Results for 'Seeing that P'

960 found
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  1. Perceptual experience and seeing that p.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . (...)
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  2. Truth and Moral Responsibility.P. Roger Turner - 2014 - In Fabio Bacchini Massimo Dell'Utri & Stefano Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Most philosophers who study moral responsibility have done so in isolation of the concept of truth. Here, I show that thinking about the nature of truth has profound consequences for discussions of moral responsibility. In particular, by focusing on the very trivial nature of truth—that truth depends on the world and not the other way around—we can see that widely accepted counterexamples to one of the most influential incompatibilist arguments can be shown not only to be false, (...)
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  3. NK≠HPC.P. D. Magnus - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):471-477.
    The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but (...)
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  4. Technocracy versus experimental learning in RRI: On making the most of RRI’s interpretative flexibility.P. Klaassen, M. Rijnen, Sara Vermeulen, F. Kupper & J. Broerse - 2019 - In Robert Gianni, John Pearson & Bernard Reber (eds.), Responsible Research and Innovation. Routledge. pp. 22.
    This chapter aims to narrow the gap between how Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is conceived of in European Commission policy circles and how it is conceived of in scholarly circles. The policy view of RRI and the scholarly view of RRI each have their strengths and weaknesses and both would be better off if coupled to the other. Large and pertinent differences between Scott's High Modernist projects and pRRI, however, perhaps weigh heavier than do the aforementioned similarities. In the (...)
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  5. Wittgenstein Didn’t Agree with Gödel - A.P. Bird - Cantor’s Paradise.A. P. Bird - 2021 - Cantor's Paradise (00):00.
    In 1956, a few writings of Wittgenstein that he didn't publish in his lifetime were revealed to the public. These writings were gathered in the book Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). There, we can see that Wittgenstein had some discontentment with the way philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians were thinking about paradoxes, and he even registered a few polemic reasons to not accept Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
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  6. Generative AI and photographic transparency.P. D. Magnus - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-6.
    There is a history of thinking that photographs provide a special kind of access to the objects depicted in them, beyond the access that would be provided by a painting or drawing. What is included in the photograph does not depend on the photographer’s beliefs about what is in front of the camera. This feature leads Kendall Walton to argue that photographs literally allow us to see the objects which appear in them. Current generative algorithms produce images (...)
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  7. State of the Field: Why novel prediction matters.Heather Douglas & P. D. Magnus - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):580-589.
    There is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e. when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the field on this question, noting both fully articulated views such as weak and strong predictivism, and more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for the instrumental value of prediction. By examining the various reasons offered for the value of prediction across a range of inferential contexts , we (...)
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  8. Reckoning the shape of everything: Underdetermination and cosmotopology.P. D. Magnus - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):541-557.
    This paper offers a general characterization of underdetermination and gives a prima facie case for the underdetermination of the topology of the universe. A survey of several philosophical approaches to the problem fails to resolve the issue: the case involves the possibility of massive reduplication, but Strawson on massive reduplication provides no help here; it is not obvious that any of the rival theories are to be preferred on grounds of simplicity; and the usual talk of empirically equivalent theories (...)
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  9. Proving the Reality of Global Warming.P. Olcott - manuscript
    When we look at 800,000 year ice core data CO2 levels since 1950 have risen at a rate of 123-fold faster than the fastest rate in 800,000 years. When we see that this rise is precisely correlated with global carbon emissions the human link to climate change seems certain and any rebuttal becomes ridiculously implausible. The 800,000 year correlation between CO2 and global temperatures seems to be predicting at least 9 degrees C of more warming based on current CO2 (...)
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  10. (2 other versions)Can the multitude be philosophic? – Myth, Reason, and Politics.Justin P. Holt - 2021 - Academia Letters 2846 (Article 2846.).
    In his Republic, Plato argues that self-rulership cannot be widespread enough in a populace due to structural failures of education. This means that rulership by the few with the use of manipulative mythological devices is inevitable. That is, if a populace cannot rule themselves through the use of their reason, then they will be ruled by others through the use of myth, at best, and at worst, violence. Even given this rather grim conclusion, if we closely examine (...)
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  11. ‘Heads Cast in Metaphysical Moulds’ Damaris Masham on the Method and Nature of Metaphysics.Marcy P. Lascano - 2018 - In Emily Thomas (ed.), Early Modern Women on Metaphysics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 9-27.
