Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia

Journal of Human Cognition 8 (1):3-21 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is first shown that many questions could be raised about phenomenal concepts and the popular answer to the question what Mary learns upon release, namely, that this is what it is like to see red. It is then shown that the category of quale is actually a postulate of philosophical theories and philosophers posit qualia because they fail to see how to account for the two related features of experience, namely, subjectivity and phenomenality. It is argued that we don't need qualia to explain the subjectivity and phenomenality of experience because we don't have to posit apparent properties. It is then proposed that experiencing is a way of knowing and that the new knowledge Mary acquires upon release is her knowledge by acquaintance with red.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-10-27

Downloads
12 (#100,178)

6 months
12 (#99,018)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?