A proof-theoretical view of collective rationality
In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013) (2013)
Abstract
The impossibility results in judgement aggregation
show a clash between fair aggregation procedures
and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we
are interested in analysing the notion of rational
outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical understanding
of collective rationality. In particular, we
use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided
by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained notion
of group reasoning that allows for studying
collective rationality with respect to a number of
logics. We analyse the well-known paradoxes in
judgement aggregation and we pinpoint the reasoning
steps that trigger the inconsistencies. Moreover,
we extend the map of possibility and impossibility
results in judgement aggregation by discussing the
case of substructural logics. In particular, we show
that there exist fragments of linear logic for which
general possibility results can be obtained.
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2014-10-29
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144 ( #31,533 of 55,922 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #42,193 of 55,922 )
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