Abstract
In this paper, I argue for a version of panpsychist idealism on first-person experiential
grounds. As things always appear in my field of consciousness, there is prima facie
empirical support for idealism. Furthermore, by assuming that all things correspond to
a conscious perspective or perspectives (i.e., panpsychism), realism about the world is
arguably safeguarded without the need to appeal to God (as per Berkeley’s idealism).
Panpsychist idealism also has a phenomenological advantage over traditional
panpsychist views as it does not commit perceptual experience to massive error by
denying that perceived colours are properties of things. Finally, I argue that the subject
combination problem for panpsychism has been motivated by the problematic
assumption that consciousness is in things. Thinking about subject combination from
the first-person perspective is fruitful for reframing the subject combination problem
and for seeing how subjects could potentially combine for the idealist.