How not to test for philosophical expertise
Synthese 192 (2):431-452 (2015)
Abstract
Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that these findings do not threaten philosophical expertise—though we can draw lessons for more effective empirical tests
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Mortal Questions.Nagel, Thomas
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Williamson, Timothy
Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.DePaul, Michael R. & Ramsey, William (eds.)
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Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection.Schwitzgebel, Eric & Cushman, Fiery
Philosophical Expertise Beyond Intuitions.Drożdżowicz, Anna
Fast, Cheap, and Unethical? The Interplay of Morality and Methodology in Crowdsourced Survey Research.Haug, Matthew
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2014-11-19
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2014-11-19
Total downloads
1,017 ( #1,376 of 37,113 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
67 ( #5,034 of 37,113 )
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