" nur durch politische Institutionen ermöglicht werden kann, produziert dieser Freiheitsbegriff neue Anschlüsse von Foucaults Denken an die normative politische Theorie und postfundamentalistische Demokratietheorie. How can freedom and resistance be conceived within Foucault's theory of power and subjectivation? This central question of the interpretation of Foucault's multi-layered work has been widely discussed and yet not satisfactorily answered. The fact that until today there has been little clarity about the status of freedom in Foucault's work is also due to the fact that the current interpretations confuse the various concepts of freedom which can be found in Foucault's work. The article therefore brings order to this confusing situation by differentiating the various concepts and problems of freedom in Foucault's work. This enables a better understanding of Foucault's thinking of freedom and his theory of power and leads to a new concept of freedom: freedom as the capability to critically reflect on one's own subjectivation. Because this "freedom as critique" can only be made possible by political institutions, this concept of freedom produces new connections from Foucault's thinking to normative political theory and post-fundamentalist democratic theory. (shrink)

In der postmarxistischen politischen Philosophie wird die Veränderung gegenüber der Verstetigung analytisch und normativ bevorzugt. Deshalbleistet die postmarxistische Theorie keine realistische Analyse und normativ-differenzierende Bewertung von politischen Institutionen, insbesondere des Rechts. Der Beitrag liefert einen Ansatz, um diese Lücke zu schließen, indem er der Abblendung von institutionellen Fragen mit einer neuen postfundamentalistischen Institutionentheorie begegnet. Diese Theorie basiert auf dem Freiheitsbegriff der Kritik, der im Anschluss an Foucault entwickelt wird und zeigt, dass kritischer Subjektivität durch die Institutionalisierung von freiheitlichen Subjektivierungsregimen bedingt (...) ist. Dieser Freiheitsbegriff korrigiert den avanciertesten Ansatz der postmarxistischen Rechtstheorie, Menkes Rechtskritik. Deren Stärke ist es,die liberal entpolitisierende Subjektivierung des Rechts zu kritisieren, doch Menkes Vorschlag einer radikalen Politisierung ist paternalistisch. Mit Foucault lässt sich hingegen ein Recht denken, das Subjektivierung kritisiert und dennoch nicht paternalistisch ist, weil es die Subjekte zur Kritik der Institutionen befähigt. (shrink)

