Results for 'hypocrisy'

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Bibliography: Hypocrisy in Normative Ethics
  1. Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):57-80.
    Hypocrisy is a ubiquitous feature of moral and political life, and accusations of hypocrisy a ubiquitous feature of moral and political discourse. Yet it has been curiously under-theorized in analytic philosophy. Fortunately, the last decade has seen a boomlet of articles that address hypocrisy in order to explain and justify conditions on the so-called “standing” to blame (Wallace 2010; Friedman 2013; Bell 2013; Todd 2017; Herstein 2017; Roadevin 2018; Fritz and Miller 2018). Nevertheless, much of this more (...)
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  2. Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
    Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of (...)
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  3. Hypocrisy in Politics.Maggie O’Brien & Alexandra Whelan - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (63):1692-1714.
    The charge of hypocrisy is a peculiar kind of accusation: it is damning and ubiquitous; it is used to deny the hypocrite standing to speak; and it is levelled against a great variety of conduct. Much of the philosophical literature on hypocrisy is aimed at explaining why hypocrisy is wrongful and worthy of censure. We focus instead on the use of the accusation of hypocrisy and argue for a revisionary claim. People think that hypocrisy in (...)
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  4. Hypocrisy: What Counts?Mark Alicke, Ellen Gordon & David Rose - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-29.
    Hypocrisy is a multi-faceted concept that has been studied empirically by psychologists and discussed logically by philosophers. In this study, we pose various behavioral scenarios to research participants and ask them to indicate whether the actor in the scenario behaved hypocritically. We assess many of the components that have been considered to be necessary for hypocrisy (e.g., the intent to deceive, self-deception), factors that may or may not be distinguished from hypocrisy (e.g., weakness of will), and factors (...)
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  5. Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements.John Brunero - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy – in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the anti-hypocrisy requirement.
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  6. Hypocrisy as Two-Faced.Margaret Shea - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    This paper argues that there is a distinctive vice of hypocrisy, which is Janus-faced. The vice of hypocrisy is the self-excepting avoidance of a particular pain, namely, the pain associated with being an object of blame one believes deserved. One can self-exceptingly avoid this pain attitudinally or behaviorally. With “attitudinal” hypocrisy, a person avoids it at the level of her beliefs: she avoids forming the belief that she is blameworthy for some act, while blaming others for their (...)
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  7. Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia.Christopher Bartel - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):269-281.
    The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. (...)
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  8. Prolife Hypocrisy: Why Inconsistency Arguments Do Not Matter.Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce Philip Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics (Online First):1-6.
    Opponents of abortion are often described as ‘inconsistent’ (hypocrites) in terms of their beliefs, actions and/or priorities. They are alleged to do too little to combat spontaneous abortion, they should be adopting cryopreserved embryos with greater frequency and so on. These types of arguments—which we call ‘inconsistency arguments’—conform to a common pattern. Each specifies what consistent opponents of abortion would do (or believe), asserts that they fail to act (or believe) accordingly and concludes that they are inconsistent. Here, we show (...)
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  9. The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy.Benjamin Rossi - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):553-567.
    Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an (...)
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  10. Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity.Valentin Beck - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    Accusations of hypocrisy are a recurring theme in the public debate on climate change, but their significance remains poorly understood. Different motivations are associated with this accusation, which is leveled by proponents and opponents of climate action. In this article, I undertake a systematic assessment of climate hypocrisy, with a focus on lifestyle and political hypocrisy. I contextualize the corresponding accusation, introduce criteria for the conceptual analysis of climate hypocrisy, and develop an evaluative framework that allows (...)
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  11. Modesty, asymmetry, and hypocrisy.Hans Maes - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4):485-497.
    Numerous philosophers have tried to define modesty, but none of them succeeds in articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions for this virtue. Moreover, all existing accounts ignore the striking self-other asymmetry that is at the heart of modesty. Drawing on the analogy with the practice of giving presents, I clarify and further investigate this self-other asymmetry. In the process, I show why Bernard Williams is right in pointing out the notorious truth that a modest person does not act under the (...)
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  12. Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Pascal Engel (2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)— relies on a presupposition (...)
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  13. Bernard Mandeville on Honor, Hypocrisy, and War.Peter Olsthoorn - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 60 (2):205-218.
