Is ‘ought’ an object? Meinong’s and Veber’s answers

In T. Pirc (ed.), Object, Person, and Reality: An Introduction to France Veber. JSKD. pp. 53-65 (2012)
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Abstract
Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In "Die Natur des Sollens", Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber's and Meinong's conceptions of the ought
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