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  1. Calculus of Qualia 7: Equations vs. Qualations, Assertions with non-referential terms, Proofs, Logic.P. Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    General Introduction: In [1] a Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed. The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader’s mind and is non-referential; it does not even refer to itself. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. All of philosophy, from Plato through Descartes through Chalmers, including hieroglyphics and emojis, used (...)
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  2. Calculus of Qualia 4: Why Something Rather than Nothing; Rather than Weakest Assumptions; Contingent Possibility vs Necessary Actuality; Possibilities of Possibilities.P. Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    General Introduction: In [1] a Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed. The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader’s mind and is non-referential; it does not even refer to itself. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. All of philosophy, from Plato through Descartes through Chalmers, including hieroglyphics and emojis, used (...)
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  3. Calculus of Qualia 6: Materialism, Dualism, Idealism, and 14 others.P. Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    General Introduction: In [1] a Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed. The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader’s mind and is non-referential; it does not even refer to itself. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. All of philosophy, from Plato through Descartes through Chalmers, including hieroglyphics and emojis, used (...)
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  4. Calculus of Qualia 3: Godel Incompleteness, CQ Transcendence.Paul Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    A Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed (on PhilPapers). The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader's mind and is non-referential, *it does not even refer to itself*. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. In this paper in this series of papers, we discuss Godel Incompleteness and the incompleteness or (...)
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  5. Calculus of Qualia 1: Zombies, Spectrum Inversion, Knowledge Argument, Hard Problems and Understanding their Solutions.Paul Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    A Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed (on PhilPapers). The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader's mind and is non-referential, *it does not even refer to itself*. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. In this paper in this series of papers, we give a discussion zombies, spectrum inversion, the (...)
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  6. Calculus of Qualia 2: Intersubjective and Intrasubjective Verification; Experimental Predictions; Expanding Science.Paul Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    A Calculus of Qualia (CQ) was proposed (on PhilPapers). The key idea is that, for example, blackness is radically different than █. The former term, “blackness” refers to or is about a quale, whereas the latter term, “█” instantiates a quale in the reader's mind and is non-referential, *it does not even refer to itself*. The meaning and behavior of these terms is radically different. In this paper in this series of papers, we discuss verifiability, experimental predictability and expanding science (...)
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  7. High Art, High Artists.Simon Fokt - 2024 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 82 (1): 61–73.
    Artists rarely shy away from a drink and other psychoactive substances, yet it seems that there has never been much discussion on what aesthetic or artistic relevance this has to their works and their reception. I outline the scale of the phenomenon focusing on some prominent examples and distinguish a subset of what I call ‘high artworks’. In such artworks, I argue, drug experiences are encoded: their drug-related contextual and intrinsic properties or content are aesthetically or artistically relevant and should (...)
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  8. Mathematical Quality and Experiential Qualia.Posina Venkata Rayudu & Sisir Roy - manuscript
    Our conscious experiences are qualitative and unitary. The qualitative universals given in particular experiences, i.e. qualia, combine into the seamless unity of our conscious experience. The problematics of quality and cohesion are not unique to consciousness studies. In mathematics, the study of qualities (e.g., shape) resulting from quantitative variations in cohesive spaces led to the axiomatization of cohesion and quality. Using the mathematical definition of quality, herein we model qualia space as a categorical product of qualities. Thus modeled qualia space (...)
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  9. Can We Empathize With Emotions That We Have Never Felt?Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the (...)
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  10. How Self-Reference Builds the World (Part 2).Cosmin Visan - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 14 (6):460-478.
    If you were to build a world from Nothing, how would you do it? By investigating the nature of self-reference, we will show how this can be achieved, how starting from Nothing, Everything can be obtained. Various implications of the definition of self-reference will be investigated, showing how it can account for various aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness, thus showing how starting from only 1 principle, a world of infinite complexity can be obtained. Parallels with set theory will be (...)
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  11. How Self-Reference Builds the World (Part 1).Cosmin Visan - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 14 (6):443-459.
    If you were to build a world from Nothing, how would you do it? By investigating the nature of self-reference, we will show how this can be achieved, how starting from Nothing, Everything can be obtained. Various implications of the definition of self-reference will be investigated, showing how it can account for various aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness, thus showing how starting from only 1 principle, a world of infinite complexity can be obtained. Parallels with set theory will be (...)
