Intuition and concrete particularity in Kant's transcendental aesthetic

In Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen & Tony O'Connor (eds.), Rediscovering Aesthetics: Transdisciplinary Voices from Art History, Philosophy, and Art Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. pp. 193-212 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects.
Keywords
Reprint years
2008
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PIPIAC-11
Upload history
First archival date: 2017-05-08
Latest version: 1 (2017-05-08)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
465 ( #14,034 of 64,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #40,485 of 64,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.