Opacity, belief and analyticity

Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306 (1992)
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Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in virtue of meaning alone? The paper closes by hinting at an account of analyticity from an externalist perspective.
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