Results for 'computationalism'

52 found
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  1.  22
    From Computer Metaphor to Computational Modeling: The Evolution of Computationalism.Marcin Miłkowski - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):515-541.
    In this paper, I argue that computationalism is a progressive research tradition. Its metaphysical assumptions are that nervous systems are computational, and that information processing is necessary for cognition to occur. First, the primary reasons why information processing should explain cognition are reviewed. Then I argue that early formulations of these reasons are outdated. However, by relying on the mechanistic account of physical computation, they can be recast in a compelling way. Next, I contrast two computational models of working (...)
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  2. A Mechanistic Account of Wide Computationalism.Luke Kersten - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):501-517.
    The assumption that psychological states and processes are computational in character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the computational theory of mind. In addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computational theory of mind has also had a second life supporting “individualism”, the view that psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene only on the intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. One response to individualism has been to raise the prospect of “wide computational systems”, (...)
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  3. Is There Any Real Substance to the Claims for a 'New Computationalism'?Alberto Hernandez-Espinosa, Hernandez-Quiroz Francisco & Zenil Hector - forthcoming - In CiE Computability in Europe 2017. Springer Verlag.
    'Computationalism' is a relatively vague term used to describe attempts to apply Turing's model of computation to phenomena outside its original purview: in modelling the human mind, in physics, mathematics, etc. Early versions of computationalism faced strong objections from many (and varied) quarters, from philosophers to practitioners of the aforementioned disciplines. Here we will not address the fundamental question of whether computational models are appropriate for describing some or all of the wide range of processes that they have (...)
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  4.  72
    Computationalism.Eric Dietrich - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (2):135-154.
    This paper argues for a noncognitiveist computationalism in the philosophy of mind. It further argues that both humans and computers have intentionality, that is, their mental states are semantical -- they are about things in their worlds.
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  5. Computationalism Under Attack.Roberto Cordeschi & Marcello Frixione - 2007 - In M. Marraffa, M. De Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer.
    Since the early eighties, computationalism in the study of the mind has been “under attack” by several critics of the so-called “classic” or “symbolic” approaches in AI and cognitive science. Computationalism was generically identified with such approaches. For example, it was identified with both Allen Newell and Herbert Simon’s Physical Symbol System Hypothesis and Jerry Fodor’s theory of Language of Thought, usually without taking into account the fact ,that such approaches are very different as to their methods and (...)
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  6.  15
    Objections to Computationalism: A Survey.Marcin Miłkowski - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (3):57-75.
    In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive science, and non-trivial.
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  7.  25
    Making Too Many Enemies: Hutto and Myin’s Attack on Computationalism.Jesse Kuokkanen & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):282-294.
    We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard (...)
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  8.  48
    Enactive Autonomy in Computational Systems.Mario Villalobos & Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1891-1908.
    In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...)
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  9. A Theory of Practical Meaning.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):65-96.
    This essay is divided into two parts. In the first part (§2), I introduce the idea of practical meaning by looking at a certain kind of procedural systems — the motor system — that play a central role in computational explanations of motor behavior. I argue that in order to give a satisfactory account of the content of the representations computed by motor systems (motor commands), we need to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of meaning. Defending the explanatory relevance (...)
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  10. Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing.William J. Rapaport - 2012 - International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1):32-71.
    In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and (...)
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  11. Role of the Frame Problem in Fodor's Modularity Thesis.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 1996 - In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited.
    It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.
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  12. Recensione di Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads. Why You Are Not Your Brain and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness, Hill and Wang, New York, 2009. [REVIEW]Pietro Salis - 2011 - Aphex 4:246-264.
    Ita La recensione presenta la prospettiva enattivista difesa da Alva Noë, e ne discute alcuni aspetti specifici. Il pensiero, la coscienza e la cognizione non sono pienamente comprensibili, secondo l’enattivismo di Noë, senza un’adeguata considerazione del ruolo ricoperto dal corpo e dall’ambiente. Sarebbe quindi sbagliato continuare a pensare che il cervello da solo sia responsabile dei processi cognitivi umani: il programma che ricerca i correlati neurali della coscienza sarebbe quindi destinato al fallimento dal principio, perché tralascia in partenza corpo e (...)
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  13. Pancomputationalism: Theory or Metaphor?Vincent C. Müller - 2014 - In Ruth Hagengruber & Uwe Riss (eds.), Philosophy, computing and information science. Pickering & Chattoo. pp. 213-221.
    The theory that all processes in the universe are computational is attractive in its promise to provide an understandable theory of everything. I want to suggest here that this pancomputationalism is not sufficiently clear on which problem it is trying to solve, and how. I propose two interpretations of pancomputationalism as a theory: I) the world is a computer and II) the world can be described as a computer. The first implies a thesis of supervenience of the physical over computation (...)