अमेरिका और दुनिया अत्यधिक जनसंख्या वृद्धि से पतन की प्रक्रिया में हैं, यह सबसे पिछली सदी के लिए और अब यह सब 3 दुनिया के लोगों के कारण । संसाधनों की खपत और एक या दो अरब अधिक सीए के अलावा औद्योगिक सभ्यता का पतन होगा और भुखमरी, बीमारी, हिंसा और युद्ध को चौंका देने वाले पैमाने पर लाएगा । अरबों मर जाएगा और परमाणु युद्ध सब लेकिन निश्चित है । अमेरिका में यह बेहद बड़े पैमाने पर आव्रजन और आप्रवासी (...) प्रजनन द्वारा त्वरित किया जा रहा है, लोकतंत्र द्वारा संभव बनाया गाली के साथ संयुक्त । भ्रष्ट मानव प्रकृति निष्ठुरता से लोकतंत्र और विविधता के सपने को अपराध और गरीबी के दुःस्वप्न में बदल देता है । पतन का मूल कारण हमारे जन्मजात मनोविज्ञान की अक्षमता आधुनिक दुनिया है, जो लोगों को असंबंधित व्यक्तियों के इलाज के रूप में हालांकि वे आम हितों था जाता है के लिए अनुकूल है । यह, प्लस बुनियादी जीव विज्ञान और मनोविज्ञान की अज्ञानता, आंशिक रूप से शिक्षित जो लोकतांत्रिक समाजों को नियंत्रित के सामाजिक इंजीनियरिंग भ्रम की ओर जाता है । कुछ समझते हैं कि यदि आप किसी व्यक्ति की मदद करते हैं तो आप किसी और को नुकसान पहुंचाते हैं - कोई मुफ्त दोपहर का भोजन नहीं है और हर एक आइटम किसी को भी मरम्मत से परे पृथ्वी को नष्ट कर देता है। नतीजतन, हर जगह सामाजिक नीतियां अधारणीय हैं और स्वार्थ पर कड़े नियंत्रण के बिना एक-एक करके सभी समाज अराजकता या तानाशाही में ढह जाएंगे । नाटकीय और तत्काल परिवर्तन के बिना, अमेरिका, या किसी भी देश है कि एक लोकतांत्रिक प्रणाली के बाद के पतन को रोकने के लिए कोई उंमीद नहीं है । इसलिए मेरा निबंध "लोकतंत्र द्वारा आत्महत्या" । अब यह भी स्पष्ट है कि चीन पर शासन करने वाले सात समाजपथ विश्व युद्ध 3 जीत रहे हैं, और इसलिए उन पर मेरा समापन निबंध है । केवल अधिक खतरा आर्टिफिशियल इंटेलिजेंस है जो मैं संक्षेप में टिप्पणी है । हमारे बारे में सब कुछ करने के लिए महत्वपूर्ण जीव विज्ञान है, और यह इसके लिए बेखबर है कि ओबामा, Chomsky,क्लिंटन, डेमोक्रेटिक पार्टी और पोप की तरह स्मार्ट शिक्षित लोगों के लाखों की ओर जाता है आत्मघाती काल्पनिक आदर्शों का समर्थन है कि निष्ठुरता पृथ्वी पर नरक के लिए सीधे सीसा । के रूप में डब्ल्यू ने कहा, यह है जो हमेशा हमारी आंखों के सामने है कि सबसे मुश्किल देखने के लिए है । हम सचेत विमर्श भाषाई प्रणाली 2 की दुनिया में रहते हैं, लेकिन यह बेहोश है, स्वचालित सजगता प्रणाली 1 कि नियम । यह सेरले के फेनोमेनोलॉजिकल भ्रम (टीपीआई), पिंकर के ब्लैंक स्लेट और टॉबी और कॉस्मिड्स के स्टैंडर्ड सोशल साइंस मॉडल द्वारा वर्णित सार्वभौमिक अंधापन का स्रोत है। लेख के पहले समूह के लिए कैसे हम व्यवहार है कि काफी सैद्धांतिक भ्रम से मुक्त है में कुछ अंतर्दृष्टि देने का प्रयास । अगले तीन समूहों में मैं एक टिकाऊ दुनिया-प्रौद्योगिकी, धर्म और राजनीति (सहकारी समूहों) को रोकने के प्रमुख भ्रम के तीन पर टिप्पणी । लोगों का मानना है कि समाज उनके द्वारा बचाया जा सकता है, तो मैं पुस्तक के बाकी में कुछ सुझाव प्रदान के रूप में क्यों यह छोटे लेख और प्रसिद्ध लेखकों द्वारा हाल ही में पुस्तकों की समीक्षा के माध्यम से संभावना नहीं है । एक अन्य खंड धार्मिक भ्रम का वर्णन करता है - कि कुछ सुपर पावर है जो हमें बचाएगी। अगला खंड डिजिटल भ्रम का वर्णन करता है, जो सिस्टम एक के ऑटोमैटिक्स के साथ सिस्टम 2 के भाषा खेलों को भ्रमित करता है, और इसलिए अन्य प्रकार की मशीनों (यानी कंप्यूटर) से जैविक मशीनों (यानी, लोगों) को अलग नहीं कर सकता है। अन्य डिजिटल भ्रम यह है कि हम सिस्टम 2 द्वारा बनाई गई कंप्यूटर/एआई/रोबोटिक्स/नैनोटेक/जेनेटिक इंजीनियरिंग द्वारा सिस्टम 1 की शुद्ध बुराई (स्वार्थ) से बच जाएंगे । कोई मुफ्त दोपहर के भोजन के प्रिंसिपल हमें बताता है कि वहां गंभीर और संभवतः घातक परिणाम होगा । अंतिम खंड एक बड़ा खुश परिवार भ्रम का वर्णन करता है, यानी, कि हम हर किसी के साथ सहयोग के लिए चुने जाते हैं, और यह कि लोकतंत्र, विविधता और समानता के व्योमवादी आदर्शों हमें स्वप्नलोक में ले जाएगा, अगर हम सिर्फ चीजों को सही ढंग से प्रबंधित (राजनीति की संभावना) । फिर, कोई मुक्त दोपहर के भोजन के सिद्धांत हमें चेतावनी देना चाहिए यह सच नहीं हो सकता है, और हम इतिहास भर में और समकालीन दुनिया भर में देखते हैं, कि सख्त नियंत्रण, स्वार्थ और मूर्खता के बिना ऊपरी हाथ लाभ और जल्द ही किसी भी राष्ट्र है कि इन भ्रम गलेलगाती नष्ट। इसके अलावा, बंदर मन तेजी से भविष्य छूट, और इसलिए हम अस्थाई आराम के लिए हमारे वंशज विरासत बेचने में सहयोग, बहुत समस्याओं को बढ़ा । . (shrink)