    In this chapter, first we will provide a brief discussion of part of the larger debates concerning metaphysics and attempt to place Masham alongside her friend John Locke in holding that the subject matter of metaphysics is usually either strictly the providence of revelation or is beyond human understanding. Next, we will explore Masham’s criticisms of Norris, Malebranche, and Leibniz to see how these views inform her objections. Here, it will become clear that Masham eschews metaphysics as an (...)
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  12. Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons.Donald P. Smith - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):569-585.
    Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.
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  13. Social Cohesion, Trust, and Government Action Against Pandemics.Marlon Patrick P. Lofredo - 2020 - Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 30 (4):182-188.
    The rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its corresponding COVID-19 is challenging national preparedness and response ability to pandemics. No one is prepared well, but governments around the world must respond as effectively and efficiently as possible to pandemics, and every occurrence of such worldwide disease must be a lesson for preparedness. While plans and programs may be in place to arrest the rapid spread of the virus, the success of any state intervention relies much on how cohesive the society is, (...)
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  14. Semantic WFF(x) specified syntactically.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Hypothesis: WFF(x) can be applied syntactically to the semantics of formalized declarative sentences such that: WFF(x) ↔ (x ↦ True) ∨ (x ↦ False) (see proof sketch below) For clarity we focus on simple propositions without binary logical connectives.
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  15. Hope: The Janus-faced virtue.Michael Schrader & Michael P. Levine - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):11-30.
    In this essay we argue for the Janus-faced nature of hope. We show that attempts to sanitise the concept of hope either by separating it conceptually from other phenomena such as wishful thinking, or, more generally, by seeking to minimise the negative aspects of hope, do not help us to understand the nature of hope and its functions as regards religion. Drawing on functional accounts of religion from Clifford Geertz and Tamas Pataki, who both—in their different ways—see the function (...)
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  16. Preserving the Autographic/Allographic Distinction.Jason D'cruz & P. D. Magnus - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (4):453-457.
    The primary concern of our 2014 paper was not notation but the autographic/allographic distinction, not representations as such but works of art. As we see it, Zeimbekis's considerations do not ultimately undermine the position we advanced in 2014— but they do challenge an element of Goodman's own theory of notation that derives from his requirement of recoverability. That requirement can be abandoned without losing the explanatory power of the autographic/allographic distinction as we have refined it.
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  17. Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On (...)
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  18. Natural Philosophy, Deduction, and Geometry in the Hobbes-Boyle Debate.Marcus P. Adams - 2017 - Hobbes Studies 30 (1):83-107.
    This paper examines Hobbes’s criticisms of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments in light of Hobbes’s account in _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_ of the relationship of natural philosophy to geometry. I argue that Hobbes’s criticisms rely upon his understanding of what counts as “true physics.” Instead of seeing Hobbes as defending natural philosophy as “a causal enterprise … [that] as such, secured total and irrevocable assent,” 1 I argue that, in his disagreement with Boyle, Hobbes relied upon (...)
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  19. “The Obvious Invisibility of the Relationship between Technology and Social Values.”.Jamie P. Ross - 2010 - International Journal of Science in Society, Vol. 2, No.1, P. 51-62, CG Publisher. 2010 2 (1):51-62.
    Abstract -/- “The Obvious Invisibility of the Relationship Between Technology and Social Values” -/- We all too often assume that technology is the product of objective scientific research. And, we assume that technology’s moral value lies in only the moral character of its user. Yet, in order to objectify technology in a manner that removes it from a moral realm, we rely on the assumption that technology is value neutral, i.e., it is independent of all contexts (...)
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  20. Commercialization of the nature-resource potential of anthropogenic objects (on the example of exhausted mines and quarries).D. E. Reshetniak S. E. Sardak, O. P. Krupskyi, S. I. Korotun & Sergii Sardak - 2019 - Journal of Geology, Geography and Geoecology 28 (1):180-187.
    Abstract. In this article we developed scientific and applied foundations of commercialization of the nature-resource potential of anthropogenic objects, on the example of exhausted mines. It is determined that the category of “anthropogenic object” can be considered in a narrow-applied sense, as specific anthropogenic objects to ensure the target needs, and in a broad theoretical sense, meaning everything that is created and changed by human influence, that is the objects of both artificial and natural origin. It was (...)
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  21. Nonlinear synthesis and co‐evolution of complex systems.Helena Knyazeva & Sergei P. Kurdyumov - 2001 - World Futures 57 (3):239-261.
