Evidentialism and the Numbers Game

Theoria 73 (4):304-316 (2007)
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Abstract
In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The objection arises from difficulties that evidentialism has with explaining our reasons for belief in unstable belief contexts with a single fixed point. I consider what other kinds of reasons for belief are relevant in such cases.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Evidentialism.Feldman, Richard & Conee, Earl

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