A Conditional Defense of Shame and Shame Punishment

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper makes two essential claims about the nature of shame and shame punishment. I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, that it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, & Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both emotions to “whole-self” properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and nonmoralized shame in order to show when, and how, moral and non-moral shame may be justly deployed. Shame is appropriate, I argue, if and only if it targets malleable moral or non-moral normative imperfections of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ Shame is unjustifiable when it targets durable aspects of a person’s “whole-self.” I conclude by distinguishing shame punishments from guilt punishments and show that my account can explain why it is wrong to shame individuals on account of their race, sex, gender, or body while permitting us to sometimes levy shame and shame punishment against others, even those otherwise immune to moral reasons.
ISBN(s)
1584-174X  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RAMACD-5
Revision history
First archival date: 2017-06-01
Latest version: 3 (2019-06-13)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-06-01

Total views
315 ( #10,065 of 41,542 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
146 ( #2,772 of 41,542 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.