This volume examines the entire logical and philosophical production of Nikolai A. Vasil’ev, studying his life and activities as a historian and man of letters. Readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of this influential Russian logician, philosopher, psychologist, and poet. The author frames Vasil’ev’s work within its historical and cultural context. He takes into consideration both the situation of logic in Russia and the state of logic in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of (...) the 20th. Following this, the book considers the attempts to develop non-Aristotelian logics or ideas that present affinities with imaginary logic. It then looks at the contribution of traditional logic in elaborating non-classical ideas. This logic allows the author to deal with incomplete objects just as imaginary logic does with contradictory ones. Both logics are objects of interesting analysis by modern researchers. (shrink)

Starting with the philosophical reflections of the Italian writer C. E. Gadda, the paper offers a criticism of the traditional concept of an individual as something which is determinate, separate and autonomous. Gadda argues that an individual should be understood as an element which is in a multiplicity of relations with the other elements of the system inside of which it exists. The idea is developed on the basis of Spinoza's 'Ethics', but it shares many affinities with Peirce's notions of (...) an individual and of a continuum. Taking its cue from Peirce's ideas, which are here discussed in relation to Aristotle and Kant, the paper proposes to construe an individual as a continuum, that is as something which is in a continuity of reactions and relations with the objects of the phenomenological (spatial-temporal) context in which it exists and with those of the dialectical context, that is that net of objects which can be identified starting from the relational properties of the object. (shrink)

In Meinong’s object theory there is, alongside a classificatory aspect, one having to do with degrees, increase and variation. This other aspect comes out of Meinong’s intention of extending his object theory’s aprioristic method to the empirical world. The forms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ concerning psychical experiences are first investigated; they consist in degrees of certainty of judgment and of shadiness (Schattenhaftigkeit) and seriousness (Ernstartigkeit) of imaginary representations and assumptions. Secondly, forms of variability regarding objects are shown, specifically the incompleteness (...) (Unvollständigkeit) of the objects of representations and the subfactuality (Untertatsächlichkeit) of the objectives, i.e., the objects of judgments and assumptions. There is a correspondence between such variability in objects and a variability in psychical experiences. Finally, an application of such concepts to fictional objects is proposed. (shrink)

Meinongs Untersuchungen über Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse und Vorstellungsproduktion sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil seiner Konzeption des Fiktiven. Nach Meinong verweist die Phantasie auf ihr Korrelat, das er in „Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie“ (1889) mit den Phantasievorstellungen identifiziert. Solche Vorstellungen sind, da sie produziert werden, nicht einfach, sondern aus mehreren, miteinander in Beziehung gesetzten Elementen zusammengesetzt. Zur Erklärung, wie Phantasievorstellungen produziert werden, entwickelt Meinong die Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion. Bei der Entwicklung dieser Theorie stellt der Essay „Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung“ (1899) eine wichtige Etappe dar. (...) Diese Lehre bedeutet einerseits eine Vertiefung der Relationstheorie und andrerseits bietet die Bearbeitung des Begriffs der Fundierung die Erklärung, wie sich Superiora auf Inferiora aufbauen. Das psychologische Gegenstück der Fundierung ist die Vorstellungsproduktion, insofern diese erklärt, wie die Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes höherer Ordnung aus Vorstellungen von Gegenständen niedrigerer Ordnung hervorgeht. Die weitere Entwicklung von Meinongs Denken in Über Annahmen (1902, 1910) führt zur Erweiterung des Tätigkeitsbereichs der Phantasie auf das ganze psychische Leben sowohl durch die Entdeckung einer Art psychischer Erlebnisse in den Annahmen, die im Bereich des Denkens eine ähnliche Rolle spielen wie die Phantasievorstellungen im Bereich des Vorstellens, als auch durch die Entdeckung von Phantasiekorrelaten für Gefühle und Begehrungen, so daß die Phantasie das Unterscheidungskriterium innerhalb der Erlebnisse wird. Eine reichhaltige Forschungsperspektive öffnet die Betrachtung der ernstartigen und schattenhaften Phantasieerlebnisse in Über emotionale Präsentation (1917). (shrink)

