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  1. The Existentialist View (on the Content of Experience) Defended.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2012 - Dois Pontos 9 (2):63-88..
    This article presents a dual purpose: to carefully consider objections against the existentialist conception of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids such objections, specifically addressing the so-called "problem of particularity." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience should be understood as relativized, being incomplete content (rather than classical, complete propositions), modeled as a function of the sextuple of the object, agent, time, place, causal relation, and world (...)
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  2. Perceptually Secured Knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Ori Beck & Farid Masrour (eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Essays. Routledge.
    Perceptually secured knowledge consists of beliefs that amount to knowledge just because they are based on suitable perceptual states. Relationism about the ground of perceptually secured knowledge is the view that if a perceptual state can make a belief based on it amount to knowledge, then it can do that because it constitutes an appropriate kind of relational state, e.g., a state of perceptual acquaintance. I explore the prospects of both maintaining that some beliefs amount to perceptually secured knowledge and (...)
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  3. How to Be a Hyper-Inferentialist.Ryan Simonelli - 2023 - Synthese 202 (163):1-24.
    An “inferentialist” semantic theory for some language L aims to account for the meanings of the sentences of L solely in terms of the inferential rules governing their use. A “hyper-inferentialist” theory admits into the semantics only “narrowly inferential” rules that normatively relate sentences of L to other sentences of L. A “strong inferentialist” theory also admits into the semantics “broadly inferential” rules that normatively relate perceptual states to sentences of L or sentences of L to intentional actions. It is (...)
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  4. The Unity of Perceptual Content.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Naïve Realists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious relation to an object and its property-instances. In contrast, Representationalists hold that it is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common versions of Representationalism take perceptual content to be either general (Generalism) or singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the (...)
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  5. 道德命題是否能作為感知內容呢︖.Lian Jr-Jiun & 連 祉鈞 - 2021 - 台灣哲學學會2021年學術研討會「台灣哲學 與在台灣的哲學研究」(Taiwanese Philosophical Association Annual Conference 2021).
    內容型道德感知主義者(Contentful Moral Perceptualists): Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), Werner (2016, 2018) 宣稱 道德命題(moral proposition)可以作為道德主體的感知內容(content of perception)。然而,在筆 者原創的詮釋下,晚近反駁道德感知主義的學者,如: Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), Chudnoff (2015),則隱約透露出以下想法:「與其宣稱道德命題是感知內容,不如宣稱道德 命題是認知信念內容(content of cognition)〕更為合理」。Faraci、Väyrynen、Chudnoff 都認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的道德感知」背後其實是受到宰制型的道德原則(dominative moral principles)所主導的,是一種從原則所推論產生的心理狀態; 也因此,上述反駁者認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的〔道德感知〕」缺乏貨真價實的感知經驗所具有的「非推論 的」(non-inferential)特徵,並不是真正的感知。本文將評估:「內容型的道德感知模型」是 否有辦法回應上述反駁者所提出的挑戰呢? 筆者將為肯定的答案提供初步的辯護。.
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  6. Can We Perceive the Past?E. J. Green - forthcoming - In Sara Aronowitz & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Space, Time, and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A prominent view holds that perception and memory are distinguished at least partly by their temporal orientation: Perception functions to represent the present, while memory functions to represent the past. Call this view perceptual presentism. This chapter critically examines perceptual presentism in light of contemporary perception science. I adduce evidence for three forms of perceptual sensitivity to the past: (i) shaping perception by past stimulus exposure, (ii) recruitment of mnemonic representations in perceptual processing, and (iii) perceptual representation of present objects (...)
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  7. ​Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science (2nd edition).Craig French & Phillips Ian - 2023 - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 363-383.
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  8. Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception.David de Bruijn - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):540-569.
    In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, (...)
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  9. Multimodal structure of painful experiences.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2023 - In Sensory Individuals: Unimodal and Multimodal Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    It is common to characterize pain with touch-related terms, like ‘cutting’, ‘pressing’, ‘sharp’, and ‘pulsing’, or temperature-related terms, like ‘hot’ or ‘burning’. This suggests that many pains are phenomenally multimodal because they are experienced as having some tactile-like or thermal-like character. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the structure of phenomenally multimodal pain experiences. It is argued that the usual accounts of multimodal structure proposed in investigations regarding exteroceptive experiences cannot be plausibly applied to multimodal experiences of pain. (...)
