A New Problem with Mixed Decisions, Or: You’ll Regret Reading This Article, But You Still Should

Erkenntnis 81 (2):349-373 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Andy Egan recently drew attention to a class of decision situations that provide a certain kind of informational feedback, which he claims constitute a counterexample to causal decision theory. Arntzenius and Wallace have sought to vindicate a form of CDT by describing a dynamic process of deliberation that culminates in a “mixed” decision. I show that, for many of the cases in question, this proposal depends on an incorrect way of calculating expected utilities, and argue that it is therefore unsuccessful. I then tentatively defend an alternative proposal by Joyce, which produces a similar process of dynamic deliberation but for a different reason.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PLOANP
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-03-14
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-10-01

Total views
146 ( #39,152 of 65,546 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #55,665 of 65,546 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.