Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis
Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247 (2014)
Abstract
Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.
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2013-07-19
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2013-07-19
Total views
751 ( #8,548 of 69,167 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #21,312 of 69,167 )
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