在详细评论社会世界(MSW)之前,我将首先就哲学(描述性心理学)及其与当代心理学研究的关系提出一些评论,如西尔(S)和维特根斯坦(W),因为我觉得这是把西尔或任何评论者的行为,在正确的视角最好的方式。 这将是很大的帮助,看到我对PNC,TLP,PI,OC,TARW和其他书籍的评论,这两个天才的描述心理学。 S没有提到W在TLP中作为机制的先见之明的思想陈述,以及他在后来的工作中对它的破坏。自W以来,S已经成为这些机械行为观的主要解构者,以及最重要的描述性心理学家(哲学家),但没有意识到W如何完全期待他, 也没有意识到,总的来说,做别人(但看到许多论文和普劳福和科普兰在W,图灵和AI的书)。S 的工作比 W 的工作要容易得多,尽管有一些行话,但如果你从正确的方向接近它,它几乎非常明显。有关更多详细信息,请参阅我对 W S 和其他书籍的评论。 总体而言,MSW很好地总结了在维特根斯坦的半个世纪的工作带来的许多实质性进展,但在我看来,W仍然是无与伦比的基本心理学,一旦你掌握了他在说什么(见我的评论)。理想情况下,它们应该一起阅读:Searle 对S2/S3操作的明确连贯的散文和概括,用W对S1/S2操作的敏锐例子,以及他辉煌的格言来说明。如果我年轻得多,我会写一本书。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019).

The Politics of Military Force uses discourse theory to examine the dynamics of discursive change that made participation in military operations possible against the background of German antimilitarist culture. Once considered a strict taboo, so-called out-of-area operations have now become widely considered by German policymakers to be without alternative. The book argues that an understanding of how certain policies are made possible (in this case, military operations abroad and force transformation), one needs to focus on processes of discursive change that (...) result in different policy options appearing rational, appropriate, feasible, or even self-evident. Drawing on Essex School discourse theory, the book develops a theoretical framework to understand how discursive change works, and elaborates on how discursive change makes once unthinkable policy options not only acceptable but even without alternative. Based on a detailed discourse analysis of more than 25 years of German parliamentary debates, The Politics of Military Force provides an explanation for: (1) the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse in German security policy after the end of the Cold War (discursive change), (2) the rearticulation of German antimilitarism in the process (ideational change/norm erosion) and (3) the resulting making-possible of military operations and force transformation (policy change). In doing so, the book also demonstrates the added value of a poststructuralist approach compared to the naive realism and linear conceptions of norm change so prominent in the study of German foreign policy and International Relations more generally. (shrink)

