The General Truthmaker View of ontological commitment

Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1405-1425 (2016)
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Abstract
In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something that makes true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not ontologically committed to the truthmakers of our sentences
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Truthmakers.Armstrong, D. M.
Against Parthood.Sider, Theodore

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Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.

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2015-07-26

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