De se Attitudes and Semiotic Aspects of Cognition

In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. Peter Lang. pp. 121-146 (2015)
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Abstract
Typical puzzles for de se attitudes by Perry and Lewis are laid out and contrasted with the original version of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. It is argued, from an epistemic perspective, that de se attitudes can be explained by looking at the way internal/introspective knowledge is formed without resorting to acquaintance or making assumptions about the Mind/Body problem.
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