In this article I place Jurgen Habermas' recent turn to a "post-secular society" in the context of his previous defence of a "postmetaphysical" view of modernity. My argument is that the concept of "postsecular" introduces significant normative tensions for the formal and pragmatic view of reason defended by Habermas in previous work. In particular, the turn to a "post-secular society" threatens the evolutionary narrative that Habermas espoused in The Theory of Communicative Action, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity or Postmetaphysical Thinking, (...) according to which modern "communicative" reason dialecticlly supersedes religion. If this narrative is undermined, I argue, the claim to universality of "communicative" reason is also undermined. Thus, the benefits Habermas seeks to obtain from translation of religion are offset by a destabilization of tenets central to a "postmetaphysical" view of modernity. (shrink)

In the last third of the 20th century, the Bielefeld School of social history, headed by Hans- Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, rose to prominence. It had contrasting concerns: the focus on structures and processes of development sidelined intentional action and coexisted with a political rewriting of the past that indicted the interests and decisions of dominant elites in Germany from 1870 to 1933. History was viewed, oddly enough, as retrospective politics. This article analyses the main aporiae implied by both (...) the School’s programme and its scholarly output. How did a structuralist historiography contrive backward-looking political denunciations? Is our time entitled to judge and accuse the past? Notwithstanding the weight of structures and processes, were there real alternatives for the historical agents? Did systemic causality grant elbowroom to intentional action? What chances were then missed and why? Overall, the surmise that there were always choices clashes with received narratives of inevitability. (shrink)

The work project analyzes the evolution of administrative reforms and concepts of sustainability and solidarity in the management and administration of public collective demands and proposes a model that integrates strategic planning, management, use of information and communication tools (ITC's), and active citizenship, as an ideal model to manage and manage current and future collective demands. Through the bibliographic review of the main authors, a thorough study was made about the evolution of human behavior in the management and administration of (...) their collective demands, relating it to the concepts of sustainability and solidarity. What is the ideal management and public administration model for the State to be self-sustaining at the local, regional, and national levels? A model that manages and, through the active participation of taxpayers/citizens, their collective demands utilizing in an integrated and decentralized way, available tools of planning, management, information and communication, active citizenship, as observed in some countries and the international experiences of participatory budgeting and development of production chains integrated business. The research methodology developed was descriptive through documentary research. The study will have an essentially qualitative character. (shrink)

The trajectory of Paul Ricoeur’s thought from the fallible to the capable human person offers a hopeful vision of human nature constitutive of our shared political life. Yet, by necessity, hope arises in response to the tragic, which also features in Ricoeur’s work at the existential and ethical levels. At the same time hope and tragedy represent concepts at the limit of philosophical reasoning, introducing meeting points with religious discourse. Exploring those meeting points reveals the contribution of religious thinking to (...) the understanding of hope and tragedy and establishes Ricoeur’s political thinking as ultimately shaped by their interplay. (shrink)

The critical theory of society as a political program takes an important turn in the socalled second stage of Max Horkheimer’s thought. This stage was marked by exile to North America, between 1933 and 1950, where important changes were generated in the critical theory of the Frankfurt author mainly embodied in his works Dialectic of Enlightenment, written together with Theodor Adorno, and Eclipse of reason. In this passage, or evolution of the horkheimerian thought, a theoretical reformulation can be seen in (...) which the utopia of the first stage of his thought is questioned by the lines of history described in the pages of the philosopher. This has not been problematic: the dialectical character of the theory is a central feature of it, and its reformulation, crossed by the phenomenon of the Second World War, focuses mainly on criticism of Western logos. The appreciations of the works have a certain normative character, and although they describe a certain eclipse of the Western reason denied by the same mythified Enlightenment, they imply a final call to human emancipation. -/- The essay intends to cover the main criticisms of the works and show that they do not state the death of critical theory, but rather reinforce its dialectical character as a critical description of the history of society. (shrink)