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  10. Could Dehumanization Be Perceptual?Somogy Varga - 2021 - In Kronfeldner, M.E. (2020) Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization.
    A large part of the contemporary literature on dehumanization is committed to three ideas: (a) dehumanization involves some degree of denial of humanness, (b) such denial is to be comprehended in mental terms, and (c) whatever exact mechanisms underlie the denial of humanness, they belong in the realm of post-perceptual processing. This chapter examines (c) and argues that the awareness of minds might belong to perceptual processing. This paves the way for the possibility that dehumanization might, at least in part, (...)
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  11. Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation.Andrew Dennis Bassford - 2020 - Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 21 (2):199-221.
    The purpose of this essay is exegesis. I explicate Nicolas Malebranche's (1674, 1678, 1688, 1714) concept of intelligible extension. I begin by detailing how the concept matured throughout Malebranche's work, and the new functions it took on within his metaphysical system. I then examine Gustav Bergmann's “axiomatic” interpretation, as well as the criticism of it offered by Daise Radner. I argue that Radner's criticism of the interpretation is only partly successful; some of her objections can be met; others cannot. I (...)
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  12. Mystice videre. Il gioco degli specchi tra neurobiologia e psicologia analitica.Ferruccio Vigna - 2010 - In Jung e le immagini. Torino:
    Mystice videre: un modo particolare di vedere, sperimentato, lungo la storia dell’umanità, da coloro che hanno vissuto un’esperienza straordinaria di incontro con il sacro (termine che qui utilizzo nella sua accezione più ampia, di “ciò che è separato da” tutto ciò che è ordinario). Alludo ai mistici, ovviamente. Qualcuno, clinicamente parlando, potrebbe considerarli, con qualche ragione, individui patologici, ma sotto il profilo religioso si tratta di persone che hanno avuto la grazia di un incontro con il divino attraverso visioni profonde, (...)
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  13. A role for representations in inflexible behavior.Todd Ganson - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (4):1-18.
    Representationalists have routinely expressed skepticism about the idea that inflexible responses to stimuli are to be explained in representational terms. Representations are supposed to be more than just causal mediators in the chain of events stretching from stimulus to response, and it is difficult to see how the sensory states driving reflexes are doing more than playing the role of causal intermediaries. One popular strategy for distinguishing representations from mere causal mediators is to require that representations are decoupled from specific (...)
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  14. Klaus Hentschel, Mapping the Spectrum: Techniques of Visual Representation in Research and Teaching. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2002. Pp. XIII+562. Isbn 0-19-850953-7. £75.00. [REVIEW]Sean F. Johnston - 2003 - British Journal for the History of Science 36 (1):87-127.
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  15. The Soul and Its Parts: Varieties of Inexistence.Barry Smith - 1992 - Brentano-Studien 4:35–51.
    From the point of view of Brentano’s philosophy, contemporary philosophy of mind presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts, unity and dependence. We here describe Brentano’s own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere, and show how it opens up new possibilities for mereological investigation. One feature of Brentano’s view is that the objects of experience are themselves parts of mind, so that there is (...)
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Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  1. Non-Conceptual Content and Metaphysical Implications: Kant and His Contemporary Misconceptions.Mahyar Moradi - manuscript
    Almost any mainstream reading about the nature of Kant's 'content of cognition' in both non-conceptualist and conceptualist camps agree that 'singular representations' (sensible intuitions) are, at least in some weak sense, objectdependent because they supervene on a manifold of sensations that are given through the disposition of our sensibility and parallel thus the real and physical components of the world (cf. McDowell 1996, Allison 1983, Ginsborg 2008, Allais 2009). The relevant class of sensible intuitions should refer, as they argue, only (...)
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  2. Visual Hybrids and Nonconceptual Aesthetic Perception.Michalle Gal - 2023 - Poetics Today 44 (:4 ( December 2023)):545-570.
