Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem

Mind 129 (513):43-70 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to recent skepticism about such views.

Author's Profile

Abelard Podgorski
National University of Singapore


Added to PP

315 (#30,520)

6 months
111 (#10,006)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?