Modelling Combinatorial Auctions in Linear Logic

In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference, {KR} 2010, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, May 9-13, 2010 (2010)
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We show that linear logic can serve as an expressive framework in which to model a rich variety of combinatorial auction mechanisms. Due to its resource-sensitive nature, linear logic can easily represent bids in combinatorial auctions in which goods may be sold in multiple units, and we show how it naturally generalises several bidding languages familiar from the literature. Moreover, the winner determination problem, i.e., the problem of computing an allocation of goods to bidders producing a certain amount of revenue for the auctioneer, can be modelled as the problem of finding a proof for a particular linear logic sequent.
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