Finitism, Divisibilty, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):808-813 (2016)
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Some philosophers contend that the past must be finite in duration, because otherwise reaching the present would have involved the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events, which they regard as impossible. I recently developed a new objection to this finitist argument, to which Andrew Ter Ern Loke and Travis Dumsday have replied. Here I respond to the three main points raised in their replies.
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Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe.Stephen Puryear - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):619-629.
Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology.Craig, William Lane & Smith, Quentin

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