Scholars studying classic political texts face an important decision: Should these texts be read as artifacts of history or as sources for still-valid insights about politics today? Competing historical and “presentist” approaches to political thought do not have a methodological dispute—that is, a disagreement about the most effective scholarly means to an agreed-upon end. They instead have an ethical dispute about the respective value of competing activities that aim at different purposes. This article examines six ethical arguments, drawn primarily from (...) the work of Quentin Skinner, in favor of the historical approach. It concludes that while both intellectual history and presentist theory are ethically justifiable, the best justification of the former enterprise is that it can help us achieve the purposes of the latter. (shrink)

Habermas’ ‘ethics of citizenship’ raises a number of relevant concerns about the dangers of a secularistic exclusion of religious contributions to public deliberation, on the one hand, and the dangers of religious conflict and sectarianism in politics, on the other. Agreeing largely with these concerns, the paper identities four problems with Habermas’ approach, and attempts to overcome them: the full exclusion of religious reasons from parliamentary debate; the full inclusion of religious reasons in the informal public sphere; the philosophical distinction (...) between secular and religious reasons; and the sociological distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ religions. The result is a revised version of the ethics of citizenship, which I call moderate inclusivism. Most notably, moderate inclusivism implies a replacement of Habermas’ ‘institutional translation proviso’ with a more flexible ‘conversational translation proviso’. (shrink)

This article aims to describe the last 10 years of the collaborative scientific endeavors on polarization in particular and collective problem-solving in general by our multidisciplinary research team. We describe the team’s disciplinary composition—social psychology, political science, social philosophy/epistemology, and complex systems science— highlighting the shared and unique skill sets of our group members and how each discipline contributes to studying polarization and collective problem-solving. With an eye to the literature on team dynamics, we describe team logistics and processes that (...) we believe make our multidisciplinary team persistent and productive. We emphasize challenges and difficulties caused by disciplinary differences in terms of terminology, units/levels of analysis, methodology, and theoretical assumptions. We then explain how work disambiguating the concepts of polarization and developing an integrative theoretical and methodological framework with complex systems perspectives has helped us overcome these challenges. We summarize the major findings that our research has produced over the past decade, and describe our current research and future directions. Last, we discuss lessons we have learned, including difficulties in a “three models” project and how we addressed them, with suggestions for effective multidisciplinary team research. (shrink)

In this essay I address the difficult question of how citizens with conflicting religious and secular views can fulfill the democratic obligation of justifying the imposition of coercive policies to others with reasons that they can also accept. After discussing the difficulties of proposals that either exclude religious beliefs from public deliberation or include them without any restrictions, I argue instead for a policy of mutual accountability that imposes the same deliberative rights and obligations on all democratic citizens. The main (...) advantage of this proposal is that it recognizes the right of all democratic citizens to adopt their own cognitive stance in political deliberation in the public sphere without giving up on the democratic obligation to provide reasons acceptable to everyone to justify coercive policies with which all citizens must comply. (shrink)

This paper describes five theses on the characteristics of post-truth politics: (1) post-truth politics are populist politics, (2) post-truth politics are nativist politics, (3) post-truth politics are zero-sum game politics, (4) post-truth politics is emotional politics that anti-rational-factual-scientific truth, and (5) post-truth politics is autocracy politics. After describing the six theses, this paper shows conclusions and reflections on post-truth politics.

What happens when mindless symbols of algorithmic AI encounter mindful performative rituals? I return to my criticisms of Habermas’ secularising reading of Kierkegaard’s ethics. Next, I lay out Habermas’ claim that the sacred complex of ritual and myth contains the ur-origins of postmetaphysical thinking and reflective faith. If reflective faith shares with ritual same origins as does communicative interaction, how do we access these archaic ritual sources of human solidarity in the age of AI?

Este ensayo presenta una descripción de los escritos inéditos de Jacques Derrida sobre Marx y Louis Althusser en la década de 1970, y un estudio de conceptos como ideología, diferencia sexual, reproducción, violencia, dominación o hegemonía en perspectiva deconstructiva. Se trata de pensar en una otra economía, más allá de la economía del cuerpo propio. El artículo fue publicado en el Volumen 7 de la Revista Demarcaciones, "a 25 años de Espectros de Marx.".