Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being fine-grained. However, only the latter have furthermore a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completion and variation/constancy. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for thinking that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional abilities it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. Finally, I argue that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it's neither experiences nor seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence
PhilPapers/Archive ID
REIESA-3
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 1 (2015-12-25)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 73 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Unity of Perception.Chudnoff, Elijah & Didomenico, David
Consciousness and Knowledge.Brogaard, Berit & Chudnoff, Elijah

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-10-06

Total views
352 ( #8,864 of 41,616 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
106 ( #4,287 of 41,616 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.