Life as a Trust Game: a comment on The Option Value of Life

Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):300-308 (2022)
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Abstract

According to Burri, a major reason why suicide is often irrational lies in the option value of life. Remaining alive is valuable because this allows for a larger menu of options, and the possibility of committing suicide in the future adds further value to the act of remaining alive now. In this note, I represent life as a trust game played by two selves – the young self and the old self – and I argue that the possibility to commit suicide in the future can encourage committing suicide now, against what the theory of the option value of life predicts.

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Grégory Ponthière
Catholic University of Louvain

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