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  12. Meaning Representationalism: Between Representationalism and Qualia Realism.da Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93.
    The purpose of this article is to offer a new view of the key relation between the content and the conscious character of visual experience. The author aims to support the following claims. First, the author rejects the qualia realist claim that conscious character is an intrinsic, nonrepresentational property of visual experience, for example, a pattern of activation of neurons. However, the author also rejects the rival widespread representationalist claim that the conscious character of visual experience is identical to, or (...)
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  13. Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7.
    How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, (...)
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  14. Phänomenale Begriffe.Martina Fürst - 2019 - In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler. pp. 1-11..
    Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich (...)
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  15. Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.Roberto de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7:1-7.
    How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia-beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, as (...)
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  16. Representational Qualia Theory.Allsop Brent - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1 (2).
    This is a paper about a general representational theory of consciousness. It is quite old, and much progress has been made since. We are building and tracking consensus arround the ideas in the Representational Qualia Theory camp on Canonizer.
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  17. Are qualia computations or substances?Mostyn Jones & Eric LaRock - forthcoming - Mind and Matter:in press.
    Computationalism treats minds as computations. It hasn't explained how our quite similar sensory circuits encode our quite different qualia, nor how these circuits encode the binding of the different qualia into unifi ed perceptions. But there is growing evidence that qualia and binding come from neural electrochemical substances such as sensory detectors and the strong continuous electromagnetic field they create. Qualia may thus be neural substances, not neural computations (though computations may still help modulate qualia). This neuroelectrical view not only (...)
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  18. The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.
    Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...)
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  19. How to Include Qualia in Science.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    How can we expand science to include what-it’s-like information like qualia? This paper gives the beginning of one possible way forward. It is possible to include qualia in communications as their own terms.
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  20. Sensualism (the Universal Correlates of Qualia).Lorenzo Sleakes - manuscript
    It is hard to believe that colors, sounds, tastes and feelings, the essential ingredients of the world as we know it, never existed in the universe until complex nervous systems appeared. This paper explores the idea that phenomenal experiences made of sensible qualities such as colors and sounds exist physically as the “clothing” of matter and are real public appearances that may be experienced by any locally situated subject, shared by multiple such subjects, or may even exist unperceived. In this (...)
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  21. A Higher Dimension of Consciousness: Constructing an empirically falsifiable panpsychist model of consciousness.Jacob Jolij - manuscript
    Panpsychism is a solution to the mind-body problem that presumes that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality instead of a product or consequence of physical processes (i.e., brain activity). Panpsychism is an elegant solution to the mind-body problem: it effectively rids itself of the explanatory gap materialist theories of consciousness suffer from. However, many theorists and experimentalists doubt panpsychism can ever be successful as a scientific theory, as it cannot be empirically verified or falsified. In this paper, I present (...)
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  22. Dual aspect theory (Spinoza-Velmans) versus the EDWs perspective by Gabriel Vacariu (January 2023).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscript
    On January 2023, I received an email from somebody regarding Velmans’s article 2008. After I took a look at the paper, I started to read his book 2000. Therefore, in this section, I will investigate Velmans’ works from 2000 and 2008. I emphasize that the main difference between Spinoza’s (Velmans) dual aspect theory and my EDWs approach is the framework of thinking: Spinoza, Velmans and everybody until me had been working within the unicorn world (the Universe/world), while my EDWs assumes (...)
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  23. An Argument for Temporal A-theories Based on the Calculus of Qualia 12 23 2022.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    We give an argument for temporal A-theories based on the calculus of qualia.
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  24. Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Michelle Liu - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    It is often said that there is no appearance/reality distinction with respect to consciousness. Call this claim ‘NARD’. In contemporary discussions, NARD is closely connected to the thesis of revelation, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in experience, though the connection between the two requires clarification. This paper distinguishes different versions of NARD and homes in on a particular version that is closely connected to revelation. It shows how revelation and the related version of NARD pose (...)
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  25. A Calculus of Qualia 9 30 2022.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    The idea of this paper is to put actual qualia into equations (broadly understood) to get what might be called qualations. Qualations arguably have different meanings and truth behaviors than the analogous equations. For example, the term ‘ black ’ arguably has a different meaning and behavior than the term ‘ █ ’. This is a step in the direction of a ‘calculus of qualia’ and of expanding science to include 1st-person phenomena.
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  26. Corpo funzionale e corpo senziente. La tesi forte del carattere incarnato della mente in fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):41-56.