    This essay characterizes the perception of the visual hybrid as nonconceptual, introducing the terminology of nonconceptual content theory to aesthetics. The visual hybrid possesses a radical but nonetheless exemplary aesthetic composition and is well established in culture, art, and even design. The essay supplies a philosophical analysis of the results of cross-cultural experiments, showing that while categorization or conceptual hierarchization kicks in when the visual hybrids are juxtaposed with linguistic descriptions, no conceptual scheme takes effect when participants are presented with (...)
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  3. Relativizing the Opposition between Content and State Nonconceptualism.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2):17–30.
    Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by different readings of what I want to call here Bermúdez’s conditions on content-attribution (2007). In one read- ing, what is required is a neo-Fregean content to solve problems of cognitive significance at the nonconceptual level (Toribio, 2008; Duhau, 2011). In the other reading, what is required is a neo-Russellian or possible-world content to account for how conspecifics join attention and cooperate, contemplating the same things from different perspectives in the same perceptual field. (...)
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  4. Perception, force, and content.Dominic Gregory - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    [Open Access.] Perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology: we seem to encounter real situations in the course of visual experiences, for instance. The current paper articulates and defends the claim that the contents of at least some perceptual experiences are inherently presentational. On this view, perceptual contents are not always forceless in the way that, say, the propositional content that 2 + 2 = 4 is generally taken to be, as a content that may be asserted or denied or merely supposed; (...)
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  5. Fineness of grain and the hylomorphism of experience.Sascha Settegast - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-29.
    A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in recourse to the possibility of demonstrative concepts, his reply has engendered a plethora of further objections and is widely considered inadequate. I believe that McDowell’s critics underestimate the true force of his reply because they tend to read unrecognized empiricist (...)
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  6. Limits of Intention and the Representational Mind.Michael Schmitz - 2013 - In Michael Schmitz, Gottfried Seebaß & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Acting Intentionally and its Limits: Individuals, Groups, Institutions: Interdisciplinary Approaches. DeGruyter. pp. 57-84.
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  7. The Elasticity of Perception: Undermining the (Non-)Conceptualism Debate.Endres Tobias - 2023 - Studia Kantiana 20 (2):153-165.
    In the current philosophy of perception, a debate about whether concepts permeate perceptual states in constituting the perceptual object or not has been widely discussed. Analytic philosophers and phenomenologists participate in this debate likewise, but it is also a debate in Kantian scholarship since the conceptualists’ thesis goes back to Kant’s Criticism and neo-Kantians already discussing such theory against any philosophy of immediate experience long before Wilfrid Sellars had started his attack against the so-called myth of the given. In light (...)
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  8. Perception needs modular stimulus-control.Anders Nes - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-30.
    Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...)
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  9. Phenomenal and Representational Character of Conscious Experience.Manoj Panda - 2017 - Sandhān : Journal of Centre for Studies in Civilizations (1 & 2):59-92.
    My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate the debate surrounding the distinction between phenomenal and representational character of conscious experience which is one of the important debates in contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness studies. The main objective of this paper is to seek an answer to the question- whether the content of conscious experience is phenomenal or intentional, or both? In the introduction, I will introduce the phenomenal and representational as two significant properties of consciousness. In the (...)
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  10. Conteúdo não conceitual e a idealidade transcendental do espaço e do tempo.Maria Carolina Mendonça de Resende - 2019 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
    O debate em torno do não conceitualismo kantiano ganhou notoriedade nas pesquisas em filosofia kantiana contemporânea desde a publicação do artigo de Robert Hanna, em 2005, Kant and nonconceptual content (“Kant e o conteúdo não conceitual”). Desde então, muito tem sido discutido sobre essa nova leitura da doutrina do idealismo transcendental que busca compatibilizá-la com os argumentos não conceitualistas da filosofia analítica. Procuramos mostrar de que forma a intuição pura do espaço, enquanto forma a priori da sensibilidade, introduz uma estrutura (...)
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  11. Imagination, Endogenous Attention, and Mental Agency.Tom Cochrane - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:1-21.
