Moral Worth and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns

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Abstract
Some right acts have what philosophers call moral worth. A right act has moral worth if and only if it manifests a set of motives/concerns that makes its agent deserving of praise for having non-accidentally done what’s right. I argue that what makes an agent deserving of praise for having non-accidentally done what’s right is that her act manifests an appropriate set of concerns, where the appropriateness of these concerns is a function what her ultimate moral concerns should be. Two important upshots of the resulting account of moral worth are that (1) an act can have moral worth even if it doesn’t manifest a concern for doing what’s right and that (2) an act can lack moral worth even if it is performed for the right reasons.
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Archival date: 2020-10-13
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2020-10-13

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