Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity

Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744 (2018)
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Abstract
Larry Temkin famously argues that what he calls spectrum arguments yield strong reason to reject Transitivity, according to which the ‘all-things-considered better than’ relation is transitive. Spectrum arguments do reveal that the conjunctions of independently plausible claims are inconsistent with Transitivity. But I argue that there is very strong independent reason to reject such conjunctions of claims, and thus that the fact that they are inconsistent with Transitivity does not yield strong reason to reject Transitivity.
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2017, 2018
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Archival date: 2018-12-02
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2017-05-25

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