Present Time

Foundations of Science 20 (2):135-145 (2015)
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The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Presentism.Crisp, Thomas M.

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Why ‘NOW’?Riggs, Peter J.

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