Jainism II: Normative and Applied Ethics (Ethics-1, M37)

In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-Pg Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT) (2016)
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Abstract

Normative ethics concerns the practical resolution of questions about the right and the good. Applied ethics concerns the case-based resolution of questions of the right and the good. In this module, we look at the implications of the radical Virtue Theory of Jainism for practical questions, such as life decisions, occupations, and diet –-- questions of normative and applied ethics. The Jain position is that the self is defined by virtue, and hence action (karma) is derivative and not essential to the self. This entails an ethics of ahiṃsā, as action in conformity to the virtues of the self. As only action can harm, the virtue of the individual is beyond harm and hence action in accordance with this virtue is nonharmful. I consider how this impacts questions of guilt and responsibility. Unlike Buddhists who treat states of the world as the outcomes that justify actions, Jains treat the virtue of the self as the guiding outcome of ethical deliberation. It is the ultimate good. In the fourth section, I review a classic disagreement between Jains and Buddhists. This highlights a difference: while Buddhists regard virtue to be a consequence to be maximised, the Jains reject this. Virtue is our essence, and the authentic life reflects our virtue.

Author's Profile

Shyam Ranganathan
York University

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