Understanding How Experience "seems"

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Abstract
I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides support for the naïve-realist theory and weighs against sense-data theories . If my argument is correct, and we abandon this way of understanding how experience “seems”, we would lose one reason for favouring naïve-realism at the start of the dialectic of the traditional problem of perception. En route, I distinguish diff erent ways of understanding the transparency of experience, consider how to make sense of rival theorists’ disagreement over the manifest nature of visual phenomenology and recount a story about Wittgenstein
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2010-10-07

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