Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination

Dissertation, University of Toronto (2015)
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This thesis explores the possibility of composite consciousness: phenomenally conscious states belonging to a composite being in virtue of the consciousness of, and relations among, its parts. We have no trouble accepting that a composite being has physical properties entirely in virtue of the physical properties of, and relations among, its parts. But a long­standing intuition holds that consciousness is different: my consciousness cannot be understood as a complex of interacting component consciousnesses belonging to parts of me. I ask why: what is it about consciousness that makes us think it so different from matter? And should we accept this apparent difference?

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Luke Roelofs
New York University


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