The essay gives a brief account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong's reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and subsequently receives an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, fantasy representation, relation and complexion, I show how both the theory of production of representations and that of higher-order objects develop under the impulse of Ehrenfels's concept of Gestalt quality; both these theories (...) may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the objective and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extraobjective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject's mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong as regards both the role of objectives, which he views as mere intermediaries of beauty, and the conception of imaginary and aesthetic feelings. In the last part, I present the reactions to Witasek's aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself, and I sketch Ehrenfels's and Veber's aesthetic views. (shrink)

This paper discusses the intellectual relationship between Meinong and Twardowski, focusing on their ideas about representations and judgements, which are in part extraneous to Franz Brentano’s philosophy. The two philosophers addressed similar topics and their respective positions can be seen to overlap in some regards. This is shown by looking at their views on judgements about relations, intuitive and non‑intuitive representations, and Twardowski’s represented judgements, which display some strong analogies with Meinong’s assumptions.

Brentano’s dissertation "Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles" (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle) (1862) is examined in the light of the nineteenth-century debate on the Aristotelian categories. After providing an exposition of the conceptions of the main representatives of this debate, Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Bonitz, this paper assesses Brentano’s point of view on the meaning and origin of the Aristotelian categories. It shows (i) that Brentano assumes non-Aristotelian elements in his reading of the Aristotelian (...) categories, (ii) that this depends on the fact that he shares Bonitz’s thesis, and (iii) that his reading is incomplete in the light of certain Aristotelian statements about non-being. (shrink)

Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong’s conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, (...) and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects. (shrink)

At first, I explain how Bergmann reads Meinong. As regards his method, Bergmann’s stated aim is to examine Meinong’s thought through all the stages of its development; but he is very selective in choosing exactly what to consider, not just within each of Meinong’s texts, but equally among his texts – indeed he completely ignores Meinong’s mature works. Moreover, he often alters Meinong’s thought by translating it into his foil ontology. As regards the content, Bergmann interprets Meinong as a reist (...) and a nominalist. I try to show that such a view is not correct. I then discuss this interpretation by focusing on which Meinong Bergmann reads, that is, which writings he refers to and at the same time which of Meinong’s theories he criticizes. I sketch the four phases of the development of Meinong’s thought distinguished by Bergmann: his first theory of relations, the theory of the objects of higher order, of objectives, and finally object theory. I present Bergmann’s critique and compare his distinction of different degrees of independence, which establish differences of status among categories of existents, with Meinong’s distinction between kinds of being. Finally, taking into account also Meinong’s mature work, I offer an assessment of Bergmann’s proposal to rethink object theory. Considering Meinong’s theory of incomplete objects, I show that Bergmann would have found in Meinong an ally not only in the battle against representationalism, as he maintains, but also in that against nominalism. (shrink)

Stories express hypotheses, interpretations of the world that have a certain degree of probability. To demonstrate this thesis I have adopted the notion of hypothesis, in a sense very close to the Meinongian concept of assumption, and a ‘metric’ conception of the values of the truth or falsity of a proposition – as that has been proposed in several ways by Peirce, Vasil’ev and Meinong. To show the the cognitive value of literary texts, and therefore their truth value, I take (...) my move from chapter 9 of Aristotle’s Poetics, where he holds that poetry is imitative of reality, not in the sense of history – which relates what has happened – but rather, in so far as it expresses “the kinds of things that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are either probable or necessary.” The probable admits variations of degree. By means of an examination of the Meinongian concepts of assumption and objective (i.e. state of affairs), which also allow different modes of gradation, I introduce, with examples drawn from Dante’s Divine Comedy and The Description (Tradimento) by Machiavelli, a theory of degrees of truth that makes it possible to apply the concept of probability to literary as well as to historical texts. Finally, I connect the universal character of the literary text with the ontological notion of incomplete object and argue that a fictional object, as it is incomplete, is not an individual but a type. (shrink)

Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is (...) the realm of possibility. In "Die Natur des Sollens", Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber's and Meinong's conceptions of the ought. (shrink)

A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a context. But there is (...) more: it identifies a context. Laz nije ni pogresna tvrdnja, ni greska, niti pak puka fikcija; ona predstavlja odredjeni tip fikcije, cin - tacnije - intencionalni cin. Cinu je potreban subjekat, te je stoga laz neodvojiva od svog subjekta. Oni zajedno cine stvaran objekat: on mora biti stvaran,buduci da laz proizvodi posledice, a odnos uzroka i posledice vazi jedino izmedju stvarnih bica. Kao i svaki objekat, laz se obelodanjuje u kontekstu. Ali to nije sve, ona identifikuje kontekst. (shrink)

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the capacity to attract (...) aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed. (shrink)

The notion of identity is investigated through Aristotle and Hegel as supporters of two different ontological conceptions: pluralism of substances and relational holism. Through Aristotle, I examine both the thesis according to which the identity of an object is constituted by its properties and the difficulties which this thesis encounters. Aristotle easily defines the identity in species, in genus, and in number; some problems arise regarding the identity of individuals: for these, it is not enough to indicate the definition and (...) the proper qualities, but matter is needed. Matter cannot, however, be a criterion for identifying duplicate objects: in this case, it plays at most the role of a “weak individuator.” A weak individuator involves relations with other entities. The use of relations in determining the identity of an entity is extensively treated by Hegel, according to whom, in order to define the identity of an object a multiplicity of particular objects is required and, therefore, relations among entities. I conclude by proposing a notion of the object understood not as an independent, separate, and autonomous item, but as a portion of the world, which is given in a phenomenological context and identifies a dialectical context. (shrink)

The theses exposed by Alexius Meinong in two newspaper articles in 1873 are taken as the paradigm of a feeling that was common to young Austrian intelligentsia. Meinong upholds a conception of life as struggle and of history as a series of struggles among nations. In his view, the defence of the interests of a people is absolute and generates conflicts among nations that will increasingly dominate future scenarios. The concept of nation has an identification function inward and one of (...) dissociation outward. This discourse is contextualised within the framework of the various student corporations of the University of Vienna, where the new ruling class was forming which, despite different political ideas, was united by nationalism. Finally, the paper analyses the opposing views of Eric J. Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith on the idea of nation and suggests some similarities between the Habsburg Empire and the European Union. (shrink)

Il lavoro si interroga principalmente sul significato di «verità effettuale della cosa». Dopo aver esaminato la nozione di vero da un punto di vista semantico e gnoseologico – nel primo senso, è vero, secondo Machiavelli, il discorso che riscontra le cose, nel secondo, il discorso che si fonda sull’esperienza, intesa come esperienza sia diretta (vissuta e osservata) che mediata (letta e ascoltata) –, giunge a definire la «verità effettuale della cosa» come «il discorso storicamente e empiricamente verificabile negli effetti, o (...) nei fatti, che concerne la cosa in oggetto, ossia lo stato». A questo si contrappone «l’immaginazione della cosa», il discorso che, mancando del riscontro delle cose e di esperienza dello stato, non può che ricorrere all’immaginazione, la quale svolge pertanto la funzione di un surrogato. Ma l’immaginazione non è solo fonte di inganni, in un altro senso svolge un ruolo altamente positivo: l’immaginazione che muove dal riscontro permette di individuare un «rimedio» possibile per «questo guasto mondo»; e consente al principe, nella situazione contingente, di agire e apparire anche contro i dettami di una certa mortale, se necessario. L’individuazione di un rimedio possibile e l’attuazione di un agire necessario, contrapposti al pericolo incombente della rovina, richiedono la conoscenza delle regole e leggi dell’agire politico. La verità come coerenza, coerenza del discorso che risulta dall’esame dell’agire storico e politico, ossia coerenza delle argomentazioni machiavelliane che traducono in proposizioni l’agire politico, nella fattispecie, quello del principe, è condizione necessaria, anche se non sufficiente, per preservarsi dalla rovina e mantenere uno stato. (shrink)

