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  1. Moral philosophy and the problems of anxiety.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Some of the most influential moral philosophers in the English-speaking world say or suggest that we should only pay attention to moral judgments made in certain states of mind, where these states exclude anxious states. In this paper, I argue that this position faces at least two major problems.
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  2. Do Emotions Represent Values and How Can We Tell?A. Grzankowski - manuscript
    Do emotions represent values? The dominant view in philosophy has it that they do. There is wide disagreement over the details, but this core commitment is common. But there is a new comer on scene: the attitude view. According to it, rather than representing value properties, there is a value-relevant way you represent the targets of emotion. For example, in feeling angry with someone you stand to them in the relation of representing-as-having-wronged-you. Although a recent view, it has quickly generated (...)
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  3. The Attitudinalist Challenge to Perceptualism about Emotion.Michael Milona - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    Perceptualists maintain that emotions essentially involve perceptual experiences of value. This view pressures advocates to individuate emotion types (e.g. anger, fear) by their respective evaluative contents. This paper explores the Attitudinalist Challenge to perceptualism. According to the challenge, everyday ways of talking and thinking about emotions conflict with the thesis that emotions are individuated by, or even have, evaluative content; the attitudinalist proposes instead that emotions are evaluative at the level of attitude. Faced with this challenge, perceptualists should deepen their (...)
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  4. Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like.James Fritz - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2597-2616.
    Sometimes, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems like a demand to have that attitude. But in other cases, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems more like a permission to have the attitude. I defend a proposal that can accommodate both of these appearances. I argue that there is a kind of emotionlessness, which I call apathy, that can be fitting or unfitting in just the same way that emotion can. I further argue that, in some cases, (...)
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  5. What “Values” Are Emotions About?Michael Milona - 2022 - A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa, Edited by Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet and Fabrice Teroni.
    This paper’s starting point is the popular thesis that emotions are constituted by experiences of value. This thesis raises what I call the value question: what exactly are these values that emotions are supposedly about? ‘Value’ here is understood broadly to include not only properties such as being good, bad, fearsome, dangerous, etc. but also being right, wrong, a reason, etc. In my view, the value question hasn’t received the concentrated attention that it deserves (though there are some notable exceptions), (...)
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  6. Defining Optimisms.Massin Olivier - 2022 - A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa, Edited by Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet and Fabrice Teroni in 2022.
    To be optimistic, it is standardly assumed, is to have positive expectations. I here argue that this definition is correct but captures only one variety of optimism – here called factual optimism. It leaves out two other important varieties of optimism. The first – focal optimism – corresponds to the idea of seeing the glass half full. The second – axiological optimism – consists in the view that good is stronger than bad. Those three varieties of optimism are irreducible to (...)
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  7. La redefinición del concepto de juicio en la explicación cognitivista de las emociones.Rodrigo Braicovich - 2021 - Eikasia Revista de Filosofía 102:129-151.
    Una de las premisas centrales del modelo cognitivista de explicación de las emociones consiste en afirmar que toda emoción es un juicio, afirmación que conduce a lo que denominaré el problema de la restrictividad, es decir, al hecho de que dicho modelo parece impedirnos atribuir emociones a entidades que carecen (temporal o estructuralmente) de la capacidad de juzgar. El objetivo del artículo consistirá en relevar las estrategias a las que recurren los dos autores que han defendido el modelo cognitivista de (...)
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  8. Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.
    According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...)
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  9. Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):733-752.
    De Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the (...)
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  10. Awe and Wonder in Scientific Practice: Implications for the Relationship Between Science and Religion.Helen De Cruz - 2020 - Issues in Science and Theology: Nature – and Beyond.
    This paper examines the role of awe and wonder in scientific practice. Drawing on evidence from psychological research and the writings of scientists and science communicators, I argue that awe and wonder play a crucial role in scientific discovery. They focus our attention on the natural world, encourage open-mindedness, diminish the self (particularly feelings of self-importance), help to accord value to the objects that are being studied, and provide a mode of understanding in the absence of full knowledge. I will (...)