    Today a change is imperative in approaching global problems: what is needed is not arm-twisting and power politics, but searching for ways of co-evolution in the complex social and geopolitical systems of the world. The modern theory of self-organization of complex systems provides us with an understanding of the possible forms of coexistence of heterogeneous social and geopolitical structures at different stages of development regarding the different paths of their sustainable co-evolutionary development. The theory argues that the evolutionary channel (...)
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  22. Artificial Intelligence and Punjabi Culture.D. P. Singh - 2023 - International Culture and Art (Ica) 5 (4):11-14.
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a technology that makes machines smart and capable of doing things that usually require human intelligence. AI works by training machines to learn from data and experiences. Such devices can recognize patterns, understand spoken language, see and understand images, and even make predictions based on their learning. Voice assistants like Siri or Alexa can understand our voice commands, answer questions, and perform tasks for us. AI-based self-driving cars can sense their surroundings, make decisions, and (...)
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  23. Analogy, Semantics, and Hermeneutics.Joshua P. Hochschild - 2003 - Medieval Philosophy & Theology 11 (2):241-260.
    Cajetan's treatment of analogy in De Nominum Analogia is well known as the most influential and sophisticated theory of a central issue in Thomistic philosophy. The late twentieth century saw that theory subject to a family of criticisms. If the critics are correct, Cajetan's analogy theory is also significant historically for exposing weaknesses latent in medieval semantic assumptions. According to the critics, the Aristotelian assumptions that words signify by means of discrete “concepts,” and that the meaning of (...)
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    The book and Typhoon Yagi.Nghiem P. K. Cuong - 2024 - Sm3D Portal.
    Typhoon Yagi has, to a large extent, shown the greatly detrimental effect of the climate crisis currently facing the Earth. The death toll in Vietnam only has surpassed most people’s imagination, let alone the devastating impacts caused by the dangerous storm on many provinces under its trajectory. I came to know the book by Professor Vuong Quan Hoang and Dr. Nguyen Minh Hoang in mid-July 2024. However, only when seeing the grave consequences of Typhoon Yagi, could I gradually understand (...)
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  25. Modernizing Frontier Chemical Transformations of Young People’s Minds and Bodies in Puerto Princesa.Anita P. Hardon & Michael L. Tan - 2017 - Amsterdam, Netherlands: The Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research University of Amsterdam Department of Anthropology University of the Philippines Diliman and Palawan Studies Center Palawan State University.
    Palawan is a land of promise, and of paradox. On maps, it appears on the edge of the Philippines, isolated. Indeed, it is a kind of last frontier. Its population remained tiny for centuries, the government offering homestead land in the 1950s practically for free to attract migrants from outside. The Palawan State University was established by law in 1965, but did not become operational until 1972. A commercial airport did not exist until the 1980s, and for many years, flights (...)
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  26. Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?Craig French - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer (...)
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  27. Functioning of Healthcare Facilities under the Martial Law.Tetiana Sviatenko, Inna Gogunska, Oleksandr P. Krupskyi, Tetiana Ihnatova & Liubov Bilyk - 2023 - Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 26 (3):24-27.
    This topic focuses on the problems that arise in providing medical care to the population during armed conflict or martial law. Under such conditions, hospitals, clinics, and other healthcare facilities have to work in challenging circumstances with limited resources and reduced security for medical personnel. This topic explores such issues as how martial law affects the work of medical institutions, what problems arise in providing medical care to the population in war, how war affects the health of the people, (...)
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  28. From P-Zombies to Substance Dualism.Perry Hendricks - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    P-zombies are creatures that are physically (functionally, behaviorally) like you and I and yet lack phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are possible, it’s (typically) taken to show property dualism is true: phenomenal consciousness isn’t reducible to—nor does it supervene on—physical states. If inverted qualia are possible, it’s possible that you and I have identical physical states and yet you see tomatoes as green and I see tomatoes as red. If this is the case, then (again) property dualism is (...)
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  29. Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.
    Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world — that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: Which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the following proposal: if your experience e immediately (...)
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  30. That seems wrong: pedagogically defusing moral relativism and moral skepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2023 - International Journal of Ethics Education 8 (2):335-349.
    Students sometimes profess moral relativism or skepticism with retorts like ‘how can we know?’ or ‘it’s all relative!’ Here I defend a pedagogical method to defuse moral relativism and moral skepticism using phenomenal conservatism: if it seems to S that p, S has defeasible justification to believe that p; e.g., moral seemings, like perceptual ones, are defeasibly justified. The purpose of defusing moral skepticism and relativism is to prevent these metaethical views from acting as stumbling blocks to insightful (...)
