Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-02-19
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
164 ( #25,406 of 51,459 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #16,048 of 51,459 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.