Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Deep brain stimulation has been of considerable interest to bioethicists, in large part because of the effects that the intervention can occasionally have on central features of the recipient’s personality. These effects raise questions regarding the philosophical concept of authenticity. In this article, we expand on our earlier work on the concept of authenticity in the context of deep brain stimulation by developing a diachronic, value-based account of authenticity. Our account draws on both existentialist and essentialist approaches to authenticity, and Laura Waddell Ekstrom’s coherentist approach to personal autonomy. In developing our account, we respond to Sven Nyholm and Elizabeth O’Neill’s synchronic approach to authenticity, and explain how the diachronic approach we defend can have practical utility, contrary to Alexandre Erler and Tony Hope’s criticism of autonomy-based approaches to authenticity. Having drawn a distinction between the authenticity of an individual’s traits and the authenticity of that person’s values, we consider how our conception of authenticity applies to the context of anorexia nervosa in comparison to other prominent accounts of authenticity. We conclude with some reflections on the prudential value of authenticity, and by highlighting how the language of authenticity can be invoked to justify covert forms of paternalism that run contrary to the value of individuality that seems to be at the heart of authenticity.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PUGDBS
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation for the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa.Maslen, Hannah; Pugh, Jonathan & Savulescu, Julian
Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?Focquaert, Farah & Schermer, Maartje
A Coherence Theory of Autonomy.Ekstrom, Laura Waddell

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-10-25

Total views
66 ( #25,684 of 37,213 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #18,535 of 37,213 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.