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Evidentialism and the Numbers Game
Theoria 73 (4):304-316 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The objection arises from difficulties that evidentialism has with explaining our reasons for belief in unstable belief contexts with a single fixed point. I consider what other kinds of reasons for belief are relevant in such cases.Author's Profile
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2010-09-16
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2010-09-16
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103 (#36,221)
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