The simple duality: Humean passions

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):98-116 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume’s treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (1997).

Author's Profile

Hsueh Qu
National University of Singapore

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-30

Downloads
469 (#48,369)

6 months
135 (#32,438)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?