Beyond Infanticide: How Psychological Accounts of Persons Can Justify Harming Infants

The New Bioethics 24 (2):106-121 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is commonly argued that a serious right to life is grounded only in actual, relatively advanced psychological capacities a being has acquired. The moral permissibility of abortion is frequently argued for on these grounds. Increasingly it is being argued that such accounts also entail the permissibility of infanticide, with several proponents of these theories accepting this consequence. We show, however, that these accounts imply the permissibility of even more unpalatable acts than infanticide performed on infants: organ harvesting, live experimentation, sexual interference, and discriminatory killing. The stronger intuitions against the permissibility of these ‘pre-personal acts’ allow us to re-establish a comprehensive and persuasive reductio against psychological accounts of persons.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RODBIH
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-09-25
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-02-21

Total views
174 ( #24,048 of 50,419 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #8,850 of 50,419 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.