Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination
Dissertation, University of Toronto (2015)
Abstract
This thesis explores the possibility of composite consciousness: phenomenally conscious states belonging to a composite being in virtue of the consciousness of, and relations among, its parts. We have no trouble accepting that a composite being has physical properties entirely in virtue of the physical properties of, and relations among, its parts. But a longstanding intuition holds that consciousness is different: my consciousness cannot be understood as a complex of interacting component consciousnesses belonging to parts of me. I ask why: what is it about consciousness that makes us think it so different from matter? And should we accept this apparent difference?
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2016-10-14
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Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #17,751 of 58,357 )
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