    Authors from Cicero to Smith held honor to be indispensable to make people see and do what is right. As they considered honor to be a social motive, they did not think this dependence on honor was a problem. Today, we tend to see honor as a self‐regarding motive, but do not see this as problematic because we stopped seeing it as a necessary incentive. Bernard Mandeville, however, agreed with the older authors that honor is indispensable, but agreed with us (...)
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  14. Justifying Standing to Give Reasons: Hypocrisy, Minding Your Own Business, and Knowing One's Place.Ori J. Herstein - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (7).
    What justifies practices of “standing”? Numerous everyday practices exhibit the normativity of standing: forbidding certain interventions and permitting ignoring them. The normativity of standing is grounded in facts about the person intervening and not on the validity of her intervention. When valid, directives are reasons to do as directed. When interventions take the form of directives, standing practices may permit excluding those directives from one’s practical deliberations, regardless of their validity or normative weight. Standing practices are, therefore, puzzling – forbidding (...)
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  15. Kant and the king: Lying promises, conventional implicature, and hypocrisy.Roy Sorensen & Ian Proops - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):51-63.
    Immanuel Kant promised, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’, to abstain from all public lectures about religion. All past commentators agree this phrase permitted Kant to return to the topic after the King died. But it is not part of the ‘at-issue content’. Consequently, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’ is no more an escape clause than the corresponding phrase in ‘I guarantee, as your devoted fan, that these guitar strings will not break’. Just as the guarantee stands regardless of whether the (...)
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  16. The Significance of Al Gore’s Purported Hypocrisy.Scott F. Aiken - 2009 - Environmental Ethics 31 (1):111-112.
    This paper is a survey of a variety of hypocrisy charges levied against Al Gore. Understood properly, these hypocrisy charges actually support Gore's case.
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  17. The Specter of Narration and Hypocrisy in Albert Camus’ The Fall.Jan Gresil Kahambing - 2020 - Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 28 (1):207-220.
    In this paper, I explored what Sartre referred to as Camus’ ‘most beautiful and least understood novel,’ The Fall. As a methodology, I applied textual hermeneutics to immerse in the text and got out of it what I deemed as the crux of its existentialism as founded in the two-in-one leitmotif of narration and hypocrisy. In Clamence, there was a profound need – a specter that lingered and haunted – to narrate his life, especially the fall that triggered it (...)
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  18. Wokeness is Inverted Fascism plus Hypocrisy: a Libertarian Perspective.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    This is an attempt to clarify the nature of extreme, or complete, “wokeness” in its modern sense. The central thesis is that it is an inverted form of fascism, and thereby even worse than some of its critics assume. In fact, it is far worse than ordinary fascism whether or not it is correct to see it as an inverted form. As this is a thesis, it is not a definition. Therefore, this thesis could certainly be mistaken. But if it (...)
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  19.  94
    To ski or to preach from the mountaintop of hypocrisy.Mihai Nadin - 2019 - Medium.
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  20. The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is (...)
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  21. The Impossibility of Hypocritical Advice.Casey Hall - 2023 - Southwest Philosophy Review 39 (1):193-200.
    Charging others with hypocrisy often acts as a way of rejecting the practical reasons they attempt to give (Herstein, 2017). There are some merits to a practice of rejecting reasons. To accept others’ provided reasons as valid is to affirm their authority in the relevant normative domain (Isserow and Klein, 2017). Conversely, to reject these reasons as invalid is to undermine the reason-givers’ authority in the domain. However, this practice can be rife with abuse—if we allow charges of ‘Hypocrite!’ (...)
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  22. On Hypocrisy1.Eva Feder Kittay - 1982 - Metaphilosophy 13 (3-4):277-289.
    I explore what and when hypocrisy is a moral wrong by interrogating the case of hypocrisy of Julien in Stendhal's The Red and The Black. I conclude hypocrisy is most morally vexed in those sphere where sincerity is required.
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  23. The paradox of self-blame.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):111–125.
    It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?”. But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for (...)
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  24. A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.Patrick Todd - 2019 - Noûs 53:347-374.
    Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: -/- 1. One’s blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing. 3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the (...)
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  25. Authenticity in Political Discourse.Ben Jones - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):489-504.
