Abstract

When is a genealogical approach to our conceptual practices called for? In contrast to Miranda Fricker’s interpretation of pragmatic genealogies as elaborate ways of achieving what could equally be achieved with paradigm-based explanations that dispense with historicizing and fictionalizing, an account of pragmatic genealogy is developed which shows that it would be a mistake to replace pragmatic genealogies with paradigm-based explanations across the board. When dealing with self-effacingly functional practices, paradigm-based explanation misses important aspects that pragmatic genealogy is better suited to capturing. And when dealing with historically inflected practices that lack a paradigm case or an obvious connection to generic human needs, paradigm-based explanation fails to get a grip; by achieving a grip even here and giving us a comprehensive view of the historical amalgam of generic and local needs to which our practices answer, pragmatic genealogy earns its keep alongside paradigm-based explanation.