Results for 'Panpsychism'

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  1. Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the (...)
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  2. Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the (...)
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  3. Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge.
    The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem, the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance (...)
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  4.  34
    Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism.Yujin Nagasawa & Khai Wager - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 113-129.
    A contemporary form of panpsychism says that phenomenality is prevalent because all physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal or protophenomenal properties. According to priority cosmopsychism, an alternative to panpsychism that we propose in this chapter, phenomenality is prevalent because the whole cosmos instantiates phenomenal or protophenomenal properties. It says, moreover, that the consciousness of the cosmos is ontologically prior to the consciousness of ordinary individuals like us. Since priority cosmopsychism is a highly speculative view our aim in this chapter remains (...)
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  5. Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (2):186-201.
    Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti-realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual-aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by (...)
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  6.  30
    Can the Berkeleyan Idealist Resist Spinozist Panpsychism?Graham Clay & Michael Rauschenbach - forthcoming - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy.
    We argue that prevailing definitions of Berkeley’s idealism fail to rule out a nearby Spinozist rival view that we call ‘mind-body identity panpsychism’. Since Berkeley certainly does not agree with Spinoza on this issue, we call for more care in defining Berkeley’s view. After we propose our own definition of Berkeley’s idealism, we survey two Berkeleyan strategies to block the mind-body identity panpsychist and establish his idealism. We argue that Berkeley should follow Leibniz and further develop his account of (...)
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  7. Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - 2016 - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
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  8.  48
    Panpsychism in the Recent Debates About the Mind.Jacek Jarocki - 2018 - Diametros (59):49-64.
    The purpose of this article is to present contemporary varieties of panpsychism, i.e. a metaphysical view according to which at least some of the fundamental properties which constitute the world are mental. Despite its popularity in the history of philosophy, the view has been thought, in the analytic tradition, to be unscientific. Nevertheless, in light of some insolvable problems with the explanation of mind, panpsychism has become a view which is taken seriously as a correct metaphysical theory. In (...)
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  9. An Analytic Perspective on Panpsychism: A Book Review of Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2017 - Metascience 26 (3):471-474.
    This is an important collection in that it fleshes out the vague postulate of panpsychism with a detailed analysis of how it might be understood (if not exactly what it might mean). For the many skeptics who simply dismiss the very idea as ridiculous, there is much here to demonstrate that a good deal of serious thought has gone into this ancient proposal. There are many ways to interpret panpsychism, and they are well represented in this group of (...)
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  10.  47
    Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, and Neutral Monism.Donovan Wishon - 2017 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Philosophy: Mind (MacMillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks). Farmington Hills, MI: pp. 51-70.
    This chapter provides an introduction to panpsychism, panprotopsychism, and neutral monism to an interdisciplinary audience.
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  11. A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Cognitive Computation 1 (3):221-233.
    The journal of Cognitive Computation is defined in part by the notion that biologically inspired computational accounts are at the heart of cognitive processes in both natural and artificial systems. Many studies of various important aspects of cognition (memory, observational learning, decision making, reward prediction learning, attention control, etc.) have been made by modelling the various experimental results using ever-more sophisticated computer programs. In this manner progressive inroads have been made into gaining a better understanding of the many components of (...)
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  12. Margaret Cavendish, Environmental Ethics, and Panpsychism.Stewart Duncan - manuscript
    Margaret Cavendish (1623-73) held a number of surprising philosophical views. These included a materialist panpsychism, and some views in what we might call environmental ethics. Panpsychism, though certainly not unheard of, is still often a surprising view. Views in environmental ethics - even just views that involve a measure of environmental concern - are unusual to find in early modern European philosophy. Cavendish held both of these surprising views. One might suspect that panpsychism provides some reasons for (...)
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  13. What Panpsychists Should Reject: On the Incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.
    Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the (...)
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  14. Bayle and Panpsychism.Jean-Luc Solère - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (1):64-101.
    Pierre Bayle shows that, in order to avoid devastating objections, materialism should postulate that the property of thinking does not emerge from certain material combinations but is present in matter from the start and everywhere—a hypothesis recently revived and labelled “panpsychism”. There are reasons for entertaining the idea that Bayle actually considers this enhanced materialism to be tenable, as it might use the same line of defence that Bayle outlined for Stratonism. However, this would lead to a view similar (...)
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  15. Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
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  16. Panpsychism: Ubiquitous Sentience.Peter Sjöstedt-H. - 2018 - High Existence 1.
    This public article presents three arguments for the plausibility of panpsychism: the view that sentience is a fundamental and ubiquitous element of actuality. Thereafter is presented a brief exploration of why panpsychism has been spurned. The article was commissioned by High Existence. -/- – Introduction – 1. The Genetic Argument – 2. The Abstraction Argument – 3. The Inferential Argument – Why Panpsychism is Spurned – End Remarks.
