Rule-following and Functions

O Que Nos Faz Pensar 33:95-141 (2013)
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Abstract
This paper presents a new reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s famous (and controversial) rule-following arguments. Two are the novel features offered by our reconstruction. In the first place, we propose a shift of the central focus of the discussion, from the general semantics and the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of mathematics and the rejection of the notion of a function. The second new feature is positive: we argue that Wittgenstein offers us a new alternative notion of a rule (to replace the rejected functions), a notion reminiscent of Category Theory’s notion of a morphism.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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