Hume on Mental Transparency

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):576-601 (2017)
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This article investigates Hume's account of mental transparency. In this article, I will endorse Qualitative Transparency – that is, the thesis that we cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our current perceptions, and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical – on the basis that, unlike its competitors, it is both weak enough to accommodate the introspective mistakes that Hume recognises, and yet strong enough to make sense of his positive employments of mental transparency. Moreover, Qualitative Transparency is also philosophically satisfying in providing good philosophical reason for why the mental states that are incorrigible should in fact be so.

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Hsueh Qu
National University of Singapore


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