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  17. The Argument for Panpsychism From Experience of Causation.Hedda Hassel Mørch - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
    In recent philosophical literature, panpsychism has been defended by appeal to two main arguments. First, an argument from philosophy of mind, according to which panpsychism is the only view which successfully integrates consciousness into the physical world (Strawson 2006; Chalmers 2015). Second, an argument from categorical properties, according to which panpsychism offers the only positive account of the intrinsic, categorical nature of physical reality (Seager 2006; Adams 2007; Alter and Nagasawa 2012). Historically, however, panpsychism has also (...)
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  18. Panpsychism and Structural Realism.Godehard Brüntrup - 2011 - In Michael Blamauer (ed.), The Mental as Fundamental. New Perspectives on Panpsychism. pp. 15-35.
    Paper on structural realism and how its problems lend support to some kind of panpsychism.
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  19. David Skrbina (Ed.): Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. [REVIEW]Susan Stuart - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (3):271-275.
    David Skrbina opens this timely and intriguing text with a suitably puzzling line from the Diamond Sutra: ‘‘Mind that abides nowhere must come forth.’’, and he urges us to ‘‘de-emphasise the quest for the specifically human embodiment of mind’’ and follow Empedocles, progressing ‘‘with good will and unclouded attention’’ into the text which he has drawn together as editor. If we do, we are assured that it will ‘‘yield great things’’ (p. xi). This, I am pleased to say, is not (...)
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  20.  27
    Panpsychism and Real Mental Causation.Lorenzo Sleakes - manuscript
    The following paper is a panpsychist metaphysics and seeks to avoid any radical emergence of mentality. Science has progressed by stripping the world of all mental qualities but a complete understanding of the world must ultimately put these back. The two types of mental qualities that must be reinstated as fundamentals are the private worlds of individual subjects and phenomenal qualities like colors. I view these as separate aspects of mind although they have a history of being conflated. In this (...)
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  21.  67
    Introducing a Non-Physicalist Conception of Panpsychism.Peter E. Ells - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Reading
    The aim of this dissertation is to provide an elementary example of a panpsychic universe. It is one in which – in contrast to physicalism – the experiential (defined in terms of the possession of a qualitative, subjective, structured percept) is the foundation of existence. In this panpsychism, physics is secondary because it is arrived at by collating the experiences of a collection of experiential entities as they perceive one another.
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  22. In Defense of Panpsychism.William Meacham - manuscript
    Presents in outline form a logical argument for Panpsychism, the idea that everything has an aspect of psyche or mind to it.
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  23.  25
    Pansentient Monism: Formulating Panpsychism as a Genuine Psycho-Physical Identity Theory [PhD Thesis: Abstract & Contents Pages].Peter Sjöstedt-H. - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Essex
    The thesis that follows proffers a solution to the mind-matter problem, the problem as to how mind and matter relate. The proposed solution herein is a variant of panpsychism – the theory that all (pan) has minds (psyche) – that we name pansentient monism. By defining the suffix 'psyche' of panpsychism, i.e. by analysing what 'mind' is (Chapter 1), we thereby initiate the effacement of the distinction between mind and matter, and thus advance a monism. We thereafter critically (...)
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  24. Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2014 - Dissertation, Oslo
    Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting (...)
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  25. Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being.Luke Roelofs & Jed Buchanan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2991-3017.
    Some philosophical theories of consciousness imply consciousness in things we would never intuitively think are conscious—most notably, panpsychism implies that consciousness is pervasive, even outside complex brains. Is this a reductio ab absurdum for such theories, or does it show that we should reject our original intuitions? To understand the stakes of this question as clearly as possible, we analyse the structured pattern of intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with. We consider a variety of ways that the tension between (...)
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  26. Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Topoi:1-16.
    According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties – in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but (...)
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  27. Panpsychism.Godehard Brüntrup - 2013 - In Robert Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy. Gale. pp. 1119-1120.
    Encyclopedia entry about "Panpsychism".
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  28. Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion.William Seager - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.
    Deferential Monadic Panpsychism is a view that accepts that physical science is capable of discovering the basic structure of reality. However, it denies that reality is fully and exhaustively de- scribed purely in terms of physical science. Consciousness is missing from the physical description and cannot be reduced to it. DMP explores the idea that the physically fundamental features of the world possess some intrinsic mental aspect. It thereby faces a se- vere problem of understanding how more complex mental (...)
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  29. Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism.John Mark Bishop - 2002 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 360-379.
    The argument presented in this paper is not a direct attack or defence of the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this paper will explore the associated link between syntax and physics. The main (...)