    Judith Shklar, David Runciman, and others argue against what they see as excessive criticism of political hypocrisy. Such arguments often assume that communicating in an authentic manner is an impossible political ideal. This article challenges the characterization of authenticity as an unrealistic ideal and makes the case that its value can be grounded in a certain political realism sensitive to the threats posed by representative democracy. First, by analyzing authenticity’s demands for political discourse, I show that authenticity has greater (...)
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  26. Hypercrisy and standing to self-blame.Hannah Tierney - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):262-269.
    In a 2020 article in Analysis, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that (...)
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  27. Let's See You Do Better.Patrick Todd - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    In response to criticism, we often say – in these or similar words – “Let’s see you do better!” Prima facie, it looks like this response is a challenge of a certain kind – a challenge to prove that one has what has recently been called standing. More generally, the data here seems to point a certain kind of norm of criticism: be better. Slightly more carefully: One must: criticize x with respect to standard s only if one is better (...)
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  28. On Losing One's Moral Voice.Neal Tognazzini - manuscript
    Although it is widely accepted that hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame others who have committed similar wrongs, an account of what it is that’s lost when someone loses their standing to blame remains elusive. When moral address is inappropriate because it is or would be hypocritical, what is the precise nature of the complaint that the blamed party is entitled to raise, and that so often gets voiced as “I don’t have to take that from you”? In this (...)
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  29. Epistemically Hypocritical Blame.Alexandra Cunningham - 2024 - Episteme:1-19.
    It is uncontroversial that something goes wrong with the blaming practices of hypocrites. However, it is more difficult to pinpoint exactly what is objectionable about their blaming practices. I contend that, just as epistemologists have recently done with blame, we can constructively treat hypocrisy as admitting of an epistemic species. This paper has two objectives: first, to identify the epistemic fault in epistemically hypocritical blame, and second, to explain why epistemically hypocritical blamers lose their standing to epistemically blame. I (...)
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  30. On Complacency.Jason Kawall - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):343-55.
    This paper begins by drawing attention to inadequacies in common characterizations of the vice of complacency. An alternative account is presented that avoids these flaws. The distinctive nature of complacency is then clarified by contrasting it with related vices, including apathy, resignation, akrasia, excessive pride, and hypocrisy.
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  31. Whataboutisms and Inconsistency.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2020 - Argumentation 34 (4):433-447.
    Despite being very common in both public and private argumentation, accusations of selective application of general premises, also known as “whataboutisms”, have been mostly overlooked in argumentation studies, where they are, at most, taken as accusations of inconsistency. Here I will defend an account according to which allegations of this sort can express the suspicion that the argumentation put forward by one party does not reflect his or her actual standpoint and reasons. Distinguishing this kind of argumentative moves is important (...)
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  32. Understanding the Dangers of Mind Changes in Political Leadership (and How to Avoid Them).Kyle G. Fritz - 2023 - Social Theory and Practice 49 (4):653-679.
    Political leaders may change their mind about a policy, or even a significant moral issue. While genuinely changing one’s mind is not hypocritical, there are reasons to think that leaders who claim such a change are merely hypocritically pandering for political advantage. Indeed, some social science studies allegedly confirm that constituents will judge political leaders who change positions as hypocritical. Yet these studies are missing crucial details that we normally use to distinguish genuine mind changers from hollow hypocrites. These details (...)
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  33. Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit.Hans Maes & Katrien8 Schaubroeck - 2006 - In Hardcastle Reisch (ed.), Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court.
    In this paper, we aim to show that there is a particular kind of bullshit that is not dealt with in Harry Frankfurt’s and G.A. Cohen’s critiques of bullshit. We also point out the evaluative complexity of bullshit. Frankfurt and Cohen both stress its negative and possibly destructive aspects, but one might wonder whether bullshit need always and necessarily be reprehensible. We will argue that there are positive or at least neutral aspects to some kinds of bullshit.
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  34. Many shades of ressentiment.Ignace Haaz & Ivana Zagorac - 2023 - In Ignace Haaz, Jakob Bühlmann Quero & Khushwant Singh (eds.), Ethics and Overcoming Odious Passions: Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism through Shared Human Values in Education. Geneva (Switzerland): Globethics Publications. pp. 33-58.
    In philosophical literature, the complex emotional state of ressentiment gained popularity through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment was a bad feeling that reflected the suppressed anger, the pain of impotence, and the general misery of the weak when they compared themselves to the strong and talented members of society. Max Scheler took up Nietzsche’s thesis and described ressentiment as a complex condition characterised by a thirst for revenge. Moreover, ressentiment has the annoying property of presenting itself (...)
