A Conjectural Solution to the “Easy” and “Hard” Problems of Consciousness

Abstract

Where Consciousness has been described previously, it is only in the context of strictly unconscious means – we leave ourselves under the guise of some manifestation of consciousness from alien means, and lose ourselves in the mysterianism that has formed a true government over conjectural thought on the study of consciousness. This article instead proposes that the information which, to us, occupies a passive basis is formative for consciousness – derivative on a prerogative for formation that is observed in GWT and IIT that rejects any preconceived notion of immediate innateness for consciousness – and that it provides a shape for consciousness that suggests its function to be explicitly limited to its faculties.

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2024-10-15

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