The paper investigates the system of 'Imaginary Logic' created by the Russian logician N.A. Vasil'ev (1880-1940), considered by some to be a forerunner of paraconsistent or intuitionistic logics. It is shown how he constructs a logic without the law of contradiction redefining the concept of negation. Vasil'ev singles out two levels of logic, an external one which is absolute and one depending on commitments in relation to cognizable objects which is not absolute. His reconstruction of the syllogism shows the viability (...) of his system and indicates how, indeed, he may be called an initiator of nonclassical logics. (shrink)

Aristotle's Organon in Old and New Logic 1800–1950 explores the reception and interpretation of Aristotle's logic over the last two centuries. The volume covers seminal works during this period by logicians, historians of logic, and historians of philosophy, including John Lloyd Akrill, Francesco Barone, Günther Patzig, Enrico Berti, and Mario Mignucci. Contributors consider the reception of the Organon in old logic and chart the appearance of formal approaches to logic beginning with Boole. This in-depth study of Aristotelianism also covers logic (...) in Kant and Hegel, alongside the problems and projects of interpreting Aristotle in the new logic after Boole and Frege. The background of modern debates concerning induction and abduction provides further insight into Aristotelian logic during the period. By filling gaps in our understanding of Aristotelian logic, this book provides a fundamental missing link in 21st century studies of the history of Aristotelianism. It brings together scholars of both ancient and modern logic to understand the interpretation of ancient logic before and after the development of the modern, algebraic approach to logic. (shrink)

The paper examines the constitutive rule of the Documentality (object = written act), its explanatory power, and the role that writing and relations play in it. The social object is explained as a hybrid object, of higher order, consisting of heterogeneous parts; its identity is determined, amongst other things, by the relations it entertains with other entities. In the second part, after criticizing Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, which fails to explain conflict situations, the article focuses on some political implications (...) of social ontology, examining the role of immigrants sans papiers. (shrink)

The essay gives an account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong’s reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and comes subsequently to an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, phantasy-representation, relation and complexion, I show how the theory of production of representations, as well as that of higher-order objects, develops under the impulse of Ehrenfels’ concept of Gestalt qualities; both these theories (...) may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the “objective” and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extra-objective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject’s mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong on both the conception of aesthetic objects and of imaginary feelings. In the last sections, I review the reactions to Witasek’s aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself (in particular Schwarz’ and Saxinger’s ideas on phantasy-feelings, and Ameseder’s on value beauty), and I sketch Ehrenfels’ and Veber’s aesthetic views. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to apply Meinong’s theory of signs to an analysis of literary texts. The focus lies on words and sentences which, according to Meinong, expressing fantasy experiences when they occur in literary texts. He distinguishes between “serious-like” and “shadow-like” fantasy experiences. The former can be detached from their fictional context, i.e., they are also understandable in other contexts. The latter, instead, are dependent on their fictional contexts. This implies that shadow-like fantasy experiences are less specific (...) than serious-like ones. The objects presented by these experiences are the meanings of the signs involved. The definiteness of the experience is related to the completeness of the object; consequently, objects involved in shadow-like experiences are incomplete. In addition to be incomplete, fictional objects can be defined as non-existent objects of higher order, which come into the world through linguistic expression and are tied to the context(s) in which the fantasy has placed them. (shrink)

Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is (...) the realm of possibility. In "Die Natur des Sollens", Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber's and Meinong's conceptions of the ought. (shrink)