Phenomenal Concepts and Incomplete Understanding

Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):15-17 (2012)
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It is often thought that acquiring a phenomenal concept requires having the relevant sort of experience. In "Extending Phenomenal Concepts", Andreas Elpidorou defends this position from an objection raised by Michael Tye (in "Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts"). Here, I argue that Elpidorou fails to attend to important supporting materials introduced by Tye.

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Adam C. Podlaskowski
Fairmont State University


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