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  11. Edmund Husserl.Jardine James - 2020 - In Hilge Landweer & Thomas Szanto (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London, New York: Routledge. pp. 53-62.
    While Husserl is widely recognised as the founder of the phenomenological movement, and as responsible for important positions on a number of central philosophical topics (such as, for instance, perception, intentionality, self-consciousness, and the tenability of naturalism), he is frequently regarded, even within phenomenological circles, as having a fairly impoverished understanding of the emotions. And indeed, there is some validity to the observation that, while essential roles are accorded to emotion in Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of personhood, (axiological) reason, value-theory, and (...)
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  12. Really expressive presuppositions and how to block them.Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (1):138-158.
    Kaplan (1999) argued that a different dimension of expressive meaning (“use-conditional”, as opposed to truth-conditional) is required to characterize the meaning of pejoratives, including slurs and racial epithets. Elaborating on this, writers have argued that the expressive meaning of pejoratives and slurs is either a conventional implicature (Potts 2007) or a presupposition (Macià 2002 and 2014, Schlenker 2007, Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016). We argue that an expressive presuppositional theory accounts well for the data, but that expressive presuppositions are not just (...)
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  13. Hope, Hate and Indignation: Spinoza on Political Emotion in the Trump Era.Ericka Tucker - 2018 - In M. B. Sable & A. J. Torres (eds.), Trump and Political Philosophy. pp. 131-158.
    Can we ever have politics without the noble lie? Can we have a collective political identity that does not exclude or define ‘us’ as ‘not them’? In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that individual human emotions and imagination shape the social world. This world, he argues, can in turn be shaped by political institutions to be more or less hopeful, more or less rational, or more or less angry and indignant. In his political works, Spinoza offered suggestions for how to shape (...)
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  14. How do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making?Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist - 2015 - Emotion Review 7 (1):81-89.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  15. The difference between emotion and affect.Tom Cochrane - 2015 - Physics of Life Reviews 13 (2):43-44.
    In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.
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  16. Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction.Jeff Kochan - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking a socially inflected reliabilism as (...)
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  17. The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction.Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):507-511.
    Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate (...)
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  18. In what sense are emotions evaluations?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15-31.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  19. Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  20. Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies - Volume 6. Athiner. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  21. Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Theorie der Meta-Emotionen.Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch - 2009 - In Barbara Merker (ed.), Leben mit Gefühlen. mentis. pp. 113-137.
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  22. Emotion, Meaning, and Appraisal Theory.Michael McEachrane - 2009 - Theory and Psychology 19 (1):33-53.
    According to psychological emotion theories referred to as appraisal theory, emotions are caused by appraisals (evaluative judgments). Borrowing a term from Jan Smedslund, it is the contention of this article that psychological appraisal theory is “pseudoempirical” (i.e., misleadingly or incorrectly empirical). In the article I outline what makes some scientific psychology “pseudoempirical,” distinguish my view on this from Jan Smedslund’s, and then go on to show why paying heed to the ordinary meanings of emotion terms is relevant to psychology, and (...)
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  23. Epistemic Emotions.Adam Morton - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 385--399.
    I discuss a large number of emotions that are relevant to performance at epistemic tasks. My central concern is the possibility that it is not the emotions that are most relevant to success of these tasks but associated virtues. I present cases in which it does seem to be the emotions rather than the virtues that are doing the work. I end of the paper by mentioning the connections between desirable and undesirable epistemic emotions.
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  24. Great Anger.Anthony Cunningham - 2005 - The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  25. Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, (...)
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  26. Outlines of a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind.Rainer Reisenzein - 1998 - In A. H. Fischer (ed.), ISRE ' 98, Proceedings of the 10th Conference of the International Society for Research on Emotions (pp. 186-191). ISRE.
    This paper summarizes a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind (for more detail, see Reisenzein, 1998). The basic idea of the theory is that at least a core set of human emotions including surprise are nonconceptual products of hardwired, metarepresentational mechanisms whose main function is to subserve the monitoring and updating of the two basic forms of propositional representations, beliefs and desires.
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