Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247 (2014)
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Abstract
Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
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Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan
Mind and World.McDowell, John

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