Infanticide

Edited by Craig Paterson (Complutense University of Madrid)
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  1. added 2020-06-23
    The Meaning of Killing. [REVIEW]Nicolas Delon - 2018 - Books and Ideas 2018.
    Why do we consider killing and letting someone die to be two different things? Why do we believe that a doctor who refuses to treat a terminally ill patient is doing anything less than administering a lethal substance? After all, the consequences are the same, and perhaps the moral status of these acts should be judged accordingly. -/- Reviewed: Jonathan Glover, Questions de vie ou de mort (Causing Death and Saving Lives), translated into French and introduced by Benoît Basse, Genève, (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-10
    Defending the Distinction Between Pregnancy and Parenthood.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 1:1-3.
    In this paper, I respond to criticisms toward my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent-child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclude the raised (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-07
    Beyond Infanticide: How Psychological Accounts of Persons Can Justify Harming Infants.Daniel Rodger, Bruce P. Blackshaw & Calum Miller - 2018 - The New Bioethics 24 (2):106-121.
    It is commonly argued that a serious right to life is grounded only in actual, relatively advanced psychological capacities a being has acquired. The moral permissibility of abortion is frequently argued for on these grounds. Increasingly it is being argued that such accounts also entail the permissibility of infanticide, with several proponents of these theories accepting this consequence. We show, however, that these accounts imply the permissibility of even more unpalatable acts than infanticide performed on infants: organ harvesting, live experimentation, (...)
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  4. added 2020-02-21
    Fetuses, Newborns, and Parental Responsibility.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):188-193.
    I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the (...)
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  5. added 2018-11-01
    Abortion and Infanticide: A Triple Libertarian and Critical-Rationalist Defence.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    From libertarian and critical-rationalist assumptions, the moral permissibility of abortion and infanticide can be explained and defended in three principal ways; although non-libertarians and justificationists could also accept these arguments. These include new theories of personhood (in critical-rationalist terms) and harm-infliction (in libertarian terms). The three defences are independent of each other but collectively consistent. 1) The unborn and infant human is not a person in the relevant intellectual and moral sense, because incapable of critically appraising abstract conjectures. 2) There (...)
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  6. added 2018-07-24
    Od eutanazie k infanticidě.Tomas Hribek - 2015 - Časopis Zdravotnického Práva a Bioetiky 5 (1):5-27.
    [From Euthanasia to Infanticide] The paper revisits the recent controversy over Dr. Mitlőhner’s defense of infanticide, published in this journal. In section 1, I point out the weaknesses of Mitlőhner’s paper. In sections 2 and 3 I turn to the most sophisticated defense of infanticide on offer today, that of Peter Singer’s. Section 2 sums up Singer’s description of the medical practice as already having abandoned the traditional ethic of equal value of all human lives, which motivates ethical revisionism. However, (...)
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  7. added 2017-01-17
    Pro‐Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why They Are Not Convincing.Joona Räsänen - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (9):656-662.
    Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro-life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book ‘Ethics of Abortion’. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some similar arguments presented by other philosophers, are mistaken (...)
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  8. added 2016-11-28
    Valuing Life as Necessary for Moral Status: A Noteon Depression and Personhood.Joshua Stein - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):45-51.
    Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual's status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one's own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health problems (...)
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