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  35. Konfuçyüs Öğretisinde Nepotizm Sorunu.İlknur Sertdemir - 2022 - Felsefe Dünyasi 1 (75):364-383.
    The teaching of Confucius, one of the doctrines built Chinese philosophy, is the movement of thought that has penetrated politics, education, manners and customs in East Asia for centuries. Reading the principles that advise wisdom and virtue through classical texts, we can find out normative moral knowledge. This teaching, in which ethical standards guiding human relations are regulative, promotes hierarchy as required by patriarchal and patrimonial regime. Social structure is grounded on discrimination between nobles and commons. Since the rights and (...)
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  36. Democracy’s Values and Ideals: A Duboisian Defence.Elvira Basevich - 2024 - The Monist 107 (1):13-25.
    This essay offers a Duboisian defense of democracy’s expressive and experimental values. It argues that the expressive value of democracy supports an ideal of inclusion, whereas the experimental value of democracy supports that of innovation. One appeals to the ideal of inclusion to extend to excluded groups codified constitutional protections and to condemn white hypocrisy. The ideal of innovation, in contrast, helps one reimagine what constitutional protections should be in the first place. Drawing on Du Bois’s writings, this essay (...)
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  37. Getting Less Cynical about Virtue.Joshua May - 2017 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Christian Miller (eds.), Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character. MIT Press. pp. 45-52.
    This is a commentary on a paper by the social psychologist C. Daniel Batson. I too think virtue is rare, but not so rare as Batson seems to think, despite his ingenious experiments on "moral hypocrisy.".
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  38. American History X, Cinematic Manipulation, and Moral Conversion.Christopher Grau - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):52-76.
    American History X (hereafter AHX) has been accused by numerous critics of a morally dangerous cinematic seduction: using stylish cinematography, editing, and sound, the film manipulates the viewer through glamorizing an immoral and hate-filled neo-nazi protagonist. In addition, there’s the disturbing fact that the film seems to accomplish this manipulation through methods commonly grouped under the category of “fascist aesthetics.” More specifically, AHX promotes its neo-nazi hero through the use of several filmic techniques made famous by Nazi propagandist Leni Riefenstahl. (...)
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  39. Dismissing Blame.Justin Snedegar - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (3).
    When someone blames you, you might accept the blame or you might reject it, challenging the blamer’s interpretation of the facts or providing a justification or excuse. Either way, there are opportunities for edifying moral discussion and moral repair. But another common, and less constructive, response is to simply dismiss the blame, refusing to engage with the blamer. Even if you agree that you are blameworthy, you may refuse to engage with the blame—and, specifically, with blame coming from this particular (...)
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  40. Backlash: What Happens When We Talk Honestly About Racism in America by George Yancy.Tina Fernandes Botts - 2019 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 9 (1):166-173.
    George Yancy's Backlash is a book about American racism. It is the story of what often happens when blacks dare to challenge whiteness on its hubris, or on its appallingly obvious hypocrisy. It is the story of the anger and violence that often arises in the white American in the aftermath of such a challenge, generating in him or her a need to humiliate and destroy the source of the diminished (and fragile) white sense of self. Racism is not (...)
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  41. Double effect reasoning: why we need it.Helen Watt - 2017 - Ethics and Medicine 33 (1):13-19.
    The “principle of double effect” is a vital tool for moral decision making and is applicable to all areas of medical practice, including (for example) end-of-life care, transplant medicine, and cases of conscientious objection. Both our ultimate and our more immediate intentions are relevant in making and evaluating choices— though side effects must be kept proportionate and can be morally conclusive when linked with some intentions. Intentions help to form the character of doctors, and of human beings generally. While (...) is certainly possible in regard to this form (and other forms) of moral reasoning, double effect reasoning, sincerely practised, remains indispensable in identifying moral problems and solutions. (shrink)
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  42. Twisted Pictures: morality, nihilism and symbolic suicide in the Saw series.Steve Jones - 2013 - In James Aston & John Walliss (eds.), To See the Saw Movies: Essays on Torture Porn and Post-9/11 Horror. McFarland. pp. 105-122.
