Opacity, belief and analyticity

Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306 (1992)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in virtue of meaning alone? The paper closes by hinting at an account of analyticity from an externalist perspective.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-12-31
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
De Re Senses.McDowell, John

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
212 ( #20,058 of 48,952 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #33,625 of 48,952 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.