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  30.  37
    Forming a Positive Concept of the Phenomenal Bonding Relation for Constitutive Panpsychism.Gregory Miller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (4):541-562.
    Philip Goff has recently argued that due to the ‘subject-summing problem’, panpsychism cannot explain consciousness. The subject-summing problem is a problem which is analogous to the physicalist's explanatory gap; it is a gap between the micro-experiential facts and the macro-experiential facts. Goff also suggests that there could be a solution by way of a ‘phenomenal bonding relation’, but believes that this solution is not up to scratch because we cannot form a positive not-merely-role-playing concept of this relation. In this (...)
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  31.  39
    Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism[REVIEW]Christian Onof - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1-2).
    This collection of papers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, edited by Anthony Freeman presents seventeen responses to Galen Strawson’s keynote paper which claims that the only plausible way to be a real physicalist is to accept that the intrinsic properties of the physical are experiential in character, i.e., the doctrine of panpsychism. The book concludes with Strawson’s reply to these responses. This “real physicalism” is, according to Strawson, the only way of dealing with (...)
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  32. Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.David Bourget - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
    In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and (...)
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  33.  41
    Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, Eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 414 Pp., $78.00. [REVIEW]Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):639-641.
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  34. Fechner's Panpsychism: A Scientific Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.William R. Woodward - 1972 - Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 8:367-386.
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  35. The Universe in Consciousness.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):125-155.
    I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated (...)
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  36. On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):13-34.
    Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for (...)
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  37. Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
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  38. An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (2):doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010.
    I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, as (...)
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  39. The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - 2016 - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  40. Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta.Luca Gasparri - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (1):130-142.
    The combination of panpsychism and priority monism leads to priority cosmopsychism, the view that the consciousness of individual sentient creatures is derivative of an underlying cosmic consciousness. It has been suggested that contemporary priority cosmopsychism parallels central ideas in the Advaita Vedānta tradition. The paper offers a critical evaluation of this claim. It argues that the Advaitic account of consciousness cannot be characterized as an instance of priority cosmopsychism, points out the differences between the two views, and suggests an (...)
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  41. Mind Under Matter.Sam Coleman - 2009 - In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.
    Panpsychism is an eminently sensible view of the world and its relation to mind. If God is a metaphysician, and regardless of the actual truth or falsity of panpsychism, it is certain that he regards the theory as an honest and elegant competitor on the field of ontologies. And if God didn’t create a panpsychist world, then there’s a fair chance that he wishes he had done so, or will do next time around. The difficulties panpsychism faces, (...)
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  42. Does Integrated Information Lack Subjectivity.Janko Nešić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (2):131-145.
    I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different (...)
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  43. The Mind-Body Problem and Whitehead’s Nonreductive Monism.Anderson Weekes - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):40-66.
    There have been many attempts to retire dualism from active philosophic life, replacing it with something less removed from science, but we are no closer to that goal now than fifty years ago. I propose breaking the stalemate by considering marginal perspectives that may help identify unrecognized assumptions that limit the mainstream debate. Comparison with Whitehead highlights ways that opponents of dualism continue to uphold the Cartesian “real distinction” between mind and body. Whitehead, by contrast, insists on a conceptual distinction: (...)
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  44. Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...)
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  45.  87
    Against Deflation of the Subject.Nesic Janko - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (4):1102-1121.
    I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the subject/self (...)
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  46.  29
    Introduction.Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 1-34.
    The Introduction highlights the three main themes of the book: (1) the ontological and epistemological status of everyday human consciousness, (2) the distribution of consciousness in the natural world, and (3) panpsychism. The individual contributions to the book are summarized and related literature is briefly discussed.
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  47.  53
    A Short Solution to the Hard Problem.A. T. Bollands - forthcoming - The Philosophical Society Review 41.
    This very short paper provides a panpsychic solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. It was presented to the Philosophical Society of the Oxford University Department of Continuing Education (OUDCE) on 18th August 2019, and posted on Twitter (@ATBollands) on the 20th August, 2019. It solves the Hard Problem by 1) making the case for Panpsychism, and 2) solving the Combination Problem (Panpsychism's equivalent of the Hard Problem). -/- The paper aims to be clear, concise, to-the-point and accessible (...)
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  48. Eliminating the Physical.Peter Ells - 2014 - Oxford Philosophical Society Review 36:23-27.
    If we reject physicalism, for the reasons given in my 2011 book ‘Panpsychism,’ we can arrive at a variant of idealism that accepts the concrete existence of all entities discoverable by science, but argues that these are nothing over and above centres of experience that can perceive one another and act on their percepts. In this metaphysical system, all physical properties and laws reduce without remainder to mental dittos – length is used in this paper as an example. Adopting (...)
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  49. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
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  50. The Microstructure of Experience.Andrew Y. Lee - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):286-305.
    I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.
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