‘BOGHOSSIAN’S BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL

Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RAMBBR
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-04-08

Total views
385 ( #7,094 of 39,647 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #19,715 of 39,647 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.