Mechanistic Causation: Difference-Making is Enough

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 3 (38):53-75 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper we defend the view that mechanisms are underpinned by networks of difference-making relations. First, we distinguish and criticise two different kinds of arguments in favour of an activity-based understanding of mechanism: Glennan’s metaphysics- first approach and Illari and Williamson’s science-first approach. Second, we present an alternative difference-making view of mechanism and illustrate it by looking at the history of the case of scurvy prevention. We use the case of scurvy to argue that evidence for a mechanism just is evidence for difference-making relations.

Author Profiles

Stathis Psillos
University of Athens
Stavros Ioannidis
University of Athens


Added to PP

257 (#63,657)

6 months
71 (#68,265)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?