    In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” (...)
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  27. Sensing Qualia.Paul Skokowski - 2022 - Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 16:1-16.
    Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple (...)
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  28. A sketch of a Kripkean theory of consciousnes.Federico Zilio - 2021 - Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia 10 (3):273-292.
    In this paper, I will propose a provisional blueprint of the notion of consciousness. I will start an analysis of the notion from the way we generally use the term “consciousness” in our ordinary language. In this regard, I will use Saul Kripke’s direct reference theory to define the term “consciousness” in a non-descriptive way, that is, interpreting it as a rigid designator. Then, I will critically discuss the idea of a necessary a posteriori relationship between consciousness and brain activity, (...)
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  29. Do Qualia Exist Necessarily? v. 2.0.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Why is there something rather than nothing? I don’t know. But ‘nothing’ may not be the correct default state. It may be that the existence of possibilities requires fewer (weaker) assumptions. In this case, arguably, we should start with the existence of possibilities and not ‘nothing’. In this case, there exists the possibility of (for example) red qualia. But the possible existence of a red quale does not delineate what it is the possibility of if the possibility contains only a (...)
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  30. The problem of artificial qualia.Wael Basille - 2021 - Dissertation, Sorbonne Université
    Is it possible to build a conscious machine, an artifact that has qualitative experiences such as feeling pain, seeing the redness of a flower or enjoying the taste of coffee ? What makes such experiences conscious is their phenomenal character: it is like something to have such experiences. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the question of the qualitative aspect of conscious experiences is often addressed in terms of qualia. In a pre-theoretical and intuitive sense, qualia refer to the phenomenal character (...)
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  31. Meaning and Context: A Brief Introduction.Cosmin Visan - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 12 (4):356-382.
    In searching for what is the most natural way to regard the world, it will be shown that existence is an interplay between meanings and contexts. This interplay takes the form of consciousness, which arises on top of an infinite ocean of formless contexts. Various aspects of meaning and context will be explored, going through the emergent structure of consciousness, self-reference, the contradictory nature of the formless realm and love as the ultimate context for existence. Given the infinite ramifications of (...)
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  32. On the Big Bang, Qualia, Einstein’s Train, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Hard Problems, etc.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    On Einstein's Train and the Big Bang in Fragmental Presentism, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Qualia, Hard Problems, etc.
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  33. Qualities and the Galilean View.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):147-162.
    It is often thought that sensible qualities such as colours do not exist as properties of physical objects. Focusing on the case of colour, I discuss two views: the Galilean view, according to which colours do not exist as qualities of physical objects, and the naive view, according to which colours are, as our perception presents them to be, qualities instantiated by physical objects. I argue that it is far from clear that the Galilean view is better than the naive (...)
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  34. Do Qualia exist Necessarily?Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Why is there something rather than nothing? I don't know. But I give an argument that qualia exist *necessarily*. The *possibility* of the existence of red qualia requires actual red qualia to specify what the possibility is a possibility *of*.
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  35. On the Solutions to the Hard Problems.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    There is a profound difference between asking a 'hard problem' and asking a 'hard problem' that has qualia in the question. There are plausible answers to the former that are nevertheless clearly not answers to the latter. I give a method by which hard problems will be able to be solved, if possible. I speculate on the (possible) causal efficaciousness of consciousness in evolution and in quantum mechanics.
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  36. The Archeology of Qualia.Cosmin Visan - 2021 - Journal Of Anthropological And Archeological Sciences 4 (5):565-569.
    Researching into our past, scientists use different methods, from looking at the night sky to digging traces of our past and analyzing DNA. I propose here another method, that can have the potential of shedding more light into our history and the type of entities that we are. Working under philosophical idealism, I propose that evolution is in the first place the evolution of consciousness, and thus the traces of evolution are mostly not to be found in our physical bodies, (...)
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  37. Fragmental Presentism and Quantum Mechanics.Paul Merriam - 2021
    This paper develops a Fragmentalist theory of Presentism and shows how it can help to develop a interpretation of quantum mechanics. There are several fragmental interpretations of physics. In the interpretation of this paper, each quantum system forms a fragment, and fragment f1 makes a measurement on fragment f2 if and only if f2 makes a corresponding measurement on f1. The main idea is then that each fragment has its own present (or ‘now’) until a mutual quantum measurement—at which time (...)
