The Existentialist View (on the Content of Experience) Defended

Dois Pontos 9 (2):63-88. (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This article presents a dual purpose: to carefully consider objections against the existentialist conception of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids such objections, specifically addressing the so-called "problem of particularity." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience should be understood as relativized, being incomplete content (rather than classical, complete propositions), modeled as a function of the sextuple of the object, agent, time, place, causal relation, and world to absolute values.

Author's Profile

Roberto Horácio De Pereira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro


Added to PP

18 (#88,054)

6 months
18 (#86,206)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?