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  31. P≠NP.Didehvar Farzad - manuscript
    Here, the author tries to build the structure of the Theory of computation based on considering time as a fuzzy concept. In fact, there are reasons to consider time as a fuzzy concept. In this article, the author doesn’t go to this side but note that Brower and Husserl views on the concept of time were similar [8]. Some reasons have been given for it in [3]. Throughout this article, the author presents the Theory of Computation with Fuzzy Time. (...)
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  32. The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.
    I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. (...)
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  33. Dial P for Philosophy (Review of Mary Midgley's Utopias, Dolphins and Computers.). [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1997 - New Scientist (2066).
    Mary Midgley's book Utopias, Dolphins and Computers will be needed to recharge our more philosophical approach to life as new problems present themselves to humanity at an accelerated rate. The most dangerous attitude to these challenges, Midgley argues, is an anti-intellectualism that fails to see that all approaches presuppose tacit or hidden assumptions, that is a philosophy. One part of our tacit philosophy that is now breaking up is the social contract, according to Mary Midgley in (...)
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  34. The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.
    Epistemological disjunctivism says that one can know that p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p. The basis problem for disjunctivism says that that can’t be since seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p. In defense of their view disjunctivists have rejected the idea that seeing that p is just a way of (...)
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  35. Six Roles for Inclination.Zach Barnett - forthcoming - Mind.
    Initially, you judge that p. You then learn that most experts disagree. All things considered, you believe that the experts are probably right. Still, p continues to seem right to you, in some sense. You don’t yet see what, if anything, is wrong with your original reasoning. In such a case, we’ll say that you are ‘inclined’ toward p. This paper explores various roles that this state of inclination can play, both within epistemology and more (...)
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  36. Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.
    If you want to understand McDowell's spatial metaphors when he talks about perceptual knowledge, place him side-by-side with Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Though McDowell shows no evidence of reading Dretske's writings on knowledge from the late 1960s onwards (McDowell mentions "Epistemic Operators" once in passing), McDowell gives the same four arguments as Dretske for the conclusion that knowledge requires "conclusive" reasons that rule of the possibility of mistake. Despite various differences, we think it is best to read McDowell (...)
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  37. That May Be Jupiter: A Heuristic for Thinking Two-Dimensionally.Berit Brogaard - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):315 - 328.
    According to epistemic two-dimensionalism, every expression is associated with two kinds of meaning: a primary intension (a “Fregean” component) and a secondary intension (a “Russellian” component). While the rst kind of meaning lines up with the speaker’s abilities to pick out referents of correctly employed expressions in hypothetical scenarios, the second kind of meaning is a version of what standard semanticists call “semantic content”—a kind of content which does not pivot on speaker abilities. Despite its conciliatory temperament, epistemic two-dimensionalism has (...)
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  38. Ordinary Language Philosophy as an Extension of Ideal Language Philosophy. Comparing the Methods of the Later Wittgenstein and P.F. Strawson.Benjamin De Mesel - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 45 (2):175-199.
    The idea that thought and language can be clarified through logical methods seems problematic because, while thought and language are not always exact, logic (by its very nature) must be. According to Kuusela, ideal (ILP, represented by Frege and Russell) and ordinary language philosophy (OLP, represented by Strawson) offer opposed solutions to this problem, and Wittgenstein combines the advantages of both. I argue that, given Kuusela’s characterisation of OLP, Strawson was not an OLP’er. I suggest that, instead (...)
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  39. 'So Don't You Lock up Something / That You Wanted to See Fly'. What Story for Asylum Psychiatry? [REVIEW]George Tudorie - 2021 - Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations 23:71-79.
    In a rather long piece which an exhibition catalog has called „catholic propaganda”(Busch & Maisak, 2013, p. 342), Guido Görres reflected on madness and art, using Kaulbach’s iconic 1835 drawing of asylum inmates (Das Narrenhaus) as pretext. Görres wrote of “this hospital of the human spirit (…), this charnel ground of the living, who like specters roam, wearing on their foreheads the faded and almost illegible traces of their former names.”1(1836, p. 9). Overdramatic prose, but unlikely to strike one as (...)
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  40. And the Time Will Come When You See We’re All One: The Beatles and Idealistic Monism.Michael Baur - 2006 - In Michael Baur & Steven Baur (eds.), The Beatles and Philosophy: Nothing You Can Think That Can’t Be Thunk. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. pp. 13-24.