    This paper develops a mechanistic account of basic mental agency by identifying similarities between two of its major exemplars: endogenous attention and imagination. Five key similarities are identified: i) that both capacities are driven by currently prioritised goals that are either person-level or apt to become person-level. ii) that both deliver their outputs to the working memory iii) that both range across all and only conceptual contents; iv) that both proceed under the guidance of norms and/or habits; and v) that (...)
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  12. The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
    ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...)
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  13. Eliminativism and Reading One's Own Mind.T. Parent - manuscript
    Some contemporary philosophers suggest that we know just by introspection that folk psychological states exist. However, such an "armchair refutation" of eliminativism seems too easy. I first attack two strategems, inspired by Descartes, on how such a refutation might proceed. However, I concede that the Cartesian intuition that we have direct knowledge of representational states is very powerful. The rest of this paper then offers an error theory of how that intuition might really be mistaken. The idea is that introspection (...)
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  14. El contenido mental no-conceptual y la experiencia perceptual espacial.John Anderson P.-Duarte & Alejandro Murillo - 2011 - Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia 11 (23):7-28.
    Nuestro interés en el contenido mental no-conceptual es, principalmente, la articulación de una versión sustantiva (no-trivial) de esta clase de contenido en la experiencia perceptual. El debate acerca del contenido no-conceptual ha girado, en su mayor parte, alrededor de su existencia; y los argumentos que se han ofrecido en su favor abogan por una versión no sustantiva según la cual el contenido no-conceptual es aquel que no satisface ciertos requisitos conceptuales. Así, para desarrollar una versión sustantiva del contenido mental no-conceptual (...)
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  15. Taking non‐conceptualism back to Dharmakīrti.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):3-29.
    Some recent surveys of the modern philosophical debate over the existence of non-conceptual perceptual content have concluded that the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representations is largely terminological. To remedy this terminological impasse, Robert Hanna and Monima Chadha claim that non-conceptualists must defend an essentialist view of non-conceptual content, according to which perceptual states have representational content whose structure and psychological function are necessarily distinct from that of conceptual states. Hanna and Chadha additionally suggest that non-conceptualists should go “back to (...)
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  16. Corijn van Mazijk: Perception and reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, New York: Routledge, 2020, 192 pp., ISBN 978-0-367-44180-7, ISBN 978-1-003-01022-7. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 55 (1):119-123.
    Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s (...)
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  17. Pictures, Propositions, and Predicates.Dominic Gregory - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):155-170.
    Do representational pictures have propositional contents? The current paper argues that the characteristic contents of pictures are predicative rather than propositional: pictures characterise things as looking certain ways, and they thereby express properties of visual perspectives. The paper argues that the characteristic predicative contents of pictures are nonetheless able to feature in fully-fledged propositional contents once they are combined with contents of other suitable sorts. Various facts about communicative uses of pictures are then explained. The paper concludes by considering the (...)
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  18. Visual Metaphors and Cognition: Revisiting the Non-Conceptual.Michalle Gal - 2019 - In Kristof Nyiri & Andras Benedek (eds.), Perspective on Visual Learning, Vol. 1. The Victory of the Pictorial Aga. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 79-90.
    The paper analyzes the visual aspect of metaphors, offering a new theory of metaphor that characterizes its syntactic structure, material composition and visuality as its essence. It will accordingly present the metaphorical creating or transfiguring, as well as conceiving or understanding, of one thing as a different one, as a visual ability. It is a predication by means of producing non-conventional compositions – i.e., by compositional, or even aesthetic, means. This definition is aimed to apply to the various kinds of (...)
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  19. Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts.David Pitt - 2019 - In The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge: Cambridege University Press. pp. 87-101.
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  20. Smell's puzzling discrepancy: Gifted discrimination, yet pitiful identification.Benjamin D. Young - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (1):90-114.
    Mind &Language, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 90-114, February 2020.
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  21. There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa.Amit Chaturvedi - 2020 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 48 (2):255-314.
    This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic. The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking (...)
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  22. On Schellenberg’s The Unity of Perception.Ayoob Shahmoradi - manuscript
    My general worry is that Schellenberg’s arguments against naive realism, generalism, and Russellian representationalism do not seem to be successful. Thus her attempt at ruling these views out fails. Her main arguments rely on a shared premise whose plausibility, in the absence of an appropriate theory of particulars, is hard to assess (§2.1). Apart from that, these arguments rely on an under-specified notion of constitution; there seems to be no sense of the term that makes all the premises of her (...)