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  38. The consumer society by Baudrillard : A sociological approach to capitalism.Irfan Ajvazi - 2021 - Germany: Heisenberg Academy and Idea Books.
    Consumer society, by Jean Baudrillard, is a major contribution to contemporary sociology and philosophy, at the height of the Division of Labor Durkheim or The Protestant Ethic and the Ethics of Capitalism Weber.
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  39. Equations, Qualia, and Qualations.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Abstract to Equations, Qualia, and Qualations -/- With regard to consciousness, we could write an equation B = black. But it is possible to rewrite this using a quale, namely, B = █. This latter equation might be called a ‘qualation’. It has the same meaning regardless of the physiology that apprehends it. This article argues a whole theory of qualations could be developed. Further, to a Dualist, it could be that a materialist is convinced by materialist arguments involving the (...)
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  40. An introduction to dualism: the mental to the fore?Filippo Pelucchi - manuscript
    The contemporary debate around consciousness presents us (and often leads us to embrace) a specific current of thought: physicalism, which states that everything in our reality is physical1. In this paper I want to introduce the main points of the opposite view, dualism, according to which there are two different realms of reality: the mental and the physical one. In the introduction I give the main idea and sketch the general intuition behind dualism. In Section 1 I present substance dualism (...)
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  41. Quantum information theoretic approach to the mind–brain problem.Danko D. Georgiev - 2020 - Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 158:16-32.
    The brain is composed of electrically excitable neuronal networks regulated by the activity of voltage-gated ion channels. Further portraying the molecular composition of the brain, however, will not reveal anything remotely reminiscent of a feeling, a sensation or a conscious experience. In classical physics, addressing the mind–brain problem is a formidable task because no physical mechanism is able to explain how the brain generates the unobservable, inner psychological world of conscious experiences and how in turn those conscious experiences steer the (...)
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  42. Motivation and synopsis of the new theory of time.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    The motivation comes from the analogy (equivalence?) of the A-series to ontologically private qualia in Dualism. This leads to the proposal that two quantum systems, no matter how small, mutually observe each other when and only when they come to share the same A-series. McTaggart's A-series and B-series can be varied independently so they cannot be the same temporal variable.
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  43. Observations.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Observations on qualia, death, free will, why there is something rather than nothing, and the Star Trek vs. the Star Wars debate.
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  44. A new theory of time 2 29 2020.Paul Merriam & Jeremy Horne - manuscript
    We motivate and develop a new theory of time and apply it to a few thought experiments in physics.
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  45. The Super Justification Argument for Phenomenal Transparency.Kevin Morris - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):437-455.
    ABSTRACT In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, Philip Goff argues that the case against physicalist views of consciousness turns on ‘Phenomenal Transparency’, roughly the thesis that phenomenal concepts reveal the essential nature of phenomenal properties. This paper considers the argument that Goff offers for Phenomenal Transparency. The key premise is that our introspective judgments about current conscious experience are ‘Super Justified’, in that these judgments enjoy an epistemic status comparable to that of simple mathematical judgments, and a better epistemic status than (...)
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  46. Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.
    Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences (...)
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  47. Qualia.David Villena Saldaña - 2016 - Escritura y Pensamiento 39 (39):79-103.
    This paper shows why qualia constitute a problem for any theory of mental phenomena. We use the term ‘qualia’ in reference to non-intentional features of mental states which are eminently qualitative, i.e. perceptions, emotions, moods and body sensations. These non-intentional features are usually described as intrinsic, ineffable, infallible, atomic, private, direct and irreducible to the physical. The paper also explains the absent qualia argument which is addressed as a critique to functionalism.
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  48. The obscure content of hallucination.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2019 - Sofia 8 (1):30-53.
    Michael Tye proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view, which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to (...)
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  49. A Short Solution to the Hard Problem.A. T. Bollands - manuscript
    This very short paper provides a panpsychic solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. It was presented to the Philosophical Society of the Oxford University Department of Continuing Education (OUDCE) on 18th August 2019, and posted on Twitter (@ATBollands) on the 20th August, 2019. It solves the Hard Problem by 1) making the case for Panpsychism, and 2) solving the Combination Problem (Panpsychism's equivalent of the Hard Problem). -/- The paper aims to be clear, concise, to-the-point and accessible to the (...)
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  50. Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Phenomenology and Mind 14:56-67.
    In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also (...)
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