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  14. A Dialogue Concerning Two World Systems: Info-Computational Vs. Mechanistic.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Vincent C. Müller - 2011 - In Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Mark Burgin (eds.), Information and computation: Essays on scientific and philosophical understanding of foundations of information and computation. World Scientific. pp. 149-184.
    The dialogue develops arguments for and against a broad new world system - info-computationalist naturalism - that is supposed to overcome the traditional mechanistic view. It would make the older mechanistic view into a special case of the new general info-computationalist framework (rather like Euclidian geometry remains valid inside a broader notion of geometry). We primarily discuss what the info-computational paradigm would mean, especially its pancomputationalist component. This includes the requirements for a the new generalized notion of computing that would (...)
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  15. Semantic Externalism and the Mechanics of Thought.Carrie Figdor - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.
    I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this (...)
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  16.  98
    Searle's and Penrose's Non-Computational Frameworks for Naturalizing the Mind.Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr - unknown
    John Searle and Roger Penrose are two staunch critics of computationalism who nonetheless believe that with the right framework the mind can be naturalized. While they may be successful in showing the shortcomings of computationalism, I argue that their alternative non-computational frameworks equally fail to carry out the project to naturalize the mind. The main reason is their failure to resolve some fundamental incompatibilities between mind and science. Searle tries to resolve the incompatibility between the subjectivity of consciousness (...)
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  17. Computation and Multiple Realizability.Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 29-41.
    Multiple realizability (MR) is traditionally conceived of as the feature of computational systems, and has been used to argue for irreducibility of higher-level theories. I will show that there are several ways a computational system may be seen to display MR. These ways correspond to (at least) five ways one can conceive of the function of the physical computational system. However, they do not match common intuitions about MR. I show that MR is deeply interest-related, and for this reason, difficult (...)
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  18. Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, (...)
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  19. De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge.Erich Rast - 2012 - Analysis and Metaphysics 11:106-132.
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account (...)
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  20. Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions.Vincent C. Müller - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.
    The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior to (...)
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  21.  48
    The Ubiquity of Computation.Eric Dietrich - 1993 - Think (misc) 2 (June):27-29.
    For many years now, Harnad has argued that transduction is special among cognitive capacities -- special enough to block Searle's Chinese Room Argument. His arguments (as well as Searle's) have been important and useful, but not correct, it seems to me. Their arguments have provided the modern impetus for getting clear about computationalism and the nature of computing. This task has proven to be quite difficult. Which is simply to say that dealing with Harnad's arguments (as well as Searle's) (...)
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  22.  57
    A Master Wittgensteinian Surveys Human Nature--A Review of Peter Hacker 'Human Nature-the Categorial Framework' (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher (...)
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  23.  32
    Another Cartoon Portrait of the Mind From the Reductionist Metaphysicians--A Review of Peter Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher (...)
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  24. Why Think That the Brain is Not a Computer?Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 16 (2):22-28.
    In this paper, I review the objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are either based on uncharitable interpretation of the claim, or simply wrong, I argue that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro)science, and non-trivial.
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  25. What is Morphological Computation? On How the Body Contributes to Cognition and Control.Vincent C. Müller & Matej Hoffmann - 2017 - Artificial Life 23 (1):1-24.
    The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “off-loading computation from the brain to the body”, where the body is said to perform “morphological computation”. Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the ‘off-loading’ perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus distinguish (1) morphology that (...)
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  26. The Rise of Cognitive Science in the 20th Century.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge. pp. 280-302.
    This chapter describes the conceptual foundations of cognitive science during its establishment as a science in the 20th century. It is organized around the core ideas of individual agency as its basic explanans and information-processing as its basic explanandum. The latter consists of a package of ideas that provide a mathematico-engineering framework for the philosophical theory of materialism.
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  27. Is There a Future for AI Without Representation?Vincent C. Müller - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):101-115.
    This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...)
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  28. Music and Cognitive Extension.Luke Kersten - 2014 - Empirical Musicology Review 9 (3-4):193-202.
    Extended cognition holds that cognitive processes sometimes leak into the world (Dawson, 2013). A recent trend among proponents of extended cognition has been to put pressure on phenomena thought to be safe havens for internalists (Sneddon, 2011; Wilson, 2010; Wilson & Lenart, 2014). This paper attempts to continue this trend by arguing that music perception is an extended phenomenon. It is claimed that because music perception involves the detection of musical invariants within an “acoustic array”, the interaction between the auditory (...)