    Given that numerous critics have complained about Saw’s apparently confused sense of ethics, it is surprising that little attention has been paid to how morality operates in narrative itself. Coming from a Nietzschean perspective - specifically questioning whether the lead torturer Jigsaw is a passive or a radical nihilist - I seek to rectify that oversight. This philosophical reading of the series explores Jigsaw’s moral stance, which is complicated by his hypocrisy: I contend that this underpins critical complaints regarding (...)
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  43. Agitating for Munificence or Going Out of Business: Philosophy’s Dilemma.Susan T. Gardner - 2011 - Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis 31 (1):1-4.
    Philosophy has a dirty little secret and it is this: a whole lot of philosophers have swallowed the mechanistic billiard ball deterministic view of human action—presumably because philosophy assumes that science demands it, and/or because modern attempts to articulate in what free will consists seem incoherent. This below-the-surface-purely-academic commitment to mechanistic determinism is a dirty little secret because an honest public commitment would render virtually all that is taught in philosophy departments incomprehensible. Can “lovers of wisdom” really continue to tolerate (...)
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  44. Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel J. Miller - forthcoming - Ergo.
    Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, (...)
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  45. The epistemic costs of compromise in bioethics.Katrien Devolder & Thomas Douglas - 2017 - Bioethics 32 (2):111-118.
    Bioethicists sometimes defend compromise positions, particularly when they enter debates on applied topics that have traditionally been highly polarised, such as those regarding abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. However, defending compromise positions is often regarded with a degree of disdain. Many are intuitively attracted to the view that it is almost always problematic to defend compromise positions, in the sense that we have a significant moral reason not to do so. In this paper, we consider whether this common (...)
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  46. A Case for Global Democracy? Arms Exports and Conflicting Goals in Democracy Promotion.Pavel Dufek & Michal Mochťak - 2019 - Journal of International Relations and Development 22 (3):610–639.
    Employing the framework of conflicting goals in democracy promotion as departure point, the paper addresses the issue of arms exports to non-democratic countries as an important research topic which points to a reconsideration of certain fundamental conceptual and normative commitments underpinning democracy promotion. Empirically, we remind of the lingering hypocrisy of Western arms exporters, knowing that exports to non-democratic countries often hinder or block democratisation. This is not easily circumvented, because of the many conflicting objectives both internal and external (...)
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  47. New Twist to Political Corruption in 4th Republic Nigeria given Non-Human Animals Stealing millions: A Case for the Defense of Animal Rights.Amaobi Nelson Osuala - 2018 - GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis 1 (2).
    Corruption has assumed a new turn in 4th Republic Nigeria, particularly where non-human animals are alleged by human animals to deep their hands into the public tilt for their selfish non-human animal purposes. This is a clear case of hypocrisy on the part of human animals in that, at one instance we contend that non-human animals are inferior to human beings and at the other instance, we affirm though inadvertently that non-human animals are not inferior but equal since they (...)
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  48. What's A Just War Theorist?Aleksandar Jokic - 2012 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology 4 (2):91-114.
    The article provides an account of the unlikely revival of the medieval Just War Theory, due in large part to the efforts of Michael Walzer. Its purpose is to address the question: What is a just war theorist? By exploring contrasts between scholarly activity and forms of international activism, the paper argues that just war theorists appear to be just war criminals, both on the count of aiding and abetting aggression and on the count of inciting troops to commit war (...)
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  49. Attacking authority.Matthews Steve - 2011 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 13 (2):59-70.
    The quality of our public discourse – think of the climate change debate for instance – is never very high. A day spent observing it reveals a litany of misrepresentation and error, argumentative fallacy, and a general lack of good will. In this paper I focus on a microcosmic aspect of these practices: the use of two types of argument – the argumentum ad hominem and appeal to authority – and a way in which they are related. Public debate is (...)
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    Moral dimensionality.Jedrzej Stefanowicz - manuscript
    In modern, culturally-heterogeneous societies, inefficiency of communication of important moral concepts is often evidenced by asymmetrical moral judgements and hypocritical behaviour, especially in our increasingly compartmentalised social landscapes [Rozuel 2011]. This raises the question of how to present target audiences with some (perhaps novel) moral concept, like an ethical dimension of one’s ecological attitude, in a way which would resonate with them, and be conducive to a coherent moral stance, decreasing action-observer biases. We analyse this problem by introducing a formal (...)
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