On Metaepistemological Scepticism

In Michael Bergmann & Brett Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the related position outlined by Stroud. It is argued that there are at least three interesting points of contact between Fumerton and Stroud’s metaepistemology. The first point of contact is that both Fumerton and Stroud think that (1) externalist theories of justification permit a kind of non-inferential, perceptual justification for our beliefs about non-psychological reality, but it’s not sufficient for philosophical assurance. However, Fumerton claims, while Stroud denies, that (2) direct acquaintance with facts is sufficient for philosophical assurance. And this is important because Stroud thinks that (3) we have direct perceptual access or acquaintance with facts about the external world, while Fumerton denies this.

Author Profiles

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-01

Downloads
751 (#17,457)

6 months
91 (#40,149)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?