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  29. 20 Years After The Embodied Mind - Why is Cognitivism Alive and Kicking?Vincent C. Müller - 2013 - In Blay Whitby & Joel Parthmore (eds.), Re-Conceptualizing Mental "Illness": The View from Enactivist Philosophy and Cognitive Science - AISB Convention 2013. AISB. pp. 47-49.
    I want to suggest that the major influence of classical arguments for embodiment like "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991) has been a changing of positions rather than a refutation: Cognitivism has found ways to retreat and regroup at positions that have better fortification, especially when it concerns theses about artificial intelligence or artificial cognitive systems. For example: a) Agent-based cognitivism' that understands humans as taking in representations of the world, doing rule-based processing and then acting on (...)
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  30. Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism.Jim Hopkins - 2012 - In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-144.
    Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
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  31. The Innocent Eye: Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process By Nico Orlandi. [REVIEW]Thomas Polger - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):343-345.
    In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi argues that vision is not a cognitive process. In particular, she argues that forming subject-level visual representations that are available for reasoning should not itself be understood as a process of inference. This comes to the claim that vision (properly so-called) is a process that produces representations but is not best understood as a process that uses representations.
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  32.  64
    Whitehead's Unique Approach to the Topic of Consciousness.Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 137-172.
    Conventional approaches to consciousness assume that our current science tells us within tolerable limits what physical nature is. Because nature so understood cannot explain consciousness as we seem to experience it ourselves, explaining consciousness becomes a problem. One solution is to rethink what consciousness is so that it becomes the sort of thing our current natural science could in principle explain. Whitehead takes the opposite approach, using the existence of consciousness as a clue to what nature must be if it (...)
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  33.  83
    The Functionalist's Body.Robert D. Rupert - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (2):258-268.
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  34. Dal Simulazionismo al Paradigma Galileiano.Marco Giunti - 2005 - In Atti del XIX Congresso Nazionale dell'Associazione Italiana di Psicologia, sez. di Psicologia Sperimentale, Cagliari, 18-20 settembre, 2005. (CD-ROM). Associazione Italiana di Psicologia Sperimentale.
    Il lavoro esamina criticamente i presupposti di cinque differenti approcci alla Scienza Cognitiva, (simbolico, connessionista, dinamico, della cognizione incarnata e della vita artificiale) e sostiene che tutti e cinque condividono tacitamente un’ipotesi metodologica molto generale. Tale ipotesi, che propongo di chiamare simulazionismo , postula che i fenomeni cognitivi di un qualunque sistema reale possono essere adeguatamente spiegati sulla base di opportuni modelli di simulazione del sistema stesso. Tuttavia, a causa della loro costituzione, i modelli di simulazione hanno forti limitazioni, sia (...)
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  35.  48
    De Se Attitudes and Semiotic Aspects of Cognition.Erich Rast - 2015 - In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. Peter Lang. pp. 121-146.
    Typical puzzles for de se attitudes by Perry and Lewis are laid out and contrasted with the original version of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. It is argued, from an epistemic perspective, that de se attitudes can be explained by looking at the way internal/introspective knowledge is formed without resorting to acquaintance or making assumptions about the Mind/Body problem.
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  36.  66
    Transcendence and the Elusive Science of the Mind.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao Jr - 2009 - Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture 13 (1-3).
    This essay shows the presence of transcendence in the on-going attempt to come up with a purely scientific account of the workings of the human mind. At the center of the developmental stages of this attempt is the computational theory of mind, which regards the human mind as some kind of computer. With Wittgenstein’s analysis of the limits of linguistic representation in the Tractatus as a framework, it is argued that the various difficulties encountered by this attempt are primarily due (...)
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  37.  26
    From the Closed Classical Algorithmic Universe to an Open World of Algorithmic Constellations.Mark Burgin & Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2013 - In Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic Raffaela Giovagnoli (ed.), Computing Nature. pp. 241--253.
    In this paper we analyze methodological and philosophical implications of algorithmic aspects of unconventional computation. At first, we describe how the classical algorithmic universe developed and analyze why it became closed in the conventional approach to computation. Then we explain how new models of algorithms turned the classical closed algorithmic universe into the open world of algorithmic constellations, allowing higher flexibility and expressive power, supporting constructivism and creativity in mathematical modeling. As Goedels undecidability theorems demonstrate, the closed algorithmic universe restricts (...)
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  38. Realism in Mind.Ricardo Restrepo - 2010 - University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
    The thesis develops solutions to two main problems for mental realism. Mental realism is the theory that mental properties, events, and objects exist, with their own set of characters and causal powers. The first problem comes from the philosophy of science, where Psillos proposes a notion of scientific realism that contradicts mental realism, and consequently, if one is to be a scientific realist in the way Psillos recommends, one must reject mental realism. I propose adaptations to the conception of scientific (...)
