A Modest Defence of Somewhat Selective Outrage

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Many people think there is something objectionable about ‘selective outrage’. After investigating how to best characterise what selective outrage is and what these objections target, this paper argues that many cases of supposedly selective outrage actually have important positive effects. Because we often have limited resources with which to enforce norms, it can be collectively prudent to prioritise enforcing norms that are well-established or collectively recognisable over those that are not. This will sometimes require responding to individual wrongs that seem less immoral, outrageous or in need of attention than others. We argue that when we encounter agents who are outraged about a violation of a genuinely valuable norm but not another relevantly similar violation, we should generally refrain from objecting unless we have good independent evidence the agent’s outrage stems from objectionable motives.

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Adam Piovarchy
University of Notre Dame Australia

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