Outlines of a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind

In A. H. Fischer (ed.), ISRE ' 98, Proceedings of the 10th Conference of the International Society for Research on Emotions (pp. 186-191). ISRE (1998)
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This paper summarizes a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind (for more detail, see Reisenzein, 1998). The basic idea of the theory is that at least a core set of human emotions including surprise are nonconceptual products of hardwired, metarepresentational mechanisms whose main function is to subserve the monitoring and updating of the two basic forms of propositional representations, beliefs and desires.
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