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  23. Kant, Husserl, and the Case for Non-conceptual Content.Jacob Rump - 2014 - In Faustino Fabbianelli & Sebastian Luft (eds.), Husserl and Classical German Philosophy. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
    In recent debates about the nature of non-conceptual content, the Kantian account of intuition in the first Critique has been seen as a sort of founding doctrine for both conceptualist and non-conceptualist positions. In this paper, I begin by examining recent representative versions of the Kantian conceptualist (John McDowell) and Kantian non-conceptualist (Robert Hanna) positions, and suggest that the way the debate is commonly construed by those on both sides misses a much broader and more important conception of non-conceptual content, (...)
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  24. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Perception and Self-Awareness.Christian Coseru - 2016 - In John Powers (ed.), The Buddhist World. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 526–537.
    Like many of their counterparts in the West, Buddhist philosophers realized a long time ago that our linguistic and conceptual practices are rooted in pre-predicative modes of apprehension that provide implicit access to whatever is immediately present to awareness. This paper examines Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s contributions to what has come to be known as “Buddhist epistemology” (sometimes referred in the specialist literature by the Sanskrit neologism pramāṇavāda, lit. “doctrine of epistemic warrants”), focusing on the phenomenological and epistemic role of perception (...)
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  25. Against a “mindless” account of perceptual expertise.Amit Chaturvedi - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):509-531.
    According to Hubert Dreyfus’s famous claim that expertise is fundamentally “mindless,” experts in any domain perform most effectively when their activity is automatic and unmediated by concepts or cognitive processes like attention and memory. While several scholars have recently challenged the plausibility of Dreyfus’s “mindless” account of expertise for explaining a wide range of expert activities, there has been little consideration of the one form of expertise which might be most amenable to Dreyfus’s account – namely, perceptual expertise. Indeed, Dreyfus’s (...)
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  26. Questions, content and the varieties of force.Michael Schmitz - manuscript
    In addition to the Frege point, Frege also argued for the force-content distinction from the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on and present assertions and other forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed (...)
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  27. Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1):93-119.
    Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from § 13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports (...)
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  28. Peirce and Sellars on Nonconceptual Content.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 125-143.
    Whereas Charles Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth has been much discussed, his theory of perception still offers a rich mine of insights. Peirce presented a ‘two-ply’ view of perception, which combines an entirely precognitive ‘percept’ with a ‘perceptual judgment’ that is located in the space of reasons. Having previously argued that Peirce outdoes Robert Brandom in achieving a hyper-inferentialism (“Making it Explicit and Clear”, APQ, 2008), I now wish to examine his philosophy in the light of inferentialism’s ‘original fount’ – (...)
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  29. What Frege asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):206-227.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  30. It's Not What it Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):210-239.
    I start out by reviewing the semantics of ‘seem’. As ‘seem’ is a subject-raising verb, ‘it seems’ can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ‘it seems’. I argue that ‘it seems’ is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ‘it seems’ does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that (...)
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  31. The shortest way: Kant’s rewriting of the transcendental deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):517-545.
    This work examines Kant’s remarkable decision to rewrite the core argument of the first Critique, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. I identify a two-part structure common to both versions: first establishing an essential role for the categories in unifying sensible intuitions; and then addressing a worry about how the connection between our faculties asserted in the first part is possible. I employ this structure to show how Kant rewrote the argument, focusing on Kant’s response to the concerns raised in (...)
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  32. Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
    After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.
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  33. Acquaintance, Conceptual Capacities, and Attention.Anders Nes - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-212.
    Russell’s theory of acquaintance construes perceptual awareness as at once constitutively independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and other conceptualists object that this is a ‘myth’: perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are already in play therein. Proponents of a relational view of experience, including John Campbell, meanwhile voice sympathy for Russell’s position on this point. This paper seeks to spell out, and defend, a claim that (...)
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  34. Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
    Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can base upon his experience in order (...)
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  35. The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):93-114.
    My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modeled as a propositional function, that is, (...)
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