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  39. Nature's Providence: The Representational Role of Vision.Tim Klaassen - manuscript
    This paper presents a novel theory of what it is that makes vision a representational affair. Vision is a process of representation; a fact that does not depend on it being "contentfull" or "indirect". Even if it turns out that vision is direct and/or intrinsically "contentless", it is nevertheless defined by features that decisively make it count as a process or representation. The phenomenology of vision is key here: as we see, we are directly presented with aspects of the environment (...)
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  40.  74
    Review of The Minds I by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennet (1981).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Variable quality essays dominated by reductionist nonsense. This is a followup to Hofstadter´s famous Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its predecessor, it is concerned largely with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on the attempts of D and H to understand (...)
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  41.  6
    THE APPEARANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN MACHINES.Desmond Sander - manuscript
    This is merely the longish abstract of a talk I gave in 2001, that now seems to make more sense than ever.
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  42. Electromagnetic-Field Theories of Mind.Mostyn W. Jones - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12).
    Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, (...)
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  43.  19
    Mechanistic Computational Individuation Without Biting the Bullet.Nir Fresco & Marcin Miłkowski - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz005.
    Is the mathematical function being computed by a given physical system determined by the system’s dynamics? This question is at the heart of the indeterminacy of computation phenomenon (Fresco et al. [unpublished]). A paradigmatic example is a conventional electrical AND-gate that is often said to compute conjunction, but it can just as well be used to compute disjunction. Despite the pervasiveness of this phenomenon in physical computational systems, it has been discussed in the philosophical literature only indirectly, mostly with reference (...)
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  44. Discrete Thoughts: Why Cognition Must Use Discrete Representations.Eric Dietrich & A. Markman - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (1):95-119.
    Advocates of dynamic systems have suggested that higher mental processes are based on continuous representations. In order to evaluate this claim, we first define the concept of representation, and rigorously distinguish between discrete representations and continuous representations. We also explore two important bases of representational content. Then, we present seven arguments that discrete representations are necessary for any system that must discriminate between two or more states. It follows that higher mental processes require discrete representations. We also argue that discrete (...)
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  45.  79
    A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Cognitive Computation 1 (3):221-233.
    The journal of Cognitive Computation is defined in part by the notion that biologically inspired computational accounts are at the heart of cognitive processes in both natural and artificial systems. Many studies of various important aspects of cognition (memory, observational learning, decision making, reward prediction learning, attention control, etc.) have been made by modelling the various experimental results using ever-more sophisticated computer programs. In this manner progressive inroads have been made into gaining a better understanding of the many components of (...)
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  46. Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Gary Bartlett - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict (...)
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  47. AI, Situatedness, Creativity, and Intelligence; or the Evolution of the Little Hearing Bones.Eric Dietrich - 1996 - J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 8 (1):1-6.
    Good sciences have good metaphors. Indeed, good sciences are good because they have good metaphors. AI could use more good metaphors. In this editorial, I would like to propose a new metaphor to help us understand intelligence. Of course, whether the metaphor is any good or not depends on whether it actually does help us. (What I am going to propose is not something opposed to computationalism -- the hypothesis that cognition is computation. Noncomputational metaphors are in vogue these (...)
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  48. Subvert the Dominant Paradigm!Eric Dietrich - 2002 - J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI.
    We again press the case for computationalism by considering the latest in ill- conceived attacks on this foundational idea. We briefly but clearly define and delimit computationalism and then consider three authors from a new anti- computationalist collection.
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  49. Dynamic Systems and Paradise Regained, or How to Avoid Being a Calculator. [REVIEW]Eric Dietrich - 1999 - J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 11 (4):473-478.
    The new kid on the block in cognitive science these days is dynamic systems. This way of thinking about the mind is, as usual, radically opposed to computationalism - - the hypothesis that thinking is computing. The use of dynamic systems is just the latest in a series of attempts, from Searle's Chinese Room Argument, through the weirdnesses of postmodernism, to overthrown computationalism, which as we all know is a perfectly nice hypothesis about the mind that never hurt (...)
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  50. Structure and Dynamics in Implementation of Computations.Jacques Mallah - forthcoming - In Yasemin J. Erden (ed.), Proceedings of the 7th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy:. AISB.
    Without a proper restriction on mappings, virtually any system could be seen as implementing any computation. That would not allow characterization of systems in terms of implemented computations and is not compatible with a computationalist philosophy of mind. Information-based criteria for independence of substates within structured states are proposed as a solution. Objections to the use of requirements for transitions in counterfactual states are addressed, in part using the partial-brain argument as a general counterargument to neural replacement arguments.
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