Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem

Mind 129 (513):43-70 (2020)
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In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to recent skepticism about such views.
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First archival date: 2021-05-12
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