    In spite of their lack of interest in traditional philosophy and their explicit disavowals about the deeper meaning of their songs, there are also good reasons to approach and interpret the Beatles and their work from a philosophical point of view. In his Playboy interview from September of 1980, John praised Paul for the philosophical significance of the song, “The End,” which appeared on the Abbey Road album: “That’s Paul again. . . . he had a line in it (...)
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  41. Reason and Faith.Lara Buchak - 2017 - In Frederick D. Aquino & William J. Abraham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 46–63.
    Faith is a central attitude in Christian religious practice. The problem of faith and reason is the problem of reconciling religious faith with the standards for our belief-forming practices in general (‘ordinary epistemic standards’). In order to see whether and when faith can be reconciled with ordinary epistemic standards, we first need to know what faith is. This chapter examines and catalogues views of propositional faith: faith that p. It is concerned with the epistemology of such faith: what cognitive (...)
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  42. ‘Knowledge’ ascriptions, social roles and semantics.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):335-350.
    The idea that the concept ‘knowledge’ has a distinctive function or social role is increasingly influential within contemporary epistemology. Perhaps the best-known account of the function of ‘knowledge’ is that developed in Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature (1990, OUP), on which (roughly) ‘knowledge’ has the function of identifying good informants. Craig’s account of the function of ‘knowledge’ has been appealed to in support of a variety of views, and in this paper I’m concerned with the (...)
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  43. Transparency or Opacity of Mind?Martin F. Fricke - 2014 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
    Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the (...)
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  44. The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution.Patrick Todd - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5051-5072.
    Various philosophers have long since been attracted to the doctrine that future contingent propositions systematically fail to be true—what is sometimes called the doctrine of the open future. However, open futurists have always struggled to articulate how their view interacts with standard principles of classical logic—most notably, with the Law of Excluded Middle. For consider the following two claims: Trump will be impeached tomorrow; Trump will not be impeached tomorrow. According to the kind of open futurist at issue, both (...)
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  45. What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.
    forthcoming in reisner and steglich-peterson, eds., Reasons for Belief If I believe, for no good reason, that P and I infer (correctly) from this that Q, I don’t think we want to say that I ‘have’ P as evidence for Q. Only things that I believe (or could believe) rationally, or perhaps, with justification, count as part of the evidence that I have. It seems to me that this is a good reason to include (...)
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  46. Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, (...)
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  47. The Difference Between Knowledge and Understanding.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 384-407.
    In the aftermath of Gettier’s examples, knowledge came to be thought of as what you would have if in addition to a true belief and your favorite epistemic goody, such as justifiedness, you also were ungettiered, and the theory of knowledge was frequently equated, especially by its detractors, with the project of pinning down that extra bit. It would follow that knowledge contributes something distinctive that makes it indispensable in our pantheon of epistemic concepts only if avoiding (...)
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  48. (1 other version)Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.
    It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation (...)
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  49. Assertion, belief, and ‘I believe’-guarded affirmation.Anders Nes - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):57-86.
    According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition (...) p. For example, one might respond to a query for directions to the station by saying ‘I believe it is down the first street on your left.' Often, when we reply in this way, it would have been pragmatically preferable simply to assert that p, had we been epistemically warranted in doing so. One's guarded reply thus suggests one is not so warranted. Nevertheless, if one believes what one, at face value, says one believes, one believes p. Contrary to what might seem to be suggested by the Same Norm View, one does not seem to portray oneself as irrational or epistemically beyond the pale in replying in this way. The paper develops this puzzle in detail, and examines a variety of options for a resolving it consistently with the Same Norm view. The most promising of these options, I argue, is to see ‘I believe' guarded affirmations as a form merely approximately correct speech. They would, though, be a form of such speech that interestingly differs from paradigm cases of loose use or conventional hyperbole in that speakers would be comparatively unaware of engaging in approximation. I conclude ‘I believe’—guarded affirmations either show the Same Norm View to be false or must be recognised as such an interestingly distinctive form of merely approximately correct speech. (shrink)
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  50. Dogmatism, Probability, and Logical Uncertainty.David Jehle & Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New waves in philosophical logic. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 95--111.
    Many epistemologists hold that an agent can come to justifiably believe that p is true by seeing that it appears that p is true, without having any antecedent reason to believe that visual impressions are generally reliable. Certain reliabilists think this, at least if the agent’s vision is generally reliable. And it is a central tenet of dogmatism (as described by James Pryor) that this is possible. Against these positions it has been argued (...)
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